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UNDERSTANDING NONCOMPETITION
AGREEMENTS: THE 2014 NONCOMPETE
SURVEY PROJECT
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2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369
ABSTRACT
In recent years, scholars and policymakers have devoted
considerable attention to the potential consequences of employment
noncompetition agreements and to whether legislatures ought to
reform the laws that govern the enforcement of these controversial
contractual provisions. Unfortunately, much of this interest—and the
content of proposed reforms—derives from anecdotal tales of
burdensome noncompetes among low-wage workers and from
scholarship that is either limited to slivers of the population (across
all studies, less than 1%) or relies on strong assumptions about the
incidence of noncompetition agreements. Better understanding of the
use of noncompetes and effective noncompetition law reform
requires a more complete picture of the frequency and distribution of
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noncompetes at the individual employee level. Accordingly, in 2014,
we administered a nationwide survey of individuals in the labor
force to ask them about their employment status, history, and future
expectations—including their experience with and understanding of
noncompetition agreements. In this Article, we describe the methods
we used to carry out this survey and refine the data for analysis in
hopes of encouraging other researchers to use survey approaches to
fill other, similarly important gaps in our knowledge. To illustrate
the value of the survey project, we present a surprising empirical
finding from our data, one that raises questions about existing
scholarship and theories about why employers use noncompetes: We
find little evidence that the incidence of noncompetition agreements
in a state (after controlling for potentially confounding factors) has
any relationship to the level of enforcement of such agreements in
that state. In other words, an employee in California (where
noncompetes are prohibited) appears to be just as likely to labor
under a noncompete as an employee in Florida (where noncompetes
are much more likely to be enforced).
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INTRODUCTION
Restrictive covenants such as covenants not to compete (CNCs)
(“noncompetition agreements” or, simply, “noncompetes”),1
nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) (also called “confidentiality
agreements”),2 and nonsolicitation agreements (NSAs)3 are
undoubtedly a regular facet of employment relationships in the
United States. But just how common a feature of employment are
agreements like noncompetes, exactly? Which kinds of workers in
the U.S. labor force have agreed to these restrictions—and do they
bargain over them or even understand the terms to which they agree
to adhere? Which employers in which industries across the United
States use these agreements—and why do they use them? What
connections are there between the use of these agreements and
underlying state law? Is there a need for legal or policy reform—a
1. For our purposes, we define a noncompete as a contract between an
employer and an employee that limits the employee’s ability to engage in future
competitive activities—i.e., either working for a competitor or starting a competing
enterprise. In this Article, we focus on the employment restrictions that may affect
the post-employment mobility of an employee, not the class of noncompetes related
to the sale of the goodwill of a business. See, e.g., Rachel S. Arnow-Richman,
Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of
Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163,
1169 (2001); see also, e.g., Norman D. Bishara et al., An Empirical Analysis of
Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68
VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 n.8 (2015).
2. In the employment context, these agreements prohibit the disclosure of
information of the employer that the employee acquired as part of the employment
relationship. This information need not qualify as a trade secret, and the term of the
restriction is generally indefinite. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey
Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 155 (1998).
3. These agreements temporarily prohibit former employees from
recruiting former co-workers or pursuing business with the clients of their former
employers. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 7; see also David L. Johnson, The
Parameters of “Solicitation” in an Era of Non-Solicitation Covenants, 28 A.B.A. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 99 (2012) (critiquing nonsolicitation provisions).
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question many state legislators have begun pondering in recent
years—and if so, what changes are needed to achieve specific
outcomes, such as fairness for employees, innovation, training and
investment, and knowledge protection?
The answers to these empirical questions and many others are
critical to understanding the behavior of employers and employees,
the causes and consequences of noncompetition agreements, and
whether and how to reform the law of restrictive covenants in this
country. Yet even a rough answer to the seemingly foundational first
question—how common are noncompetition agreements in the
United States?—remains to date conspicuously absent.
In fact, we know surprisingly little about the frequency, scope,
and strength of noncompetition agreements in this country. We know
even less about how differences across jurisdictions in the law of
noncompetes and in enforcement behavior relate to the prevalence
and content of such agreements.4 Notwithstanding this dearth of
basic information, there has been a near explosion in the attention
being paid to noncompetes and their effects. Policymakers and
commentators have been engrossed. Researchers, for their part, have
published many provocative, but ultimately limited, exploratory
studies about the many roles that noncompetes play in employment
relationships and the economy.5 Much of this chorus has been fueled
by unsupported assumptions and by high-profile anecdotal evidence
of purportedly abusive practices involving noncompetes.6
Despite a long and storied history, these restrictive covenants
remain actively derided by the public, yet widely allowed by courts
4. See, e.g., Toby E. Stuart & Olav Sorenson, Liquidity Events and the
Geographic Distribution of Entrepreneurial Activity, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 175, 182
(2003) (“The prevalence of non-compete covenants in employment contracts
remains unknown, but available data suggest that they may be nearly ubiquitous in
employment contracts in high technology businesses.”).
5. See infra Part I.
6. Two recent high-profile examples involve the expansive use of
noncompetes by Jimmy John’s and Amazon. See Dave Jamieson, Jimmy John’s
Makes Low-Wage Workers Sign ‘Oppressive’ Noncompete Agreements,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2014, 4:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014
/10/13/jimmy-johns-noncompete_n_5978180.html [https://perma.cc/9PK7-2U4U]
(discussing noncompete usage by the fast-food sandwich franchise for its low-wage
sandwich makers and delivery drivers); see also Spencer Woodman, Amazon Makes
Even Temporary Warehouse Workers Sign 18-Month Non-Competes, VERGE (Mar.
26, 2015, 11:44 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/3/26/8280309/amazon-warehousejobs-exclusive-noncompete-contracts [https://perma.cc/4HS9-2JUW] (describing the
use by Amazon of noncompete agreements for its seasonal, low-skilled, and lowwage warehouse workers).
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in most states.7 At least some employers embrace noncompetes as a
necessary tool for knowledge and human capital investment
protection;8 many employees, by contrast, fear noncompetes as an
unfair restriction on their mobility;9 and certain subject-matter
experts cite noncompetes as a harmful constraint on markets and
technological innovation.10
We find this disconnect between the keen interest and active
debate around noncompetes and the lack of credible evidence about
noncompetes both curious and frustrating. Our intuition and
experience tell us that noncompetes and other restrictive covenants
are likely to affect employee and employer behavior, and may have
important knock-on effects on innovation levels, new venture
creation, and employee mobility. We also know that many scholars
and policymakers have long debated the fairness aspects of
restrictive covenants—particularly their supposed tendency to limit
employee freedom.11 While much noncompete research has been
descriptive and focused on the common law, cross-disciplinary
empirical work has made important headway of late.12 Nevertheless,
it is clear that—for the most part—this literature comprises
unconnected, piecemeal, and often abstract articles. These articles do
not have a basic, foundational understanding of noncompete
contracting behavior “on the ground” or even a full sense of state-bystate noncompete enforcement realities.
7. See generally Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete,
73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 629-70 (1960) (providing a historical view of the evolution
of common law noncompete enforcement).
8. See generally Mark J. Garmaise, Ties That Truly Bind: Noncompetition
Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
376 (2009) (studying the effect of noncompetes on employers’ capital expenditures
per employee).
9. See generally Matt Marx et al., Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan NonCompete Experiment, 55 MGMT. SCI. 875 (2009) (investigating Michigan’s 1985
reversal of its noncompete enforcement policy and analyzing the effect of the
change in law on employee mobility).
10. See generally Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, Noncompete
Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth, 57 MGMT. SCI. 425
(2011) (examining how noncompete enforcement may limit entrepreneurship).
11. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 1, at 1166 (“A central concern in the
law and scholarship regarding noncompete agreements has long been the extent to
which enforcement should be constrained to protect the mobility and economic
freedom of workers.”).
12. See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the ResourceBased Theory to Determine Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979
(2012); On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of
Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833 (2013).
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Recent media reports have cataloged a number of egregioussounding noncompete practices.13 These disclosures appear to have
influenced public perception, generating speculative conclusions that
noncompete use is on the rise.14 News that employers have used
noncompete restrictions with hair stylists, yoga instructors, lawn
sprayers, teenage camp counselors,15 low-wage fast-food workers,16
and temporary warehouse workers,17 to cite just a few examples,
strikes many as both surprising and inexplicable. These sorts of
revelations draw ire and condemnation both from the public and
from politicians.18 More than a few have decided that the availability
of enforceable noncompetition agreements necessarily results in
unfairness and that we need a decisive solution—perhaps even a
ban.19 This groundswell of attention has culminated in a just-released
U.S. Treasury report summarizing the state of noncompete research
and crystallizing the issues of the controversy,20 as well as a justreleased White House report on noncompetes that trumpets the need
13. See, e.g., Associated Press, Scrutiny on Worker Non-Compete Deals,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Jan. 3, 2015), http://www.timesfreepress.com/
news/national/georgia/story/2015/jan/03/scrutiny-worker-non-compete-deals/280886/
[https://perma.cc/D36A-92TW] (documenting the use of noncompetes for low-wage
workers and observing that noncompetes might trap such employees in their current
jobs and allow employers to pay them less as a result).
14. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop
Up in Array of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2014, at B1 (concluding that there has
been an increase in the use of noncompetes based on a review of practitioners’
litigation databases which indicate more disputes).
15. See, e.g., id. (mentioning surprising uses of noncompetes alongside the
more well-known examples of restricting executives and technology workers).
16. See, e.g., Jamieson, supra note 6.
17. See, e.g., Woodman, supra note 6.
18. See, e.g., Evan Smith, State House Committee Approves Stanford Bill to
Ban Non-Compete Agreements, HERALDNET (Feb. 20, 2015, 3:02 PM), http://www.
heraldnet.com/article/20150220/BLOG5207/150229856 [https://perma.cc/TP6C-4U78]
(quoting the sponsor of the bill to ban noncompetes as stating that “overused noncompete agreements reinforce the wealthy, stifle startups and inhibit the best and
brightest future entrepreneurs”).
19. See, e.g., Jordan Weissmann, Ban Noncompete Agreements. Do It Now.,
SLATE (June 4, 2015, 4:39 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/06/04/
forcing_low_wage_workers_to_sign_noncompete_agreements_is_vicious_and_stupid.
html [https://perma.cc/JBR6-RBAJ].
20. Office of Economic Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Noncompete Contracts: Economic Effects and Policy Implications 3 (Mar. 2016)
[hereinafter Treasury Report], https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economicpolicy/Documents/UST%20Non-competes%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GV52YHV] (examining the benefits and costs of noncompetes and concluding that
“many of these benefits come at the expense of workers and the broader economy”).
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for additional academic research and careful policy discussion to
inform this debate and potentially mend the fractured state of
noncompete law across the country.21
However, many observers ignore pivotal questions about these
stories. To begin with, it is not clear that the employers in these
examples regularly attempt to—or legally could succeed in—
enforcing noncompetes against their former low-wage employees.22
We also do not know if these agreements in fact limit employees’
mobility, keeping them in their positions for longer than they would
otherwise have stayed, all else equal, and perhaps precluding them
from advancing in their careers. Even if mobility is lower as a result
of such contracts, we have not yet determined whether affected
employees are compensated for that sacrifice, whether through
raises, greater job security, or internal promotion. And finally if these
employees were unaware of their noncompetes and if enforcement
activity is in fact minimal,23 any impact of these contracts on
employee behavior or welfare may have been negligible.
21. The White House, Non-Compete Agreements: Analysis of the Usage,
Potential Issues, and State Responses (May 2016) [hereinafter White House Report],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7GZM-JAHT].
In the coming months, as part of the Administration’s efforts to support
competition in consumer product and labor markets, the White House,
Treasury, and the Department of Labor will convene a group of experts in
labor law, economics, government and business to facilitate discussion on
non-compete agreements and their consequences. The goal will be to
identify key areas where implementation and enforcement of noncompetes may present issues, to examine promising practices in states, and
put forward a set of best practices and call to action for state reform. By
facilitating a dialogue between academic experts and those with practical
expertise, we aim to identify policies that could be used to promote a fair
and dynamic labor market, while remaining cognizant of real world
challenges to reform. We also aim to prompt further research exploring the
use and the effects of non-compete agreements.
Id. at 3.
22. In fact, in some cases, employers explicitly decline to enforce these
agreements. See, e.g., Brunner v. Liautaud, No. 14-c-5509, 2015 WL 1598106, at
*1, *10 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2015). In Brunner, one current and one former employee
sued Jimmy John’s seeking, in part, a judgment voiding their noncompetes. While
the court dismissed the claims for lack of standing, it found that even if there had
been standing, it would not have been able to overlook the fact that the employer
never enforced or intended to enforce breaches of its noncompetes. Id. at *10.
23. See id. (asserting that even if a worker had alleged a sufficient injury for
standing, he or she “still cannot overcome the Franchisee Defendants and Jimmy
John’s intention [included in two affidavits] not to enforce any breach of the
Confidentiality and Non-Competition Agreements”).
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More generally, we do not know if these agreements—
especially for low-wage employees, but even for more educated,
skilled, and highly paid workers—are truly commonplace. Are these
anecdotes outliers or instead the proverbial “tip of the iceberg,” and
thus emblematic of an important policy domain in need of sustained
collective concentration? Additionally, even if noncompetes are
relatively common and harmful for low-wage workers, just how
pervasive are they generally, and what purposes do they serve with
regard to other types of employees? Do these agreements provide
economic or social benefits for employers or for employees
themselves, including increased investment in training? These are
not merely hypothetical concerns. Many U.S. jurisdictions are in the
midst of designing, proposing, and debating policy alternatives,24 all
of which are tethered to untested assumptions about the frequency,
scope, consequences, and purposes of noncompetes.
For all of these reasons, in 2014, we designed and implemented
a comprehensive survey of U.S. labor force participants—what we
call the 2014 Noncompete Survey Project. Our principal purpose in
this Article is simply to describe our data-collection undertaking in
detail, in the hopes of convincing other legal and policy scholars to
engage in similar efforts.
We begin in Part I with our primary motivation for the survey:
furnishing basic data on the frequency of noncompetes, their
substance, and what employees know about them. We review the
various pockets of research related to noncompetes and highlight key
data problems, developing policy reactions, and unsupported
assumptions that run through the commentary and scholarship—all
of which contributed to our decision to undertake such an extensive
survey project. In Part II, we describe our survey and methodology at
length. We discuss its content and design, its online implementation,
how we cleaned and refined its data, and our treatment of sample
24. See, e.g., Editorial, Noncompete Agreements: Follow Calif. Lead and
Scrap Them, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/
editorials/2014/04/15/noncompete-agreements-follow-calif-lead-and-scrap-them/
tuZk0HoOgfK5mrt9dSgl7K/story.html (urging swift legislative support for former
Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick’s proposed reforms to the law governing
noncompetes, which continue to stall in the state); see also, e.g., Tom Erickson,
Mass. Should Get Rid of Noncompete Agreements, BOS. GLOBE (May 14, 2014),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/05/14/mass-should-get-rid-non-competeagreements/pYEjtd4BXqTUclnUoWkZlO/story.html (advocating for a legislative ban
against noncompetes in Massachusetts in an opinion piece written by the CEO of a
Massachusetts-based technology firm that voluntarily abandoned noncompetition
agreements).
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selection concerns. In Part III, we demonstrate the data’s value by
exploring the relationship between noncompete frequency and
enforceability. Curiously, we find little credible evidence of any
relationship between the strength of enforcement at the state level
and employer noncompete use by state, raising questions about the
practical significance of standard reform efforts.
We briefly conclude this Article by outlining future research
opportunities arising out of the 2014 Noncompete Survey Project.
We believe that our survey data will provide an important means of
assessing the impact noncompete agreements have on employer and,
particularly, employee choices. In the long run, we hope that our
survey and the research it engenders will lead to a much better
understanding not only of employment contracting activity, but of
how best to improve the employment relationship through targeted,
careful, and evidence-based reform.
I. PROBLEMS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND SOLUTIONS
Noncompetes have been a source of much debate in recent
years.25 Scholarly research has helped to shape and fuel this debate,26
and new research efforts are responding to the growing dispute over
restrictive covenants.27 However, these efforts focus on the perceived
widespread use and abuse of noncompetes, especially among lowwage and less empowered employees,28 as well as the hypothesized
25. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky Covenants-Not-to-Compete as the
Legal Infrastructure for Innovation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 251, 253-56 (2015)
(highlighting the flurry of academic articles and the scholarly debate surrounding
noncompete reform in the last two decades).
26. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to
Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 578-80 (1999) (proposing that the innovation and
rapid labor mobility in California and Silicon Valley in particular are an outgrowth
of California’s longstanding statute banning noncompetes); Marx et al., supra
note 9, at 875-76 (building on and partially testing Gilson’s thesis about the role of
noncompetes by exploiting a temporary change in Michigan’s noncompete
enforcement policy to study the movement of engineers with patents).
27. See, e.g., Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competition in
Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the Race
to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381, 1418-24 (2008); see also
Gomulkiewicz, supra note 25, at 258; Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Enforcement of
Noncompetition Agreements: Protecting Public Interests Through an
Entrepreneurial Approach, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J. 483, 484 (2015).
28. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 1, at 1166-67 (emphasizing the
ubiquity of noncompetes across a broad range of sectors and proposing an
alternative theory of enforcement).
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broader effects on innovation,29 mobility,30 work effort, training and
investment,31 economic growth,32 and the like.33 Yet, obtaining a
sense of the actual prevalence and use of noncompete agreements in
the United States has been glossed over at best—and at worst
ignored by existing scholarship.
The absence of comprehensive data about noncompete activity
is entirely predictable: Noncompetes are, at least in theory, the fruit
of private contracting between individual employers and employees,
negotiated on a case-by-case basis.34 These agreements are private
documents concerning confidential business interests dispersed
across many millions of distinct parties. As a result, they are almost
impossible to track down and catalog in a systematic and
representative way. Moreover, many of the parties have no incentive
to make their contracting practices and existing employment
relationships transparent, even to researchers. Indeed, they often
have strategic reasons not to make their practices known. It was with
the goal of offering at least a partial remedy for this information
deficit that we conceived, designed, and implemented the 2014
Noncompete Survey that we describe in detail in Part II.
29. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 26, at 578 (discussing the hampering effect
of noncompetes on technological innovation).
30. Id. at 579 (discussing a similar hampering-like effect of noncompetes
on employee mobility).
31. See, e.g., Evan Starr, Consider This: Firm-Sponsored Training and the
Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete 16-17 (Nov. 5, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript), https://sites.google.com/site/starrevan/research [https://perma.cc/7VR7KAS7] (investigating the impact of noncompetes on firm investments in employee
training).
32. See, e.g., Samila & Sorenson, supra note 10, at 435-37 (discussing
findings that noncompetes hinder agglomeration economies); Stuart & Sorenson,
supra note 4, at 182-84 (suggesting enforceable noncompetes may indirectly hamper
new venture creation); see also ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE
SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 49-75 (2013) (viewing
noncompetes as a hindrance to innovation and economic growth).
33. Other consequences include the effect on contracting behavior and the
structure of contracts in general. See, e.g., Kurt Lavetti et al., Buying Loyalty:
Theory and Evidence from Physicians 20-29 (Feb. 20, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript), http://www.kurtlavetti.com/UIPNC_vf.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S2V5H4T] (studying the role that noncompetes play in the contracting structure and
contracting behavior of physicians).
34. Eric A. Posner & George G. Triantis, Covenants Not to Compete from
an Incomplete Contracts Perspective 7-10 (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 137, 2001), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/137.EAP_.
covenants.pdf [https://perma.cc/G45C-39FB] (developing a model involving a series
of potential opportunities for negotiation and renegotiation of noncompetes among
employees, their employers, and potential employers).
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A. Existing Research
Early American scholarly treatments of noncompetes and other
restrictive covenants were based primarily on common law sources.35
From their first use in England as early as the fifteenth century,
covenants not to compete have been viewed with suspicion because
of their inherently anticompetitive nature.36 Nevertheless, by the midtwentieth century, there was near-consensus among U.S. courts that
noncompetes should be enforceable within reasonable limits.37 The
classic balancing test to determine whether the scope of a covenant
not to compete puts it within reasonable bounds—sometimes
referred to as the “rule of reason” test—has evolved little over time.38
This three-part inquiry requires courts to examine the legitimate
interests of the employer while also considering the impact that
enforcement is likely to have on both the employee’s interests and,
notably, the public welfare.39
35. Well-known early overviews of the use of employment-related
noncompetes in the United States include Charles E. Carpenter, Validity of
Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 244, 244-71 (1928), and Winslow
Drummond, Note, Severability of Covenants in Partial Restraint of Trade: A New
Rule, 5 DUKE B.J. 115, 115-22 (1956).
36. For a description of the early history of noncompetes and their
anticompetitive character, see Blake, supra note 7, at 627 (tracking the development
and use of covenants not to compete in the wake of the breakdown of the guild
system in Britain). For a more recent decision invoking anticompetitive concerns,
see, for example, Thiesing v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 932, 947 (E.D.
Wis. 2010) (“Restrictive covenants limit one’s right to work and to earn a livelihood
and are therefore ‘looked upon with disfavor, cautiously considered, and carefully
scrutinized.’” (citations omitted)).
37. See, e.g., Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 69193 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1952) (citing numerous examples of early law review articles
and case law disquisitions on the “reasonableness” standard for noncompetes).
38. See T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment
Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 17 (2005) (“Notwithstanding . . .
changing attitudes and conditions in the labor market, the English rule of reason
remains the doctrinal scheme in a majority of states in this country.”); Maureen B.
Callahan, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 703, 709 (1985) (noting that the English reasonableness rule stemming from
Mitchel v. Reynolds “has survived virtually unchanged to the present day”).
39. See, e.g., Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393, 39697 (Ill. 2011). In this case, the court explains the reasonableness test as follows:
A restrictive covenant, assuming it is ancillary to a valid employment
relationship, is reasonable only if the covenant: (1) is no greater than is
required for the protection of a legitimate business interest of the
employer-promisee; (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employeepromisor, and (3) is not injurious to the public. . . . Further, the extent of
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As the U.S. labor market has shifted away from manufacturing
and toward what some refer to as the knowledge economy, restrictive
covenants have come under redoubled scrutiny. Many commentators
claim that noncompetes are unfair to employees,40 perhaps because
the changing nature of employment has made such provisions more
common.41 The most spirited criticism targets employers’ tendencies
to maximize the restrictive scope of any noncompete and to exploit
their superior bargaining power in take-it-or-leave-it negotiations.42
For instance, employee fairness advocates are extremely suspicious
of noncompete clauses, contending that while such agreements may
theoretically protect employer interests, it is only at the clear and
demonstrable expense of employee freedom.43
In any event, the ideal balance between employee freedom of
choice and employer business interests is a complex question, and in
practice, courts still struggle to find what they hope is equipoise.44
the employer’s legitimate business interest may be limited by type of
activity, geographical area, and time.
Id. (citing comments to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 187 cmt. (b),
188(1) cmts. (a)-(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)).
40. See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract:
Implications for the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48
UCLA L. REV. 519, 577-92 (2001) (discussing employer abuse of superior
bargaining position in the noncompete context).
41. While this assertion is subject to debate, it seems clear that the changing
workplace—and the changing nature of knowledge itself—has affected how parties
and courts view noncompetes. See, e.g., Anenson, supra note 38, at 17-18 (“It is
clear that businesses will continue to utilize contracts restraining competition in an
effort to police faltering employee loyalty and to retain their competitive edge. The
judicial trend also seems to be toward favoring employers in the protection of
company-developed human capital and legitimate proprietary interests.”); Griffin
Toronjo Pivateau, Preserving Human Capital: Using the Noncompete Agreement to
Achieve Competitive Advantage, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 319, 320-21
(discussing the greater need for noncompetition agreements in the face of drastic
changes in information technology and the economic environment).
42. Arnow-Richman, supra note 1, at 1214-15 (2001) (reviewing the
substantive and procedural concerns intrinsic to drafting, negotiating, and enforcing
employment noncompetes).
43. Id.; see also Stone, supra note 40, at 581-82.
44. See, e.g., Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of
Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy
Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 112 (2008) (finding that courts moved to be more
“protective of the employee’s interest in mobility” and that a trend of “heightened
scrutiny of employee noncompete agreements reflects some of the fundamental
changes taking place in the economy and in the workplace”); see also Stone, supra
note 40, at 580 (discussing the inconsistencies with what is considered “reasonable,”
which “varies from state to state and from case to case”).
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Scholars, for their part, never cease complicating the picture by
proposing refinements of the factors courts should consider and the
processes courts should use in light of business realities.45
Early empirical research on noncompetes began in the 1990s
with several articles assessing the litigation and enforcement of these
contracts.46 The last 15 years have seen many more empirical studies,
almost all of which followed in the wake of Ronald Gilson’s wellknown article contrasting the use of noncompetes in the high-tech
economies of Massachusetts’s Route 128 area and California’s
Silicon Valley.47 Gilson argued that the differences in noncompete
enforcement regimes across the two states played a significant role in
the more pronounced rise of Silicon Valley.48 His explanation—
which relied on the perception that high-tech workers in Silicon
Valley were more mobile—was theoretical but intuitively attractive
as a testable claim.49 Accordingly, variation in enforcement intensity
45. See generally Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a
Knowledge Economy: Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal
Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287
(2006) (advocating for learning from the law and economics, labor mobility, and
employee rights approaches—including balancing benefits and costs of enforcement
with protecting specific classes of employees—which would maximize positive
knowledge spillovers associated with employee mobility). This tension is more
visible when considering the broader business consequences of noncompetes and
how they impact both business strategy and employee interests. See generally
Bishara & Orozco, supra note 12 (discussing disputes between employers and
employees over knowledge ownership). Ethical considerations further tweak this
challenge. See generally Norman D. Bishara & Michelle Westermann-Behaylo, The
Law and Ethics of Restrictions on an Employee’s Post-Employment Mobility, 49
AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2012).
46. See, e.g., Helen LaVan, A Logit Model to Predict the Enforceability of
Noncompete Agreements, 12 EMP. RESP. & RTS. J. 219, 226-34 (2000) (analyzing a
random sample of litigated cases to discern whether certain factors can predict court
decisions); Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in
Employment Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483, 493-94 (1990) (“The study presented in
this [a]rticle relies on the assumption that judicial decisions in noncompetition
clause cases are a function of the differing combinations of facts . . . a statistical
analysis of the relationships between the facts and outcomes of each case should
enable lawyers to better understand and predict judicial enforcement of
noncompetition clause cases.”).
47. Gilson, supra note 26, at 578-80.
48. Id. at 578.
49. See id. This is evidenced by the fact that others have used Gilson’s work
as a foundation for further empirical investigation. For example, one 2006 study
addressed Gilson’s thesis by comparing mobility rates in high-tech industries in
Silicon Valley to mobility rates in non-high-tech industries elsewhere in California.
This study found that employee mobility elsewhere in the state was consistent with
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across the states started drawing the attention of legal academics,50
and empirically minded researchers began using more rigorous
methods to evaluate the role of noncompetes.
These scholars have examined a broad array of outcomes:
employee mobility,51 human capital investment and training,52 the
formation and growth of agglomeration economies,53 innovation,54
and new venture creation,55 including spinouts.56 These studies bring
to bear a range of empirical strategies both to identify the various
effects of noncompete enforceability and to measure noncompete
enforceability itself. Yet each of these studies also relies on a set of
shared underlying assumptions about the nature and importance of
state enforcement measures and about the absolute and relative
prevalence of noncompete usage across states, types of employees
and positions, and categories of industry.57
rates of mobility in other states. Bruce Fallick et al., Job-Hopping in Silicon Valley:
Some Evidence Concerning the Microfoundations of a High-Technology Cluster, 88
REV. ECON. & STAT. 472, 475-81 (2006).
50. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 27, at 1418-24 (discussing the effect of
noncompetes in the context of intrastate choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
clauses); see also Gillian Lester & Elizabeth Ryan, Choice of Law and Employee
Restrictive Covenants: An American Perspective, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 389
(2010) (focusing on the choice-of-law issues surrounding noncompetes that cause
courts to take different approaches).
51. See, e.g., Marx et al., supra note 9, at 884 (finding that the passage of
the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act in the 1980s, which permits reasonable
noncompetes, negatively impacted the mobility of patent holders in Michigan).
52. See Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not
to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1981). Although not empirical, this important
piece of legal scholarship was the first to apply economist Gary Becker’s general
and specific human capital theory to noncompete agreements.
53. See Fallick et al., supra note 49, at 481 (“Our finding of a California
effect on mobility lends support to Gilson’s hypothesis that the unenforceability of
noncompete agreements under California state law enhances mobility and
agglomeration economies in IT clusters.”).
54. See Garmaise, supra note 8 (finding lower research and development
expenditures by publically traded firms in noncompete-enforcing states); see also
Raffaele Conti, Do Non-Competition Agreements Lead Firms to Pursue Risky R&D
Projects?, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1230, 1232 (2014).
55. See Stuart & Sorenson, supra note 4, at 183 (“Enforceable non-compete
and non-solicitation covenants also may indirectly hamper new venture creation by
depressing the life chances of early-stage companies.”).
56. See, e.g., Evan P. Starr et al., Screening Spinouts? How Noncompete
Enforceability Affects the Creation, Growth, and Survival of New Firms (U.S.
Census Bureau Ctr. Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 14-27, 2014) (analyzing the
impact of noncompetes on the process of spinout formation).
57. See infra Part III (discussing the complexities of the measurement of
state enforcement intensity).
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This rise in the empirical analysis of noncompetes and their
possible consequences, the underlying assumptions of this body of
work, and the remaining gaps in our understanding have already
been carefully assessed by noncompete scholars.58 Nevertheless, a
brief reprise of the substance of the critiques of this literature is
important to understand this Article’s premise: We simply have no
reliable way of knowing when, how often, or even why noncompetes
and other restrictive covenants are actually used.
To date, we have identified 24 significant empirical studies that
consider the use of noncompetes in the United States.59 Broadly
speaking, only six of the studies contain data on whether an
employee has signed a noncompete.60 Four of those examine top U.S.
public company executives (as these contracts are accessible),61 one
focuses on physicians,62 and one concerns engineers.63 Three other
studies catalog noncompete usage across employers,64 and two use
58. See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, The Incomplete
Noncompete Picture, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 497, 514-30 (2016) (tallying
methodological concerns in the empirical noncompete literature at length).
59. Id. at 500-01.
60. Id. at 514-17.
61. See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical
Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 254-57 (2006) (examining employment contracts with
CEOs of U.S. public companies); see also Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 9-10
(finding that top executives’ employment contracts often contain noncompete
agreements alongside other restrictive covenants); Garmaise, supra note 8
(analyzing the impact of noncompetition clauses on the mobility of U.S. public
company executives).
62. See Lavetti et al., supra note 33 (examining how noncompetes can
alleviate inefficiencies in skilled services firms, particularly focusing on physicians).
63. See Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: Non-Compete Agreements and
the Mobility of Technical Professionals, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 695, 697 (2011)
(studying the effect of noncompetes on technical professionals based on personal
interviews with a relatively modest sample of engineers).
64. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory
Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV.
ECON. STUD. 281, 289 (2003) (studying the incidence of founder noncompete
clauses across a range of startup companies); see also William P. Galle, Jr. &
Clifford M. Koen, Reducing Post-Termination Disputes: A National Survey of
Contract Clauses Used in Employment Contracts, 9 J. INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTS. 227,
239 (2000) (summarizing the usage of noncompete clauses in employment
contracts); Soc’y for Hum. Resource Mgmt., Survey on Non-Compete Agreements
(Apr. 23, 2007), available at https://www.shrm.org/research/surveyfindings/
documents/does_20your_20organization_20require_20employees_20to_20sign_20non
-compete_20agreements_.ppt (providing data on the use of noncompetes for less than
400 human resource professionals).
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experimental methods to examine noncompetes.65 The remaining
studies involve the effects of noncompete enforceability, but notably,
none generates or utilizes information on who is actually bound by
noncompete agreements.66 In our review below, we do not address
the specific findings of these articles. Rather, we highlight concerns
about how much we can truly learn from these studies—regardless of
the specific outcome of interest—given their limitations and the
centrality of their perhaps invalid assumptions.
The empirical articles that address individual professions are
useful in that they study people who have signed noncompete
agreements, including some high-impact management employees.67
This body of research gives insight into the noncompete contracting
behavior of employers and particular employee groups. However, the
studies are discrete, providing information on merely a sliver of the
U.S. labor force. Even if these employees are representative of their
professions, they are drawn from a small sample of jurisdictions and
ultimately only account for a very small proportion of the U.S.
workforce—approximately 0.87%.68 Generalizing about the effects
of noncompetes from these discrete studies is therefore highly
unreliable, particularly when the studies are cited as justifications for
reforms that will affect all employees.69
65. See Bishara & Starr, supra note 58, at 519-22 (discussing a behavioral
study intended to monitor the motivation and performance of participants under
conditions mimicking a noncompete constraint); see also Amir & Lobel, supra note
12, at 847 (describing the same behavioral study).
66. See Bishara & Starr, supra note 58, at 533-35 (raising concerns that
these studies do not account for the rate at which employees actually sign
noncompetition agreements).
67. See, e.g., Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 3 (studying many executive
employment contracts and finding that 80% of the CEOs in the sample with explicit
contracts had signed a covenant not to compete).
68. See Bishara & Starr, supra note 58, at 500-01.
69. For example, consider one study of the impact of noncompete policy on
the mobility of Michigan “knowledge workers” who file patents. Matt Marx et al.,
Regional Disadvantage? Employee Non-Compete Agreements and Brain Drain, 44
RES. POL’Y 394, 394-404 (2015). This study cleverly examines the movement of
patent-filing inventors, but does not necessarily tell us anything about the mobility
of the vast majority of other types of employees—for instance, innovators for whom
patent filing is not particularly relevant to performance or output. Regardless, these
interesting but limited results—derived exclusively from a Michigan legal change in
the mid-1980s—can be overemphasized and taken out of context. Media reports, for
example, may make sweeping statements about all types of employees when facing
a study of this sort. See Bloomberg, Laws on Noncompete Agreements Hurt
Michigan, New Study Says, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Mar. 18, 2015, 5:12 AM),
http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20150318/NEWS01/150319843/laws-on-

Understanding Noncompetition Agreements

385

The three articles that discuss the use of noncompetes among
employers are limited by both the lack of discussion of within-firm
variation in the use of noncompetes and the lack of analysis linking
the use of noncompetes to firm-level outcomes.70
The experimental studies are helpful contributions to our
understanding because the use of noncompete agreements is likely to
be nonrandom; with observational data, the nonrepresentative set of
individuals who are asked to sign noncompetes can make it difficult
to identify the true effects of such agreements.71 Aside from potential
criticisms of the methodologies of these studies and their use of
small samples of participants in laboratory situations,72 universalizing
the findings of these articles to all types of employees across a wide
range of demographics such as age, gender, experience, industry,
education, annual earnings, and geographic region is questionable, to
say the least.73 Furthermore, these laboratory studies randomly assign
noncompete status—essentially forcing participants to sign—and
hence do not allow any type of negotiation or variation in incentives
or information to be built into the contracting environment.
The batch of scholarship that relies on variation in noncompete
enforceability across or within jurisdictions (without data on who is
bound) constitutes the bulk of the noncompete literature and suffers
from numerous shortcomings related to both measuring the law and
noncompete-agreements-hurt-michigan-new-study-says [https://perma.cc/5YMHNCQX] (“It’s a homegrown brain drain, the researchers say, stripping some regions
of local talent while enriching others.”).
70. See Bishara & Starr, supra note 58, at 519.
71. See, e.g., Amir & Lobel, supra note 12, at 847-52.
72. See Bishara & Starr, supra note 58, at 519-22.
73. For a discussion of how situational effects of small scale economics
laboratory research raise external validity and generalizability issues, see Francesco
Guala, Methodological Issues in Experimental Design and Interpretation, in The
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS 280, 298-99 (Harold Kincaid &
Don Ross eds., 2009) (“The ‘external validity’ of experiments is one of the most
sensitive and controversial issues in experimental economics,” and “[t]he common
perception for a long time has been that the very possibility of the experimental
approach in economics was at stake in this controversy, and, perhaps, for this reason
both experimenters and their critics have been seeking universal a priori answers to
the question of generalizability.”); see also Linda J. Luecken & Rika Tanaka, Health
Psychology, in RESEARCH METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY 245, 256 (Irving B. Weiner ed.,
2013) (discussing highly controlled studies and controlling for variation and causal
inferences in psychological studies); id. (“The careful selection of participants and
controlled laboratory settings allows researchers to minimize other potential sources
of variation in physiological reactivity. Nevertheless, the question remains as to
whether findings from controlled laboratory studies generalize to responses in ‘real
life’ and are representative of the larger population.”).
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the lack of information on who signs noncompetes.74 Unfortunately,
whether a state allows for some minimal enforcement or instead
prohibits all enforcement ends up having little import, and only very
few states completely ban noncompetes.75 Most states provide some
level of moderate enforcement—with a few outliers on each extreme
of either aggressive enforcement or a complete enforcement ban.76
When researchers opt to rely on an outmoded and inaccurate binary
legal enforcement variable, they are, in effect, incorporating into
their empirical analysis demonstrably false assumptions about state
legal environments.77 Other studies rely on the summary findings
drawn from practitioner treatises, but these sources may not be
updated regularly and may lack a uniform approach across states.78
Embedded in these assumptions is a reliance on the false notion that
noncompete law does not evolve.79 Legal scholars do sometimes
recognize that such reliance is misplaced,80 but researchers in other
disciplines may treat “noncompete law” as unchanging.81
74. See generally the detailed discussion in Bishara & Starr, supra note 58,
at 522-33, regarding the limitations of studies of noncompete enforceability. See
also infra Part III’s examination of enforcement intensity and its measurement in
existing scholarship.
75. In contrast, for a comprehensive view of the relative strength of
noncompete enforcement policies in all 51 U.S. jurisdictions, see generally Norman
D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement of Covenants
Not to Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 751, 772-80 (2011).
76. Id. at 780 (“[T]he majority of states have followed a moderate course
that seems to comport with traditional noncompete aesthetics of moderation through
narrowly tailored and balanced—and reasonable—protectable interests that foster
business investments in workers’ human capital.”); see also infra Figure 3
(demonstrating, in one coding approach, the smooth trend in enforcement intensity
across states).
77. See Bishara, supra note 75, at 762 (critiquing the use of a “‘yes’ or
‘no’” enforcement variable in some empirical studies, which treat the enforcement
or non-enforcement of noncompetes as absolute); see also Jonathan Barnett & Ted
M. Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in Innovation Markets (SSRN Working
Paper), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2758854 (Apr. 4, 2016)
(criticizing the underlying assumptions of the use of an enforceability variable in
several studies).
78. For a critique of empirical investigations relying solely on the
Malsberger practitioner treatise for a simplified noncompete enforcement variable,
see Bishara & Starr, supra note 58, at 522-24.
79. See, e.g., Stuart & Sorenson, supra note 4, at 190 (using the Malsberger
treatise to categorize states as simply either noncompete enforcing or non-enforcing
jurisdictions).
80. See, e.g., Grant R. Garber, Noncompete Clauses: Employee Mobility,
Innovation Ecosystems, and Multinational R&D Offshoring, 28 BERKELEY TECH.
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Leaving measurement issues aside, without data on who signs
noncompetes, studies that rely on noncompete enforceability alone
must necessarily be viewed with caution, especially when the authors
claim that the effects of enforceability are the same as the effects of
noncompete agreements themselves.82 Differences between enforcing
and non-enforcing states may be driven by some unobserved and
therefore omitted state-level factor, and without being able to show
that the observed differences are due to those who sign noncompetes,
such studies can do very little to allay serious identification concerns.
Noncompete enforceability and the actual use of noncompetes are
two distinct concepts, and finding that labor market outcomes differ
in states that have greater noncompete enforceability may imply little
about the effects of noncompetes themselves. Noncompetes may
have chilling effects on employee mobility even in non-enforcing
states if individuals believe their noncompete may be enforceable.
This perspective underlines the fact that when enforceability is the
key variable, awareness of the enforceability level itself is equally
crucial to understand. Most studies assume perfect knowledge of
noncompete laws by both firms and employees, but this assumption
is highly doubtful, especially for employees.83
Some commentators also place their trust in distillations of
reported litigation as surrogate measures for both the prevalence of
noncompetes and growth trends in their use.84 Unfortunately, legal
L.J. 1079, 1095-101 (2013) (explaining the history of noncompete law and the
variation in enforcement levels); Garrison & Wendt, supra note 44, at 111 (tracking
the evolution of noncompete law and state struggles to find workable policies).
81. See, e.g., Stuart & Sorenson, supra note 4, at 182.
82. See, e.g., Garmaise, supra note 8, at 1 (“We study the effects of
noncompetition agreements by analyzing time-series and cross-sectional variation in
the enforceability of these contracts across US states.”)
83. See, e.g., Pauline Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study
of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
105, 106 (1997) (“While many commentators have questioned the assumption that
workers are legally informed, the debate has been characterized by a remarkable
dearth of empirical information. This study, by directly testing workers’ knowledge
of the relevant legal rules, offers empirical evidence contradicting the assumption of
full information commonly made by defenders of the at-will rule. Far from
understanding ‘the footing on which they have contracted,’ workers appear to
systematically overestimate the protections afforded by law, believing that they have
far greater rights against unjust or arbitrary discharges than they in fact have under
an at-will contract.”).
84. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 14; see also Bob Sullivan, Are
Noncompete Clauses Getting out of Control?, CNBC (June 25, 2014, 9:35 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2014/06/25/are-noncompete-clauses-getting-out-of-control.html
[https://perma.cc/M9XP-NMMV].
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database searches only reveal reported cases—in other words, the
relative handful of legal disputes that are not settled before trial, are
submitted for judicial review, and are legally interesting enough to
be reported within a given jurisdiction’s judicial opinion reporting
system.85 Many issues arise from the use of these case aggregations.86
If nothing else, they inaccurately suggest the existence of relatively
little noncompete activity—the very distorted tip of the iceberg.
Moreover, a change in a state’s legal framework may alter employee
and employer behavior in unanticipated or offsetting ways that are
unobservable using a reported case yardstick. For example, a strong
noncompete enforcement policy might lead to more noncompete
agreements but might also produce a chilling effect (or so-called in
terrorem effect) in which fewer employees behave in ways likely to
generate litigation, which might ultimately lead to fewer reported
opinions.87 Methodologies that rely on reported cases might conclude
that noncompetes have become less important in these circumstances
when exactly the opposite conclusion would be true.
Collectively, the empirical studies to date are surely important
contributions to our understanding of how restrictive covenants are
enforced and how they impact certain, specific groups of labor force
participants. But in the end, by omitting information on who signs
noncompetes and by studying only a tiny proportion of the U.S. labor
force, they tell us little about how noncompetes themselves operate,
and collectively they fail to provide us with any findings that can be
generalized to the U.S. labor force as a whole. Obvious gaps in our
understanding include worker perceptions, the dynamics of ex ante
and ex post negotiation, and the prevalence and content (across and
within jurisdictions and industries) of noncompetes.88
85. For an example of research that relies on case database searches to
measure the prevalence of noncompete agreements, see Whitmore, supra note 46, at
526. Other legal scholars have used reported noncompete cases as informative data
points in explaining the relevance of noncompetition agreements in the U.S. in the
last few decades. See Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and
the Limits of Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 54-59 (2001); see also
Stone, supra note 40, at 577.
86. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 52-54 (2002); see also George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1984).
87. See e.g., Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 38-40 (finding that executive
contract negotiations often yield reasonable and enforceable noncompete agreements
that comply with underlying noncompete enforcement principles and state law).
88. See Bishara & Starr, supra note 58, at 530-36 (highlighting the fact that
these studies’ assumptions about enforceability as an option may have some impact
on the ex ante and ex post behavior of the parties).
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Nevertheless, scholars and policymakers alike continue to draw
conclusions about the implications of this body of research, often
using it—or some part of it—as a basis for developing and making
policy recommendations. For example, one well-known stream of
scholarship takes the tidy position that noncompetes and other
competitive restrictions are fundamentally harmful to a wide range of
interests, including innovation and employee mobility.89 Orly Lobel
argues that the innovation-stunting influence of noncompetes is so
great that states ought not to allow them at all.90 Viva Moffat
maintains that noncompete agreements are the “wrong tool” for
protecting knowledge assets and advocates for a uniform ban across
the United States.91 Others have performed targeted noncompete data
collection—in specific regions and industries—to more deeply
explore the arguments for and against noncompetes. For instance,
Robert Gomulkiewicz has demonstrated that fears over noncompetes
limiting high-tech worker mobility may be exaggerated.92 Although
other scholars have emphasized the frequency of noncompetes in
high-tech industries, the effects of noncompetes they claim are
perhaps more pronounced than the actual incidence of enforcement
by these employers would suggest.93
B. Burgeoning Policy Responses
Coincident with the expanding and diverse body of academic
research on noncompetes, policymakers have recently shown intense
interest in the associated legal reform questions.94 State legislatures
have begun to consider taking real action in response to what many
89. See generally LOBEL, supra note 32 (critiquing all use of restrictive
covenants, including noncompetes).
90. Id.
91. Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L.
REV. 939, 984 (2012) (“Rather than adding another proposal for incremental change,
this Article advocates for wholesale reform: Employee non-competes should be
unenforceable, and the states should adopt a rule to that effect.”); Viva R. Moffat,
The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with Noncompetition Agreements, 52
WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 874 (2010) (proposing a uniform approach—
prohibition—across all states).
92. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 25, at 280-86 (providing an extensive list of
reasons why high-tech employers choose not to enforce noncompetes—including
the financial costs of litigation, trade secret disclosure risk, and unwanted
publicity—even when enforcement is available under state law).
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Noncompete Agreements: Follow Calif. Lead and Scrap
Them, supra note 24; Greenhouse, supra note 14.
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perceive to be a pervasive “noncompete problem.”95 These legislative
responses are primarily linked to concerns over employee equity.
They are secondarily rooted in broad assumptions about one’s home
state’s competitive advantage over other jurisdictions in terms of
innovation and business development.96
Existing—and longstanding—noncompete limitations include
exemptions for certain categories of employees. Although these
professional carve-outs may be the product of targeted lobbying from
self-interested industries and professions, some of them are arguably
grounded in sound public policy arguments. By supposedly allowing
unfettered access to important types of professionals in these fields,
these exemptions may help protect public health and welfare. For
example, a few states like Idaho and Nevada prohibit noncompetes in
the employment contracts of foreign doctors working under a J-1
visa.97 This limitation is ostensibly intended to attract and protect
these doctors from abusive employers and to preserve access to
health care in underserved urban and rural communities.98 Likewise,
other noncompete enforcement exceptions are justified as essential to
preserving access to key professionals, such as physicians,99 other
95. Noncompete law remains, to date, largely stable. The longstanding
“reasonableness” evaluation of noncompetes by the courts continues to be the
standard in a large majority of U.S. jurisdictions; most states therefore do allow
some form of noncompete enforcement. See Bishara, supra note 75, at 754.
Nonetheless, the level of enforcement, the details of how such contracts are
enforced, and under what circumstances they should be enforced have long varied
significantly across jurisdictions. At one extreme, California has a very strong
aversion to the enforcement of noncompetes and has frequently reiterated strong
policy grounds in favor of employee mobility. See Edwards v. Arthur Andersen
LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 288, 290 (Cal. 2008) (restating California’s strong public policy
in favor of employee mobility and against enforcing noncompetes, which create
restrictions on that mobility). At the other extreme, states such as Florida tend to
prioritize employers’ business interests over employees’ mobility, offering strong
enforcement. See Bishara, supra note 75, at 778.
96. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 25, at 255 (“No state governor or
legislature wants to be accused of losing its innovative edge by failing to update its
non-compete laws. Several states are considering legislation to ban non-competes
and others are being urged to do so.”).
97. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6109 (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 439A.175 (2015).
98. See Marshall Allen, Indentured Doctors, L.V. SUN (Sept. 30, 2007, 6:00
A.M.), http://lasvegassun.com/news/2007/sep/30/indentured-doctors-how-it-happens
-j-1-doctors-must/ [https://perma.cc/4NT6-XMHU] (“Many states forbid
noncompete clauses for J-1 doctors because they would defeat the long-term
purpose of keeping J-1 doctors in underserved areas after they leave the program.”).
99. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(3) (2015).
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health and welfare workers,100 and attorneys.101 In a different vein—
and in an apparent effort to reduce the perceived negative impact of
noncompete enforcement on lower-wage employees with limited
bargaining power—Colorado has long been more permissive of
noncompetes for executive and management personnel.102 Other
exceptions to the enforcement of noncompetition agreements are,
arguably, less high-minded. They seem to be more a function of
specific industries or discrete professional groups seeking to defend
their post-termination employment options. For example, broadcast
professionals in Oregon may avoid noncompete enforcement under
certain circumstances,103 and this same group of employees in New
York104 and Massachusetts105 has been more broadly exempted from
noncompete enforcement. In another example, used car salesmen in
Louisiana have a specific exemption.106
Against this background, many states have been revisiting their
general willingness to enforce restrictive covenants.107 For example,
Massachusetts’s legislature and its last two governors have engaged
in a vigorous debate over proposed statutory changes to curtail
noncompete enforcement.108 This debate is nourished by speculation
100. Over the years, Massachusetts has exempted several types of health and
social welfare workers from noncompete enforcement, including physicians, nurses,
and social workers. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, §§ 12X, 74D, 135C (2016).
101. Noncompetes are already prohibited for lawyers by state bar ethics rules
and the common law to ensure that clients have access to the representation of their
choice. See, e.g., MICH. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (stating that a lawyer cannot
participate in an employment agreement restricting the right of the lawyer to practice
after leaving a firm).
102. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2)(d) (providing multiple
exceptions to a general prohibition on noncompetes, but only blanket exceptions for
executive and management employees and their professional staff).
103. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295 (West 2016) (stating that those
employed as “on-air talent” may void noncompetes); see also Melissa Rassas,
Explaining the Outlier: Oregon’s New Non-Compete Agreement Law & the
Broadcasting Industry, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 447, 448 (2009) (providing an overview
of the broadcasting industry noncompete statute in Oregon and discussing other
similar statutes).
104. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 202-k (McKinney 2016) (establishing the Broadcast
Employees Freedom to Work Act that is designed for the “[p]rotection of persons
employed in the broadcast industry”).
105. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 186 (2016) (exempting those holding
certain broadcasting positions from noncompete enforceability).
106. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (2015).
107. See, e.g., Noncompete Agreements: Follow Calif. Lead and Scrap
Them, supra note 24.
108. See Callum Borchers & Michael B. Farrell, Patrick Looks to Eliminate
Tech Noncompete Agreements, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.
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in media outlets—and by the academic studies of discrete groups of
employees we discuss above109—that eliminating noncompetes will
aid the state in attracting and retaining high-tech employees that
otherwise may gravitate toward Silicon Valley.110 Legislators in other
states, including Michigan and Illinois,111 have also proposed reforms
to existing restrictive covenant laws or have suggested prohibition
altogether. Another legislative approach has been to single out
noncompete enforcement with respect to specific innovative
industries perceived to be especially harmed by restraints on
employee mobility. In 2015, Hawaii enacted a statute essentially
eliminating noncompetes for high-tech workers.112 Other reforms
have been related to process. Oregon’s 2007 amendments provided
for a two-week notice requirement under which an employer must
com/business/2014/04/09/gov-patrick-pushes-ban-noncompete-agreements-employmentcontracts/kgOq3rkbtQkhYooVIicfOO/story.html (concluding that the proposed ban on
noncompete clauses was probably the “most controversial element of legislation”
proposed by former Governor Patrick in 2014); see also Rebecca Strong, PostDeval, the Bid to Ban Noncompetes in Mass. Makes a Comeback, BOSTINNO (Apr.
10, 2015, 11:43 AM), http://bostinno.streetwise.co/ 2015/04/10/boston-tech-vc-billfiled-to-ban-noncompetes-in-mass/ [https://perma.cc/ LV39-TRYY] (describing how
many previous efforts in Massachusetts to reform noncompete enforcement policy
have failed, but also noting how state representatives and state senators continue to
propose new legislation on the issue).
109. See supra Section I.A.
110. See Editorial, Instagram Deal Highlights Need to Bolster Tech Startups
in Mass., BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/
editorials/2012/04/12/instagram-deal-highlights-need-bolster-tech-startups-mass/
1kx3VvY5DGdLLX0GBl6sQJ/story.html (arguing for Massachusetts reform of
business laws and noncompete enforcement policy on the basis of “how much the
Boston area can benefit from fostering a healthy climate for future Facebooks and
Instagrams” and because “Mark Zuckerberg has argued that he moved his fledgling
company from Massachusetts to California because of the greater availability of
investment funding”).
111. See H.B. 4198, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015) (preserving
noncompetes related to the sale of goodwill of a business but making “any term in
an agreement an employer obtains from an employee, contract laborer, or other
individual that prohibits or limits the individual from engaging in employment”
void); see also H.B. 0016, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011); Peter A.
Steinmeyer, Drafting Enforceable Noncompetition Agreements in Illinois, CORP.
LAW. (Ill. State Bar Assoc.), May 2010, at 3 (describing the proposed Illinois law,
first introduced in 2010, which would ban noncompetes except for a “key
employee” or “key independent contractor”).
112. See, e.g., H.B. 1090, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2015); Claire Zillman,
Hawaii Ban on Noncompetes Leaves Out a Huge Chunk of Workers, FORTUNE (July
8, 2015, 5:07 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/07/08/hawaii-noncompete-ban [https://
perma.cc/RUU6-7XSA] (discussing the limitations of the Hawaii statute, which
predominantly focuses on the technology industry).
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request the restriction in advance of employment.113 More recently,
Oregon has reduced its per se limit on the period of enforceability
from two years to 18 months.114
In just the last year or two, federal policymakers have also
taken up the mantle of reforming noncompete enforcement policy.115
This includes, apparently for the first time, congressional action on
the matter.116 The news of seemingly oppressive noncompetes for
low-wage employees117—and recent litigation concerning the impact
of noncompetes on those employees118—has brought noncompete
issues to the attention of several U.S. Senators,119 notwithstanding the
fact that noncompete enforcement policy has always been considered
a state-law domain.120 This congressional limelight led to the
proposed 2015 Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees
(MOVE) Act, which sought to ban covenants not to compete for
workers earning less than $15 an hour.121 In justifying the bill,
sponsors contend that employers are forcing low-wage employees
“to sign non-compete agreements in an effort to dissuade those
workers from seeking better, higher-paying jobs within the same
industry” and that “[t]his unfair use of non-compete agreements has
a chilling effect on the upward economic mobility of low-wage
workers and stifles their ability to climb out of poverty.” 122 They
113. See Rassas, supra note 103, at 460 (discussing the final provisions of
the much-debated 2007 Oregon noncompete reform legislation).
114. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295 (West 2016). Other states enforce
noncompetes as long as they have per se “reasonable” limits under the law. See H.B.
352 §1(b)(4) (Ala. 2015) (considering employee noncompetes with durations of two
years or less presumptively reasonable and placing the burden of showing undue
hardship on the opposing party).
115. See generally Treasury Report, supra note 20; White House Report,
supra note 21.
116. See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Chris Murphy, Murphy, Franken
Introduce Bill to Ban Non-Compete Agreements for Low-Wage Workers (June 3,
2015),
http://www.murphy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/murphy-frankenintroduce-bill-to-ban-non-compete-agreements-for-low-wage-workers [https://perma.cc/
KQ9F-Y8YY].
117. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 14.
118. See, e.g., Brunner v. Liautaud, No. 14-c-5509, 2015 WL 1598106, at
*1-2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2015) (exemplifying a high-profile case in which a current
and a former employee sued employer Jimmy John’s seeking a declaration of the
unenforceability of their noncompete agreements).
119. See Press Release, Sen. Chris Murphy, supra note 116.
120. See Bishara, supra note 75, at 768-71.
121. See Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees (MOVE) Act,
S. 1504, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015).
122. Press Release, Sen. Chris Murphy, supra note 116.
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conclude that the solution to this perceived problem is “outlawing
the use of non-compete agreements for low-wage workers . . . [to]
allow those currently stuck in their low-wage jobs to secure a better
life for themselves and their families.”123
C. The Need for Employee-Level Data
Better research requires better data. Moreover, as observers of
the state-level debate over what, if anything, to do with noncompete
enforcement policy, we have often been bemused and occasionally
concerned—but also not surprised—to learn that policymakers and
commentators sometimes unduly emphasize particular elements of
existing research while ignoring many of the literature’s critical
uncertainties and caveats. Accordingly, we began to work together to
diagnose the gaps in the data and in our understanding and to
identify the suspect (and especially the implicit) assumptions in the
existing scholarship and in the most commonly deployed policy
arguments. These discussions proved to be early precursors to what
became a data-gathering project.
While each of the justifications for reforming noncompete
enforcement policy or banning noncompetes may be correct to some
degree,124 available data and analysis do not conclusively support
many of the broad-sweeping claims reform advocates have put
forth.125 The possibility that noncompete policy innovation may
actually result in negative consequences for employees—for
example, for job access, for knowledge sharing and training, and for
job tenure—is too often ignored. Furthermore, the assumption that
noncompetes are pervasive among vulnerable, low-wage employees
is based only on anecdotes, despite their being embedded in highprofile media reports.126 In truth, we simply know very little about
the use and dispersion of these contracts.
In addition, many policymakers neglect to engage seriously
with the complicated and potentially offsetting effects of these
restrictions. For example, even if noncompetes reduce mobility, if
they also significantly enhance wage growth, or simply increase job
satisfaction, coming to a verdict on noncompetes requires making a
123. Id.
124. See supra Sections I.A & I.B.
125. For instance, these policy reforms—especially the strong calls for
outright bans—may implicitly assume that noncompetes have a negative impact on
employee wages, job tenure, and career mobility both internally and externally.
126. See, e.g., Jamieson, supra note 6; Woodman, supra note 6.
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value tradeoff.127 Some recommendations depend on empirically
contestable (and untested) assumptions about how the law works and
how employees are likely to behave when bound by noncompetes.128
If an employee does not know whether he is a party to a noncompete
(or believes that the noncompete is unenforceable), any restriction
may be orthogonal to his thinking and behavior. In the end, reliance
on partial data creates unsupported, overly focused, and perhaps even
inaccurate arguments (no matter how well-known and cited), which
may result in unwise policy choices.
In late 2013 and early 2014, we crafted a survey of employees
with the aim of erecting a firmer footing for the noncompete policy
debate. An extensive survey about labor market behaviors, beliefs,
and outcomes generally as well as about noncompete contracting
experiences was necessary to understand how, when, and why (and
to what effect) employers and employees enter into these contracts.
The result was the 2014 Noncompete Survey, completed by more
than 11,500 labor force participants from a range of industries and
with varied demographics, experiences, earnings, and expectations.129
By examining employee beliefs and behaviors regarding noncompete
negotiation, employee comprehension of the legal and practical
implications of noncompetes, and a wide range of worker mobility
topics, we set the stage for evaluating many assumptions embedded
in noncompete scholarship and policy discourse.
127. See Samila & Sorenson, supra note 10, at 425 (“But noncompete
covenants also have a positive side, helping companies to protect the human capital,
intellectual property, and relationships they have developed. Companies can
increase their productivity by training workers, developing new products and
processes, and building relationships with customers and suppliers.”).
128. Many assume that there is a noncompete chilling effect on employee
behavior and that unscrupulous employers use that effect to their advantage—even
when the underlying state law makes any overbroad contract unenforceable. See
Press Release, Sen. Chris Murphy, supra note 116. Some even suggest that having
employees sign noncompetition agreements creates a “market for lemons” that
ultimately backfires for employers, keeping the least talented and least valuable
workers at a firm instead of retaining the best. See Jeff Haden, The Case Against
Non-Compete Agreements, INC. (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.inc.com/jeff-haden/noncompetes-could-cause-the-death-of-your-business.html (discussing the various possible
negative effects of noncompetes with Orly Lobel). Both of these arguments rest on
the belief that employees know and appreciate the restrictions they sign. If an
employee does not recall whether he or she signed a noncompete, or does not
understand its meaning (legitimate or not), then a chilling effect or a lemons
problem is impossible.
129. See infra Section II.A for our discussion of the survey questions and
infra Part II generally for a discussion of the coverage and diversity of our sample of
respondents.
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II. SURVEY, DATA, AND METHODS
To collect the 2014 Noncompete Survey data, we employed a
large-scale, online survey instrument designed primarily to gather
information on employee experiences with and understanding of
noncompetition agreements. In this Part of the Article, we offer a
fairly detailed picture of the mechanics and methodology behind our
survey data in hopes of convincing other scholars—particularly legal
scholars—that the collection of individual-level data on very specific
legal topics is not only possible, but a rewarding, constructive, and
economical investment.130 We also hope that our thorough discussion
will provide a roadmap of key issues to consider, methods with
which to experiment, and pitfalls to avoid for others weighing the
relative merits of pursuing a similar survey project.
We begin below by outlining the substance of the survey. We
characterize the sample population and the primary categories of
questions, which include inquiries about the respondent’s future
expectations and plans, and the respondent’s beliefs about employer
behavior and the noncompete status of other employees. 131 We
describe our online implementation of the survey. We also include a
discussion of the costs and benefits of an online surveying approach
(as opposed to using a paper or direct-dial telephone survey), and
why we firmly believe that, at least in this particular context, online
130. As evidence of the efficacy of modern online surveys, note that, for the
2016 Presidential Election, Reuters has partnered with an online survey company,
Ipsos, to conduct all of its pre-election polling. Reuters explains that:
Online surveys allow us to collect far more data and to be more flexible
and fast-moving than phone research, and online is also where the future
of polling lies.
This methodology may be different from the ‘traditional’
(telephone) approach used by others, but it is highly accurate: It was the
most accurate national poll of U.S. residents published immediately before
the November 2012 general election.
Our data is primarily drawn from online surveys using sampling
methods developed in consultation with several outside experts. These
involve recruiting respondents from the entire population of U.S.-based
Internet users in addition to hundreds of thousands of individuals prescreened by Ipsos. The responses are then weighted based on demographic
information.
Because of the volume of demographic information collected, the
poll provides unprecedented insight into the myriad of communities that
constitute the United States in the 21st century.
About the Polling Explorer, REUTERS, http://polling.reuters.com/ (follow “About”
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
131. See infra Section II.A.
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surveying is sensible.132 We summarize our approach to cleaning the
data and the limitations of both the survey and the data that we
identified during the cleaning process.133 We sketch our methods for
refining the “clean” data to render it more reliable.134 We address
some of the sample selection concerns relevant to our surveying
strategy.135 We argue that, for many purposes, these sample selection
concerns are (relatively) unimportant, suggest ways to assess the
robustness of inferences to particular selection issues, and describe
our reweighting techniques. Finally, we quickly relate our multiple
imputation efforts,136 and we wrap up by reporting a second round of
reweighting that we employed to generate our final dataset.137
A. Survey Design
We conducted the survey over approximately three months—
between April 22, 2014, and July 25, 2014. We sampled labor force
participants aged 18 to 75,138 who reported being in the private forprofit or nonprofit sector or being an employee of a public healthcare
system.139 We therefore excluded from the sample all self-employed
individuals, government employees, and those who indicated that
they were both unemployed and not looking for work.
The substance of the 2014 Noncompete Survey concentrated on
three specific sets of issues related to noncompetition agreements:
the respondent’s personal lifetime experiences with noncompetes,
the respondent’s beliefs regarding the laws governing noncompetes
and his or her perceptions of enforcement costs and probabilities of
132. See infra Section II.B.
133. See infra Section II.C.
134. See infra Section II.D.
135. See infra Section II.E.
136. See infra Section II.F.
137. See infra Section II.G.
138. We chose to survey individuals who were past the standard retirement
age (ages 65–75) because these individuals are more likely to be asked to sign
noncompetes as they tend to have more senior positions, all else equal. See David B.
Ritter & Sonya Rosenberg, The Ins and Outs of Non-Competes, 39 COMPENSATION
& BENEFITS REV. 40, 42 (2007).
139. As a point of comparison, the Current Population Survey (CPS)
similarly seeks labor force participation data and studies the non-institutionalized
U.S. population. Our sampling frame is similar, except that we exclude individuals
who work in industries for which a noncompete appears unnecessary, such as
government. The American Life Panel, run by RAND, is a similar online panel that
collects data from individuals who responded to previous Census, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, or Health and Retirement Surveys and wish to respond to more surveys.
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enforcement, and the respondent’s experience with and beliefs about
noncompetes in the individual’s current job.140
It is worth highlighting at this point three general types of
questions we employed in the survey that ultimately proved useful in
evaluating our respondents’ answers for logical consistency and that
should continue to bear quite useful and informative fruit in future
analyses. First, we asked respondents to make predictions about their
future, to describe “what it would take” for them to make certain
changes (for example, to leave their current employer), and to record
their expectations about the years ahead with respect to training,
compensation, and so on. Second, we asked respondents to report
their beliefs about how their employer would respond in hypothetical
scenarios and their beliefs about the noncompete status, experiences,
and likely behavior of third parties, such as co-workers, employees
with similar positions at other employers, and other employees in the
same industry. We exploit these “projection” and “belief” questions
to better understand employees’ perceptions of noncompete law and
the use and effects of noncompetes beyond our respondents’ personal
experiences. Third, we asked respondents to answer retrospective
questions about how noncompetes may have affected their prior
employment relationships, including their current position. Such
questions allow us to examine overall experiences with noncompetes
and, in particular, how the existing distribution of occupations has
been influenced by prior generations of these contracts.
In the rest of this Section, we briefly elaborate on our question
categories primarily to introduce the survey and to provide relevant
background for our methodological discussions below.141
140. A hardcopy version of the survey instrument is available from the
authors. We set down here the substance of many of the questions we asked, but for
sake of brevity, and because we do not provide question language in the same order
or context, we do not necessarily report the precise wording of questions.
141. Although we do not discuss these questions below, we also collected a
great deal of demographic information from respondents, some of it automatically.
For example (and when applicable): In what state do you live? What is your age,
your gender, and your marital status? Are you employed? What type of employer?
What is your highest educational degree? Are you still in school? What degree are
you working toward? How long ago did you finish school? Is your spouse or partner
currently employed? How much does he or she earn? How many children or
dependents live with you? Do you anticipate extraordinary expenses with respect to
supporting your dependents in the next five years? As we explain in more detail
below, we also asked respondents questions about their online survey experience
and behavior. We asked questions such as: How many years have you taken online
surveys? Why did you sign up to take online surveys? How often do you take online
surveys? Why and where did you take this survey?
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1. Prior Employment and Experience with Noncompetes
The survey focuses predominantly on the respondent’s current
employment relationship, but also asks questions that explore the
respondent’s familiarity and history with noncompetes, which may
predate the respondent’s current employment relationship.142 We also
sought facts that might help us determine whether certain aspects of
prior employment relationships (e.g., previous noncompetes) relate
to a respondent’s current characteristics or status.143
2. Current Employment Relationship
In order to assess the potential causes and consequences of
noncompetes, the survey requests extensive information about many
dimensions of the respondent’s current employment relationship.144
Obviously, we collected basic terms of employment.145 The survey
also asks respondents about their employer—its industry, size,
structure, and so on.146 In addition, we inquired about respondents’
history with their employer (e.g., other positions, training),147 and we
142. E.g.: Have you heard of noncompetition agreements? Where or from
whom did you hear of them? At what age? Have you ever signed one? Are you sure?
Have you ever unknowingly signed one and discovered later that you had signed
one? At what age did that happen? Have you ever been sued on the basis of a
noncompete? Has a noncompete ever been a factor in your decision to stay with an
employer? If so, how? If you left, did the noncompete affect how you departed and
where you sought employment next? Did you negotiate the terms of your departure?
143. E.g.: In the last five years, how many employers have you had? How
many of these relationships involved noncompetes?
144. The sample also includes respondents who are currently unemployed.
The survey asks unemployed respondents questions about their unemployment. E.g.:
Do you have a job? If not, are you unemployed as the result of a noncompete with a
previous employer? If you are unemployed, where do you live?
145. E.g.: What is your occupation? What is your job title? What are your
duties? Do you work with trade secrets, confidential information, or have access to
clients? What is your monthly and annual compensation? We also asked questions
such as the following: How are you compensated? What benefits do you receive?
Are you represented by a union? Are you a full-time, part-time, or seasonal
employee? How many hours do you work in a week, month, or year?
146. E.g.: What is your employer’s industry? Does your employer operate in
a different state? Where is your employer headquartered? How frequently does your
employer hire someone away from a competitor? How often does someone leave
your employer to join a competitor?
147. E.g.: Did a prior noncompete influence your choice of this job? How
many years of experience do you have in this type of position? What is your tenure
with your employer? When was your last raise or promotion? How much training
have you had in the past year?
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invited respondents to assess the level of their work performance and
their contributions and loyalty to their employer.148
3. Future Compensation, Promotions, and Opportunities
If a noncompete influences the initial terms and conditions and
the subsequent evolution of a particular employment relationship, we
might observe such an effect not solely in the position’s attributes
today (e.g., current compensation), but in how those dimensions have
evolved over time or are expected to change in the future (e.g., future
compensation). For this reason, the survey asks respondents to
speculate about or “project” their likely opportunities, decisions, and
possible outcomes going forward.149
4. Enforcement and Enforceability of Noncompetes
Many commentators, as we note above, assume that employees
are poorly informed about the content and likely practical and legal
consequences of a noncompete clause. To explore this possibility, we
ask respondents to answer a few basic questions about the law that
governs noncompetes and about the likelihood of noncompetes being
enforced under the conditions of various scenarios.150
5. Scope and Substance of Noncompetes
Our survey briefly inquires about prior noncompetes, but for
those respondents currently bound by a noncompete, we asked many
questions about the existing contract’s content.151 We focused on the
148. E.g.: How would you rate your daily effort level, creativity, and overall
job performance in the last month? How would you rate yourself relative to your coworkers in the last month? What motivates you to work hard?
149. E.g.: If you stay with your current employer, what will your wages be in
the future? How likely are a number of possible changes—good and bad—to occur
in the future? In the next year, are you likely to get an offer from another employer?
Will you accept such an offer and leave your employer? How much will you
demand to leave? Will it depend on whether the offer comes from one of your
employer’s competitors or from an employer in another industry?
150. E.g.: Are noncompetes enforced at the national, state, or local level of
government? How likely is an employer to try to enforce a noncompete against an
employee? Does it depend on the circumstances? Which ones? Are noncompetes
enforceable by courts in your state? Are there any states that refuse to enforce
noncompetes to your knowledge? Which states?
151. E.g.: Do you understand the terms of your noncompete? Are the terms
of the noncompete fair? How significantly does it limit your options? For how long
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substance of the agreement’s constraints, such as the length of time
the respondent would be prohibited from working for a competitor
and whether the contract involves a geographical restriction.
6. Noncompete Negotiation and Process
To better understand the bargaining and contracting process—
especially in view of the significant concerns about the abuse of lowwage employees—the survey asks respondents who are currently
bound by a noncompete to report when and how their employer
asked them to sign it;152 to explain the negotiating process, how they
made their decision, and whether there was consideration offered in
exchange for the noncompete clause;153 and to assess an employer’s
decision to require or propose noncompetes.154
7. Performance and Mobility Consequences of Noncompetes
The survey prompts respondents with a noncompete to assess
the effect of their noncompete on their work performance; it also
asks them to gauge how their noncompete affects the possibility of
their leaving their employer—i.e., whether respondents believe
themselves to be mobile.155 We explored employee mobility in depth
by asking respondents questions, for example, about their on-the-job
search efforts and their experiences—if any—of being recruited by
are you restricted from joining a competitor upon termination? Are you limited
geographically? Is there a buy-out clause? How do you know the content of your
noncompete for this survey? Did you re-read it when responding to this survey?
How confident are you in your answers about your agreement’s content? What other
types of restrictive covenants have you signed?
152. E.g.: When were you asked to sign it? Before or after you accepted your
position? Would it have affected your choice to accept the position had you known
about it earlier?
153. E.g.: Did you have other employment opportunities when you agreed to
your noncompete? Did you read your noncompete before you signed it? Did you
consult a lawyer? Did you negotiate over the terms of your noncompete? If not, why
not? If you negotiated the terms, what did you request in return for signing? Was
your request successful? If you chose not to negotiate, what were your reasons? Did
you ask what would happen if you refused to sign? If you had declined to sign, do
you think your employer would still have hired or promoted you? Were you
promised benefits if you signed? Did you receive those benefits?
154. E.g.: Is it fair to ask an employee to sign a noncompete? Why do you
think your employer asked you to sign a noncompete?
155. E.g.: Does your noncompete, in your opinion, influence your work
performance, effort, or motivation? Would your noncompete affect your willingness
to leave? Would it affect your willingness to start a new business?
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other employers.156 Finally, the survey also solicits respondents who
have never signed a noncompete agreement to speculate on how their
behavior might change if they were bound by one.
8. Beliefs About Noncompete Frequency, Content, and Effects
With the aim of extracting additional data from our respondents
(as well as testing the consistency of their answers),157 the survey
investigates not only respondents’ personal noncompete experiences
and their beliefs about their own behavior, but also their views about
noncompete frequency generally (at the employer, occupation, and
industry level), about what other employees’ noncompete contracts
typically contain, and also about how these employees are likely to
behave in response to the strictures of a noncompete.158
B. Survey Implementation
The benefits of collecting individual-level information through
an online survey are clear. Relative to random-digit dialing (RDD),
mail-in, or in-person surveys, an online survey’s cost per respondent
is dramatically lower.159 The data-collection process is also orders of
156. E.g.: How much effort do you spend or have you spent looking for other
employment? How have you searched? Has a headhunter ever approached you? Do
you search for jobs with employers that compete with your current employer? Have
you received offers from other employers? How many? Did you turn these offers
down at least in part because of your noncompete? Was your employer aware of
your outside offer(s)? If so, how did your employer respond? How much would you
need to be offered to be willing to switch employers? Would the necessary amount
depend on whether the offer came from one of your employer’s competitors?
157. Cf. David Rothschild & Justin Wolfers, Forecasting Elections: Voter
Intentions Versus Expectations (Jan. 23, 2013) (unpublished paper) (on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Wharton School), http://users.nber.org/~jwolfers/
Papers/VoterExpectations.pdf [https://perma.cc/K526-J5CJ] (offering evidence that
answers to the question “Who will win an election?” are better predictors of the
actual election results than answers to the question “Who will you vote for?” and
explaining that result by contending that the former question produces an answer
that incorporates not only the respondent’s likely voting preferences, but also the
preferences of individuals in the respondent’s network).
158. E.g.: What percentage of your co-workers in your type of position (also,
at your workplace and at all locations) have signed a noncompete? What percentage
of employees in your type of position generally? What percentage of employees in
your industry? Are the terms of your noncompete identical to what others in your
position have? What percentage of others who are in your position and who have a
noncompete would turn down an offer because of their noncompete?
159. See ROGER TOURANGEAU ET AL., SCIENCE OF WEB SURVEYS 1-2 (2013).
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magnitude faster per respondent.160 Furthermore, an online platform
allows surveyors to ask respondents complicated, nested questions in
simple, easy-to-use, and interactive ways. Finally, companies such as
Qualtrics that conduct online surveys are at least sometimes willing
to guarantee a target sample size and thus will continue to sample the
population until that sample size is reached.161
These practical benefits, however, come at a potentially high
methodological cost: sample selection and other systematic data
collection issues. These concerns may raise serious questions about
the reliability of inferences drawn about the population of interest
from an online survey of an online sample of these individuals. Not
surprisingly, given the benefits of using an online platform to collect
data, researchers have sought to test the accuracy of online surveying
by comparing the findings of identical survey questions given both to
online respondents and by phone using RDD. This research shows
that, at least in some situations, the results can differ between the two
surveying approaches.162 Some are thus quick to dismiss data from
online surveys—especially “open” surveys accessible to anyone on
the web163—because of these observed differences, but it may also be
that more traditional survey methods, such as RDD, are themselves
unreliable, perhaps as a result of severe unit nonresponse.164
160. See MARIO CALLEGARO ET AL., WEB SURVEY METHODOLOGY 20-21
(2015) (describing speed and other advantages of online surveying).
161. At least in our case, in order to ensure the highest level of data quality,
our surveying company was willing to replace, for free, any individual respondent’s
survey answers that we were able to demonstrate were partially the product of
intentional noncompliance. See infra Section II.D.
162. See Matthias Schonlau et al., A Comparison Between Responses from a
Propensity-Weighted Web Survey and an Identical RDD Survey, 22 SOC. SCI.
COMPUTER REV. 128, 136 (2004); see also Matthias Schonlau et al., Selection Bias
in Web Surveys and the Use of Propensity Scores 12 (RAND Lab. & Population,
Working Paper No. 279, 2006); Stephanie Steinmetz et al., Comparing Different
Weighting Procedures for Volunteer Web Surveys 37-39 (Amsterdam Inst. for
Advanced Lab. Studies, Working Paper No. 09-76, 2009). Differences in the mode
of communication (online versus phone), differences in the length of the survey
period, different survey administrators, and differences in the sample populations are
several factors that may be behind these inconsistencies.
163. See Jerry Vaske et al., Can Weighting Compensate for Sampling Issues
in Internet Surveys?, 16 HUM. DIMENSIONS WILDLIFE 200, 212-13 (2011).
164. For example, Andrew Kohut and his colleagues show that the response
rate of a typical Pew Research telephone survey has fallen from 36% in 1997 to only
9% in 2012. See ANDREW KOHUT ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., ASSESSING THE
REPRESENTATIVENESS OF PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS 1 (2012), http://www.peoplepress.org/files/legacy-pdf/Assessing%20the%20Representativeness%20of%20Public%
20Opinion%20Surveys.pdf [https://perma.cc/XRM2-5R8T]. Such low response rates
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In what remains of this Section, we discuss the nuts and bolts
of our data-collection efforts. In the following Sections, we describe
our data cleaning strategy, sample selection issues, and our methods
for refining the data to make the conclusions we draw in Part III and
will draw in future research more transparent and reliable.
* * *
To collect responses to the survey, we hired a survey and data
collection firm,165 which in turn outsourced the data collection to
eight different panel partners.166 Individuals contacted by these panel
partners to take the survey had previously applied to at least one of
the panel partners seeking the opportunity to receive requests to take
online surveys. Each prospective respondent was sent the survey via
e-mail or received the survey as part of an online game. Importantly,
the survey was not available to any person who might have happened
upon it on the internet, but only to those people whom we (through
our agents) specifically sent an individualized link.167
Respondents were compensated for taking our survey, but the
nature and magnitude of this compensation varied across panel
partners. Respondents who attempted the survey but did not finish it
make one important methodological question the extent to which the final sample is
truly representative of the population it is intended to represent. All of this is to say
that the not-uncommon assumption that baseline population parameters can be
estimated using data from RDD surveys may be seriously flawed.
165. Specifically, see QUALTRICS, http://www.qualtrics.com [https://perma.cc/
XR42-VC5S] (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
166. The eight panel partners that Qualtrics used as subcontractors for the
data collection were ClearVoice, GMI, Sample Strategies, SSI, Innovate, Toluna,
Precision Sample, and Samplify. Importantly, it is possible for a single individual
respondent to have accounts with more than one of these companies. It is also
possible for the same individual respondent to have multiple accounts with the same
panel partner, but typically not without providing that partner with different identity
information for each account. We discuss the potential pitfalls associated with these
facts and how we addressed them in more detail below.
167. The survey link is individualized so the panel partner can identify which
individual respondent is taking the survey, allowing the partner to link the response
to other information that the company has about that respondent. Each panel partner
employs its own confirmation procedures to verify the demographic, contact, and
other information of its respondents. These procedures include, but are not limited
to, TrueSample, Verity, SmartSample, USPS verification, and digital fingerprinting.
To probe the veracity of the claims made by the panel partners about their
demographic verification systems, one of the authors signed up with SSI seeking to
be a part of their online survey panel. After we submitted the required information,
an SSI representative called us at a number we provided and asked to clarify some
of the prospective respondent information we had submitted.
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were paid only 10¢. By comparison, respondents who actually
completed the survey either received $1.50, were entered into a
sweepstakes drawing for various online rewards, or were awarded
credits to play a particular online game.168
Our target size for this data-collection enterprise was 10,000
completed surveys. We were able to control the characteristics of the
final sample through the use of quotas, which are simply constraints
on the numbers of respondents with particular characteristics or sets
of characteristics. In particular, we sought a final sample in which
respondents were 50% male; 60% with at least a bachelor’s degree;
50% with earnings of at least $50,000 annually from their current,
highest paying job; and 30% over the age of 55. We chose these
numbers either to align the sample with the corresponding sample
moments for labor force participants in the 2012 American
Community Survey (ACS)f169 or to oversample certain groups of the
population of particular interest for further subgroup comparisons.170
In addition, to better understand smaller states with unusual or
contested noncompete laws, our survey oversampled the residents of
Colorado, Oregon, Massachusetts, and Florida.171
168. For more insight into the methods used by Qualtrics, see Chris P. Long
et al., Fairness Monitoring: Linking Managerial Controls and Fairness Judgments
in Organizations, 54 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1045, 1051 (2011). Incentives such as online
credit not only increase the number of overall participants, but also the likelihood of
participants completing the survey. See Andrew T. Fiore et al., Incentives to
Participate in Online Research: An Experimental Examination of “Surprise”
Incentives, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 3433, 3434 (Apr. 26, 2014).
169. The American Community Survey is large, well-known, and nationally
representative and is used by governments to determine how federal and state funds
should be distributed to various potential recipients. See What Is the American
Community Survey?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 22, 2015), https://www.
census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/about.html [https://perma.cc/F2Z4-2K9J] (“The
American Community Survey (ACS) is an ongoing survey that provides vital
information on a yearly basis about our nation and its people. Information from the
survey generates data that help determine how more than $400 billion in federal and
state funds are distributed each year.”).
170. The power of a test when comparing across groups is larger when the
groups have the same number of observations. See Shayna A. Rusticus & Chris Y.
Lovato, Impact of Sample Size and Variability on the Power and Type I Error Rates
of Equivalence Tests: A Simulation Study, 19 PRAC. ASSESSMENT RES. &
EVALUATION 1, 7 (2014) (noting in Table 1 that “[e]qual sample sizes are more
powerful than unequal sample sizes”). As states are naturally of different sizes, we
oversampled smaller states with unique noncompete laws so as to increase the
statistical power of hypothesis testing in future subgroup analyses.
171. Given the size of its population, oversampling the Golden State was not
necessary, notwithstanding California’s importance in the noncompete arena.
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The survey was relatively long, and many of the questions were
cognitively intensive.172 Because we were concerned that some
respondents might not take the survey seriously as a result, we
employed the use of “attention filters,”173 which require respondents
to answer trivial questions in a certain way or else the survey session
terminates.174 In accord with standard practice in this setting,175 we
incorporated three attention filters in total—one in the beginning,
one in the middle, and one toward the end of the survey.
C. Preliminary Data Cleaning
We began cleaning our survey data by carefully screening them
for four different sorts of problems. In these preliminary rounds of
cleaning, our goal was to identify unreliable or repeat respondents
whose entire set of responses to the survey’s questions should be
dropped—i.e., entire observations that we concluded were unreliable
or duplicative and so should not be included in the final sample to be
used for analysis. In the next Section, we discuss how we went about
“refining” the remaining observations when they suffered from
missing data, typos, or other idiosyncratic errors, but nevertheless
contained, in our view, objectively useful and reliable data.
172. Cognitively difficult questions are more likely to lead to respondents
providing satisfying rather than accurate answers. See Jon A. Krosnick, Response
Strategies for Coping with the Cognitive Demands of Attitude Measures in Surveys,
5 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 213 (1991). Alternatively, respondents may give up
only part way through. See Stéphane Ganassali, The Influence of the Design of Web
Survey Questionnaires on the Quality of Responses, 2 SURV. RES. METHODS 21, 28
(2008). Longer surveys are less likely to be taken up or finished. See Mirta Galesic
& Michael Bosnjak, Effects of Questionnaire Length on Participation and
Indicators of Response Quality in a Web Survey, 73 PUB. OPINION Q. 349, 355, 358
(2009). Interestingly, evidence suggests that web surveys may reduce the cognitive
load relative to other forms of data collection since participants are more likely on
average to re-read questions and to take more time to answer, but these tendencies
vary with respondent characteristics. TOURANGEAU, supra note 159, at 146.
173. Daniel M. Oppenheimer et al., Instructional Manipulation Checks:
Detecting Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 867, 868 (2009).
174. For example, in a series of survey questions asking a respondent how
much he or she agrees or disagrees with a particular statement, an attention filter
question might simply say, “Please select Strongly Disagree.” If the respondent does
not then select “Strongly Disagree” in response to this directive, the survey session
ends. Importantly, our survey as implemented did not allow respondents to go back
and change previously selected answers to questions.
175. During our conversations and in our other communications, Qualtrics
consistently advocated the use of such filters to improve data quality.
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In the first round of preliminary cleaning, we began with the
full set of survey “starters” and identified those who (1) did not
finish the survey, (2) were filtered out as a result of failing one of the
survey’s three attention filters, or (3) were not part of the sample of
interest. In total, we invited over 700,000 individuals to participate in
our survey. Of those who supposedly received an online invitation to
take the survey from a panel partner, only 105,053 acknowledged
receiving their invitation, and only 79,328 individuals actually began
taking the survey. The numbers of invitations and acknowledgements
by panel partner are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
RECEIPT OF SURVEY INVITATIONS
Panel Partner
ClearVoice
Sample Strategies
SSI
Innovate
Precision Sample
Toluna
GMI
Samplify
Total

Invitations
181,811
155,849
27,700
8,221
260,360
43,568
22,091
12,581
712,181

Acknowledged
60,603
17,720
6,420
5,990
4,893
4,200
3,594
1,633
105,053

Proportion
0.33
0.11
0.23
0.73
0.02
0.10
0.16
0.13
0.15

Note: The Invitations column reports the number of invitations sent by the panel partner to potential respondents.
The Acknowledged column contains the number of respondents confirmed to have opened or viewed their
invitation. The Proportion column is the ratio of the Acknowledged column to the Invitations column.

Table 2 shows how many of these initial survey takers made it
through the first round of cleaning and, for those survey starters who
were eliminated from the survey pool, the specific reason for their
removal. Of those who began the survey, 28,824 respondents were
simply not in the sample of interest,176 leaving 50,504 respondents.177
Of these remaining 50,504 respondents, 28,906 (57.2%) ultimately
did not finish the survey and were eliminated for this reason.178
With respect to the survey’s three attention filters, each of
which requires a particular answer in order for the respondent to be
allowed to continue, the first attention filter caught and eliminated
176. Again, the sample of interest was all labor force participants aged 18–75
who are in the private for-profit sector or the private nonprofit sector or who are
employed in a public healthcare system.
177. The breakdown of those who were deemed not in the sample of interest
is as follows: 11,073 were neither working nor looking for work; 4,417 were selfemployed; 3,031 were employed by the government; 3,876 reported working for a
public employer that was not a public healthcare system. Two other major indicators
that a potential respondent was outside of the sample of interest were not having an IP
address in the U.S. (2,253) and being outside the age range of 18 to 75 (1,920).
178. In practical terms, the label “Did Not Finish” in Table 2 indicates that
these individuals did not receive a “survey complete” page from Qualtrics.
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3,423 respondents, the second caught and eliminated 976, and the
third caught and eliminated 1,530.179 Overall 29% of those who
started the survey in our sample of interest completed the survey and
made it through round one of the cleaning process.
Table 2
ROUND ONE CLEANING: FILTERING RESPONDENTS
Total Started Survey
Not in Population of Interest
Not working and not looking
Self employed
Non-healthcare public non-profit
Government
IP address not in U.S.
Not age 18–75
Over quota
Unemployed (over quota)
Not U.S. resident
Total Started Survey in Population of Interest
Did Not Finish (Not Otherwise Filtered Out)
Attention Filters
Attention Filter 1
Attention Filter 2
Attention Filter 3
Within-Survey Inconsistency or Unreasonableness
Signed noncompete, but says 0% signed
Length of interview < 1/3 of median finish time
More than 30 employers in last 5 years
Signed more CNCs than had employers in last 5 years
Did not sign noncompete, but says 100% signed
Occupation text entry invalid
More than 30 positions within employer
Unaware of noncompete, but says 100% signed
Duplicate from pilot (49) or other (2)
Industry text entry invalid
Total Remaining After Round One

Frequency
79,328
28,824
11,073
4,417
3,876
3,031
2,253
1,920
1,590
631
33
50,504
28,906
5,929
3,423
976
1,530
1,001
195
177
127
110
76
75
72
67
51
51
14,668

Percent
100.0
57.2
11.7
6.8
1.9
3.0
2.0
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
29.0

Note: This table presents the frequencies of eliminated respondents. The Attention Filters were three trivial
questions (at the beginning, middle, and end of the survey) respondents had to answer correctly in order to
continue the survey. Respondents were unable to change their answers. The Within-Survey Inconsistency or
Unreasonableness filtering process was installed by Qualtrics after the first batch of about 8,000 completed
surveys, and thus affected only survey responses collected later. (The first batch of respondents are flagged and
filtered later in the process). Respondents were flagged for recording Yes, No, None, Not Sure, or N/A in the
occupation and industry text entry boxes. In round three, each entry was also manually inspected for validity.

179. We also sought to identify and eliminate individuals who behaved in
ways that were clearly inconsistent within the four corners of the survey, but in the
first round of cleaning, we were only able to do this for a relatively small subsample
of the data. After we received the first 8,000 or so completed surveys, we began to
examine the data for inconsistencies. Qualtrics agreed to replace those respondents
who completed the survey but submitted observably inconsistent or unreasonable
answers. Accordingly, we built a flagging program “mid-stream” that identified
respondents providing inconsistent or unreasonable answers. Qualtrics incorporated
some of these flagging criteria into the final rounds of data collection in order to
expedite the cleaning process. Only those respondents eliminated through the use of
these flags (i.e., after more than half of the survey collection was complete) appear
in Table 2. For most of the sample, we apply the flagging criteria in round four of
the data cleaning process. We describe the specific flags in that discussion below.
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In the second round of cleaning, we investigated the fact that
multiple observations may (and do) arise from the same IP address
and also that completed surveys that might otherwise be included in
our data were at times not the first observation from a particular IP
address. To illustrate, at the end of round one of our preliminary
cleaning, of the 14,668 completed surveys, 10,446 had a unique IP
address, while 2,331 shared the same IP address with one other
observation. At the extreme end of the spectrum, one IP address was
observed in our initial survey data 66 times, although only one of
these instances involved a complete response.
Because IP addresses are tied to a specific online device, the
fact that the same IP address was observed more than once raises two
questions that are relevant to the proper cleaning of our survey data:
First, are respondents retaking the survey, potentially changing their
answers to avoid being filtered out by our screens? Second, are
different observations that are linked to the same IP address from the
same person or potentially from two or more different people?180
To address the issues that arise out of both of these questions,
we opted for a conservative approach and decided to retain only the
earliest observation from any particular IP address and only if that
observation involved a complete set of survey answers.181 Of the
14,668 complete responses from round one, this cleaning regimen
preserved 12,369 observations. In Table 3,182 we show the number
180. One possible reason for so many repeat takers from the same IP address
comes from a particular screening mechanism Qualtrics began to apply after the first
8,000 or so completed surveys had been received. Specifically, a filtering question at
the beginning of the survey asked if respondents earn more than $40,000 from their
current, highest-paying job. Later in the survey, when respondents were asked how
much they made in their current, highest-paying job, sometimes they indicated a
number that contradicted their previous answer. Instead of terminating the survey
and revoking payment for these individuals, Qualtrics used a screening mechanism
that notified them of the contradiction and forced them to fix it. Since respondents
were not allowed to “go back” in the survey, the only way for these individuals to
“fix” their response was to start the survey over. This process likely resulted in some
people taking the survey multiple times from the same IP address.
181. To be more concrete, if a respondent does not complete the survey the
first time an IP address is observed and later someone with the same IP address does
complete the survey, we remove even this completed survey from our sample.
182. In Table 3, the “Number from the Same IP Address” variable was
created before we removed the observations flagged in round one of our preliminary
cleaning. Retaining these observations is necessary to accurately assess whether a
completed survey was in fact the first observation from a particular IP address, given
that round one drops observations in which individuals—who may later complete
the survey—begin the survey but fail to finish it. Thus, while we call this round two
of our preliminary cleaning, we performed it simultaneously with round one.
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and proportion of completes that we retained and that we dropped for
each number of observations from the same IP address.183
Table 3
ROUND TWO CLEANING: DUPLICATE IP ADDRESSES
Number from Same IP
Address
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
24
30
36
37
66
Total

Total
Frequency
10,446
2,331
927
387
243
160
78
24
12
14
16
4
3
2
1
4
5
10
1
14,668

Percent
71.22
15.89
6.32
2.64
1.66
1.09
0.53
0.16
0.08
0.10
0.11
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.07
0.01
100.00

Retained in
Round Two
Frequency
Percent
10,446
1,284
374
115
77
39
18
5
1
3
3
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
12,369

84.45
10.38
3.02
0.93
0.62
0.32
0.15
0.04
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
100.00

Dropped
Frequency
0
1,047
553
272
166
121
60
19
11
11
13
3
3
2
1
3
4
9
1
2,299

Percent
0.00
45.54
24.05
11.83
7.22
5.26
2.61
0.83
0.48
0.48
0.57
0.13
0.13
0.09
0.04
0.13
0.17
0.39
0.04
100.00

Note: This table presents the frequency of post-round one respondents (total, retained by round two, and dropped
by round two) by the number of observations with the same IP address. Round two cleaning retained the
chronologically first observation from an IP address when it resulted in a completed survey. Note that the
number in the Number from Same IP Address column comes from the full sample to account for the fact that the
earliest observation otherwise may have been removed in round one. The numbers in the percent columns are
column percentages.

In the third round of cleaning, we sought to identify and
remove repeat survey takers who used different devices (presumably
intentionally).184 To rid our data of these additional observations, we
183. Even after explicitly addressing the fact that the same IP address can
appear in our data multiple times, casual inspection of the data revealed additional
repeat takers, who must have taken the survey multiple times using different
devices. Qualtrics informed us during phone conversations in late 2014 that panel
partners drop duplicate responses, although sometimes duplicate responses may still
occur as a result of survey re-routing—i.e., when individuals submit contradictory
information, they are sometimes not allowed to “go back” in the survey when they
are alerted to the contradiction, but may succeed at starting the survey over again if
they attempt to do so. Leaving this concern aside, even if panel partners do drop
duplicate responses, then repeat takers could nevertheless exist in our data for either
of two reasons: First, respondents may have accounts with multiple panel partners,
at least two of which were involved in data collection for our survey. Second,
respondents may have a second account with the same panel partner. Panel partners
verify demographics and attempt to mitigate this problem on the front end.
However, if individuals submit different demographic information during the signup process, then panel partners may not be able to identify and eliminate them.
184. Reg Baker et al., Validating Respondents’ Identity in Online Samples, in
ONLINE PANEL RESEARCH: A DATA QUALITY PERSPECTIVE 441, 442 (Mario
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closely examined the sets of individuals who have the same gender,
age, and race, and who live in the same state, work in the same
county, and live in the same zip code.185 Unfortunately, if individuals
are repeat survey takers and use completely different identities and
different devices, then there is simply no easy way to identify and
remove them as repeat takers in our data.
Table 4 shows the number of observations by the number of
potential duplicates in our survey data. According to our method, of
the 12,369 valid respondents after the second round of preliminary
cleaning, 11,704 of them have zero potential duplicates—i.e., there
does not exist another respondent with the same gender, same age,
and same race, living in the same state and zip code, and working in
the same county. Of the remaining 665 observations, 620 of them
share the same characteristics with one other observation, 33 share
the same characteristics with two other observations, and 12 share
the same characteristics with three other observations.
Table 4
POTENTIAL REPEAT RESPONDENTS WITH DIFFERENT IP ADDRESSES
Number of Potential Duplicates
Frequency
Percent
0
11,704
94.62
1
620
5.01
2
33
0.27
3
12
0.10
Total
12,369
100.00
Note: This table presents a tabulation of the number of potential duplicates from different IP addresses and their
frequency within the data.

Matching respondent demographic characteristics does not
necessarily indicate that survey responses originated from the same
individual: Panel partners may have reached distinct individuals with
the same gender, age, and race, living in the same state and zip code,
and working in the same county. To examine this issue further, we
compared the answers from suspected duplicate surveys to assess
whether and to what extent these answers also aligned.186 We found
Callegaro et al. eds., 2014) (“[T]he incentivized nature of panels may encourage
some people to go to elaborate lengths to maximize participation to their financial
advantage.”).
185. This list of identifying demographic traits emerged from our inspection
of the data. Whenever we found multiple surveys that we believed originated with
the same individual, we adjusted our flagging algorithm so that it would identify the
case in question and other similar cases.
186. We characterized responses as duplicates when free-form text entries
for occupation, industry, salary, and other important characteristics such as tenure,
experience, education, and the year in which respondents finished their schooling
were identical. It may be worth emphasizing that this analysis relied on affirmatively
typed answers, not just answers produced by ticking a box.
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that of the 665 potential repeat survey takers, 541 came from 262
individuals who took the survey at least twice.
To better understand the manner by which these individuals
were able to take the survey several times, we investigated whether
the observations we classify as duplicates involved the same panel
partner or different panel partners. We display the results in Table 5.
Of the 249 individuals whom we conclude took the survey twice
(498 observations), 206 of them (412 observations) used different
panel partners. Of the nine individuals who took the survey three
times (27 observations) and the four individuals who took it four
times (16 observations), every respondent made use of more than one
panel partner. These results imply that because panel partners verify
their respondents’ demographic information and disallow individuals
from signing up for multiple accounts, individuals registered with
multiple panel partners may more often be the source of duplication
when conducting a large-scale online survey.
Table 5
REPEAT TAKERS AND PANEL PARTNERS
Same Partner?
Number of Duplicates

No

Yes

Total

1
412
86
498
2
27
0
27
3
16
0
16
Total
455
86
541
Note: This table presents a cross tabulation of the number of identified duplicates and whether the duplicates came
from the same panel partner.

In the end, we resolved the repeat-taker problem by retaining
only data from the first survey response submitted by an individual;
we can obviously only use one set of survey answers, and later sets
of answers are contaminated as a result of the individual having
already taken the survey. Accordingly, we identified 541 duplicative
observations submitted by 262 individuals and decided to keep only
262 of these flagged observations, dropping the remaining 279.
Thus, after beginning this cleaning round with 12,369 observations,
we completed it with 12,090 observations.
In the fourth round of cleaning, we reviewed individual answer
responses to identify those respondents whose survey answers were
internally inconsistent or unreasonable in light of their other survey
answers. This process alerted us to several issues of importance,187
two of which we address at this stage: (1) certain individuals failed
to indicate that they were self-employed, retired, or government
187. See infra Section II.D (detailing our approach to “fixing” answers that
are inconsistent or unreasonable in otherwise valuable observations).
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employees—i.e., outside of our sample population of interest—in our
initial filters but later identified themselves in the survey as falling
into one of these categories;188 and (2) some people wrote gibberish,
cursed, provided clearly inconsistent answers, or otherwise revealed
that they did not take the survey very seriously by, for example,
completing it in an implausibly small amount of time.
With respect to the second discovery, we recognized that it was
important if not essential to distinguish between survey respondents
who were intentionally noncompliant and survey respondents who
may have made a few idiosyncratic errors.189 More precisely, our
goal was to exclude any respondent that we believed was likely to
have provided many unreliable responses—e.g., obvious gibberish,
containing no useful information—but to retain those observations
containing real—albeit potentially mismeasured—data. Determining
whether data are “real” is ultimately subjective, but we believe our
application of a few bright-line, reproducible filters allowed us to
further improve the quality of our final sample.
We began by considering individual respondents whose survey
completion time might have been “too fast.”190 Our assumption is
188. During our initial review of the data, we observed that our sample of
12,090 individuals still seemed to include many respondents who reported that they
were not a part of the sample of interest. These individuals claimed to be selfemployed, retired, or employed in public administration, and should have been
filtered out by previous questions. They were not, however—possibly because they
misunderstood their status at the outset. For example, individuals often notified us
about their self-employment status in questions related to occupation or in the
comments section at the end of the survey. Our initial set of respondents also
included individuals who indicated that they were in public administration when
they were asked to click the two-digit industry category that fit them best. We were
able to identify some retirees by their submissions in the end-of-survey comments
section. We discovered 43 individuals who recorded that they were employed in
public administration, 136 made it clear that they were business owners, and six
were retired. Again, these individuals were not in our sample of interest, and so we
excluded all 183 offending observations. Note that these three out-of-sample
categories are not mutually exclusive, which explains why 183 is not the sum of the
number of individuals in each of the three categories. We were left with 11,902
respondents, after eliminating seven additional respondents for reasons unrelated to
their being out of the sample of interest. To explain, our survey randomly assigned
respondents to particular information conditions—research that we do not discuss in
this Article—and so we dropped the seven individuals who took the survey before
Qualtrics had properly installed the randomization component.
189. We address how we refine the data to make sure it is free from
idiosyncratic errors in the next Section.
190. If a respondent’s survey-taking speed is correlated with substantive
responses, eliminating “fast” test takers can introduce bias. But our filter eliminated
only an extreme tail of the distribution—answers very unlikely, in our opinion, to be
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that reliable survey data hinges on respondents reading and digesting
questions before they respond and that this process requires some
minimum amount of time.191 We conservatively defined “too fast” to
be one-third of the median survey completion time for the remaining
11,902 respondents.192 Our survey’s median finish time was roughly
28 minutes from start to finish, which translates to a cutoff duration
for inclusion in the final sample of 9 minutes and 20 seconds. This
screening process eliminated 15 observations from our data.
Next we reviewed individual text entries, including respondentreported job duties, job title, industry of the employer, and the openended survey comments at the end of the survey. Individuals who do
not answer the free-form text entry questions, but instead write either
gibberish or curse words or use other language to indicate that they
are not engaging seriously with the survey, seem highly likely to
have answered many other questions inaccurately—especially when
they fail to answer the employment-related questions diligently.193
We dropped 256 more observations as a result of this process.
Finally, we used the questions on perceptions of noncompete
incidence within the respondent’s industry and employer as a means
to screen for noncompliance.194 We scoured the data to find answers
to important questions that were clearly, demonstrably inconsistent
with each other. For instance, if, at the beginning of the survey, the
individual indicates that he has never heard of a noncompete and
then later indicates that 100% of employees in his industry or at his
firm sign a noncompete, we dropped the observation. We identified
and eliminated 98 such observations. In sum, after removing those
respondents who appear highly likely to have been intentionally
noncompliant, 11,529 observations remained in our sample.
informative. We also do not see any obvious reason why time-to-completion should
be correlated with our key variables of interest.
191. Robert Greszki et al., The Impact of Speeding on Data Quality in
Nonprobability and Freshly Recruited Probability-Based Online Panels, in ONLINE
PANEL RESEARCH, supra note 184, at 238, 241 (“In effect, there is a, though not
perfect, link between very quick responses and low data quality which is supported
by evidence.”).
192. According to conversations with Qualtrics staff in April 2014, Qualtrics
uses one-third of the median completion time as a standard cutoff.
193. We identified these particular classes of respondents by examining
survey responses by hand. While these individuals may of course answer some of
the survey’s questions honestly, we view the possible bias caused by leaving their
potentially arbitrary responses in the data as a greater threat than the probably less
significant sample selection concerns generated by ignoring these answers.
194. See supra Section II.A (describing these questions about a respondent’s
perceptions in more detail).
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D. Data Refinement
Our discussion thus far has covered the design of the survey, its
online implementation, and our preliminary cleaning of the collected
data. The preliminary cleaning dropped entire observations that we
concluded were suspect. For example, we removed respondents who
appeared to be intentionally noncompliant on the assumption that
most or all of their answers were unreliable or duplicative. In this
Section, we outline our approach for refining our remaining data by
identifying observations with missing data fields or with entries that
are inconsistent with other entries. These individuals appear to have
made idiosyncratic errors—including either typographical, mental, or
memory errors. We explain our approach for correcting these errors
when they can be corrected, and we outline our creation of multiple
samples of the survey data that rely on different assumptions.195
We began our refinement of the data by attempting to measure
when and the extent to which each respondent made idiosyncratic
mistakes in answering survey questions. We developed an algorithm
to evaluate the many ways an individual could provide inconsistent
or unreasonable answers, including separate analyses of responses to
individual questions to assess the answer’s validity as well as
comparisons of the respondent’s answers across different questions
to detect conspicuous mistakes. The challenge of comparing answers
across questions is that, if there is an inconsistency, it can be difficult
to determine which question or questions (if not both or all of them)
the respondent answered erroneously.196
195. Refining data to eliminate unmistakable errors is standard practice in
survey research. Typically, researchers build data editing rules that flag observations
that fail to meet specific characteristics. There are many approaches to resolving
errors, including eliminating observations. Perhaps the most common response,
however, is to replace the erroneous entries through statistical estimation and
imputation. For more information on these data replacement methods, see TON DE
WAAL, JEROEN PANNEKOEK & SANDER SCHOLTUS, HANDBOOK OF STATISTICAL DATA
EDITING AND IMPUTATION (2011). In addition, see U.N. STATISTICAL COMM’N &
ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN STATISTICIANS
METHODOLOGICAL MATERIAL, EVALUATING EFFICIENCY OF STATISTICAL DATA
EDITING: GENERAL FRAMEWORK (2000), http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/
stats/publications/editingefficiency.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NDT-WJNA].
196. The following are the types of responses, categories of questions, and
problematic answers we analyzed: (1) the survey is missing responses to questions;
(2) the respondent has provided answers to individual questions that are impossible;
(3) the respondent’s educational patterns are nonsensical (e.g., has a Ph.D. and is
also working toward an associate’s degree); (4) the respondent reported finishing
school when younger than 13 years old; (5) the respondent’s tenure or experience
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After flagging all questionable survey responses using our
criteria, we added up the total number of flags that each respondent
received. Table 6 presents the number of survey respondents by the
total number of error flags.
Table 6
TOTAL NUMBER OF ERROR FLAGS
Number of Flags

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative

0
1
2
3
4
Total

9,478
1,850
162
30
9
11,529

82.21
16.05
1.41
0.26
0.08
100.00

82.21
98.26
99.66
99.92
100.00

Note: This table presents a tabulation of the total number of flags in the final survey sample.

There are 9,478 survey respondents—or 82.21% of our final survey
sample—who received no flags whatsoever, while the bulk of the
remainder—1,850 respondents (16.07%)—earned exactly one error
flag under our criteria. To investigate which flags are most common
in the sample and how likely each kind of flag is to appear with one
or more other flags, Table 7 below shows a cross tabulation of the
number of flags by the flagging criteria.
The criterion that flagged the greatest number of observations
is clearly the restriction that individuals cannot earn less than the
minimum wage conditional on the hours and weeks they reported
having worked—1,123 respondents of the 2,051 receiving any flags
(54.8%). Failure to report one’s income accurately may be a signal of
intentional noncompliance generally, but it may also be specific to
indicated that the respondent has held the same position since he or she was 12 years
old or younger; (6) the respondent’s tenure in his or her current position with an
employer is greater than his or her tenure at all positions with the firm combined; (7)
the respondent’s employer’s establishment size (i.e., the number of employees at a
particular branch or office) is larger than the overall size of the employer (i.e., all
employees with employer); (8) the number of employers in the last five years is
greater than 30; (9) the respondent signed a noncompete with more employers than
the respondent has had in last five years; (10) the respondent reported having held
more than 30 positions within the same employer; (11) the respondent’s spouse’s
income is reported to be more than one million dollars; (12) the respondent reported
having taken online surveys since before 1989 (i.e., for more than 25 years); (13) the
respondent learned about noncompetes at an age older than the respondent supplied
as his or her current age; (14) the respondent reported being recruited to join over 50
employers within the first 10 years of tenure at his or her current employer; (15) the
respondent has had more than 50 different job offers while employed with his or her
current employer; (16) the respondent’s reported annual income is less than
minimum wage earnings conditional on the reported hours and weeks worked; (17)
respondent’s reported income amounts to more than $300,000 annually.
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the sensitive nature of the income question.197 These individuals may
have responded appropriately to other questions. We see evidence in
favor of this proposition in the fact that for 1,007 of these flagged
individuals the below-minimum-wage flag is their sole idiosyncratic
survey response. The other criteria that flagged a significant number
of respondents are (1) the flag for respondents who reported that
their tenure in their current positions with an employer is greater than
their total tenure at the firm (251 observations) and (2) the flag that
identified missing responses (195 observations).198
Table 7
NUMBER OF FLAGS BY FLAG TYPE
Earned less than minimum wage
Tenure in current position > tenure at firm
Missing responses
Annual earnings more than $200K
Average # of offers/year of tenure > 10
Finished school before age 13
# noncompetes > # of employers in last 5 years
Recruited by over 50 employers in last year
Establishment larger than firm
More than 30 employers in last 5 years
Started related work before age 13
Values not possible
Started with current firm before age 13
Taking online surveys before 1990
Started in current position before age 13
More than 30 noncompetes in last 5 years
Learned about noncompete when older than current age
Spouse's annual income greater than $1M
Degree pursuing inconsistent with degree held
Finished school before 1939
More than 30 jobs within same employer

1
1,007
183
181
157
58
52
64
42
42
22
12
1
4
14
0
0
6
2
3
0
0

Number of Flags
2
3
97
13
55
11
9
4
13
3
30
6
28
10
12
4
23
4
15
1
6
4
7
7
14
4
3
5
2
0
2
5
4
4
1
0
2
1
0
0
0
3
1
1

4
6
2
1
0
3
2
4
2
0
2
4
0
4
0
4
2
0
0
0
0
0

Total
1,123
251
195
173
97
92
84
71
58
34
30
19
16
16
11
10
7
5
3
3
2

Total

1,850

162

9

2,051

Flag Type

30

Note: This table presents a tabulation of the reasons that individual respondents in the data were flagged in the final
survey sample.

197. See Jeffrey C. Moore et al., Income Measurement Error in Surveys: A
Review 5-19 (1997) (unpublished paper) (on file with the Census Bureau), https://
www.census.gov/srd/papers/pdf/sm97-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/TFC3-5HRV].
198. With respect to the first flag, we acknowledge that a report that one’s
tenure in one’s current position is longer than one’s tenure at one’s current firm may
reflect a misunderstanding of the question: If they had occupied similar positions
with their previous employers, respondents may have had in mind their tenure in a
particular type of position beyond just their experience with their current employer.
This explanation does not fully explain these inconsistencies, however, as 197
observations still reported that their tenure in their current position was longer than
their total experience in their position type. Thus, these mistaken responses appear to
us to be mental or typographical errors. With regard to missing responses, these
occurred only in the early days of the survey from April 22, 2014, to early in the
morning on April 24, 2014, when a few of the survey’s questions were apparently
not functioning properly.
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We turn next to the question of how we ought to handle these
idiosyncratic (as opposed to noncompliant) errors in our survey data.
We adopted a general policy of “do no harm” to the data; rather than
deciding to keep, drop, or modify these data once and for all, we
instead defined four separate samples that permit us to test whether
and how cleaning the idiosyncratic errors affects the results of our
analyses and that allow other researchers to use whichever sample
suits their research best.199 Sample 1 ignores the idiosyncratic errors,
leaving them as they are in the preliminarily cleaned data. Sample 2
excludes all individuals from the data who have received one or
more flags of any type. Sample 3 retains all of the observations, but
replaces offending variables with missing values. Sample 4 preserves
the respondents who have flagged survey answers, but also corrects
for these idiosyncratic errors by imputing the missing and offending
values, conditional on other covariates, when necessary.200 Table 8
presents and defines these sample choices.
Table 8
SAMPLE SELECTION
Sample 1
Sample 2
Sample 3
Sample 4

Retain offending values
Drop observations with any flags
Replace offending values as missing
Impute or otherwise correct for offending values

Samples 1 and 2 are obviously simple to create, but assembling
Samples 3 and 4 requires more analysis and additional assumptions.
In particular, as we note above, when we determined that the values
of related variables were inconsistent with each other, it was often ex
ante unclear which of the “inconsistent” survey answers was actually
erroneous—in isolation, any of the answers often made sense.201 We
proceeded by assuming that the error was more likely to occur in
answering the question about which a respondent was more likely to
199. See Joachim R. Frick & Markus M. Grabka, Item Nonresponse on
Income Questions in Panel Surveys: Incidence, Imputation and the Impact on
Inequality and Mobility, 89 ASTA ADVANCES STAT. ANALYSIS 49, 50 (2005).
200. We find Sample 4 attractive for many reasons: It uses all of the data and
corrects, to the best of our ability, for the idiosyncratic errors we have identified. See
infra Part III for our analysis using Sample 4.
201. For example, if we observe that an employer’s establishment size is
bigger than the size of the entire firm size, did the respondent mistakenly report the
wrong establishment size or the wrong firm size? If we believe the respondent made
a mistake when selecting the firm’s size, we should increase the firm size to at least
the establishment size. If we instead conclude that he or she mistakenly recorded the
wrong establishment size, then we should reduce the establishment size to be at most
the size of the firm.
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be ill-informed or, alternatively, that was more challenging for the
respondent to answer.202 For example, in multi-establishment firms,
employees are more likely to be knowledgeable about how many
other employees work in their own place of employment than about
their employer’s size firm-wide. Our approach thus implies that the
firm size variable is more likely to be incorrect, and that we ought to
replace its original value with the closest “consistent” value—i.e.,
resetting it to be as large as the establishment size value.
We apply 17 flags to our data to identify what seem to be
idiosyncratic errors. Ten of these flags rely on inconsistencies
between individual answers. In these cases, we must either drop or
adjust at least one of the inconsistent variable values to achieve
(perhaps minimal) consistency. Table 9 reports the flags that use the
existence of inconsistent variable values to identify questionable
observations and lists the offending variable that we believe ought to
be dropped or replaced as the least reliable among the inconsistent
set. We construct Sample 3 by replacing the least reliable variable
values in Sample 1 as missing when an inconsistency arises.
Table 9
SAMPLE 3 CORRECTIONS FOR MULTIPLE VARIABLE FLAGS
Flag Type

Offending Variable

Earned less than minimum wage
Tenure in current position > tenure at firm
Finished school before age 13
# noncompetes > # of employers in last 5 years
Establishment larger than firm
Started related work before age 13
Started with current firm before age 13
Started in current position before age 13
Learned about noncompete when older than current age
Degree pursuing inconsistent with degree held

Annual income
Tenure in position at firm
Year finished school
# noncompetes
Firm size
Experience
Tenure
Tenure in position
Age learned
Ultimate degree

Note: When there is an inconsistency between, for example, two entered values, we correct the entry for the
variable about which the respondent is more likely to be uncertain or which the respondent is less sensitive to
reporting accurately.

In Sample 4, by contrast, we aimed to maximize the survey
data’s informational content by replacing inconsistent, unreasonable,
or missing values—whenever possible—with new values that are
both internally consistent and more likely to be accurate.203 To
accomplish this, we deploy three data replacement strategies.
202. We considered numerous options for how to “fix” such errors, including
imputing the values of both variables. We chose to fix only one variable in order to
preserve as much of the respondent’s originally submitted data as possible, with the
constraint that the data not be internally inconsistent. Ultimately, the choice of
which inconsistent variable value to fix is a somewhat subjective decision.
203. See Melvin Stephens, Jr. & Takashi Unayama, Estimating the Impacts
of Program Benefits: Using Instrumental Variables with Underreported and
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First, as a general matter, we “repair” entries that are marred by
idiosyncratic inconsistency; typically, our approach is to replace the
less reliable offending value with the value that is closest to the
originally submitted value that would not be inconsistent with the
respondent’s other answers.204 Second, in a few instances in which
we observe values that are extreme outliers, such as having more
than 30 employers during the last five years, we do nothing—i.e., we
retain the original suspect value—assuming that if researchers view
the respondent’s answer as unreasonable, they will choose whatever
imputation method best suits their needs.205 Third, when an answer is
clearly unreasonable or missing, and there is no workable single
imputation procedure, we make use of multiple imputation methods
to calculate a substitute value for the original missing or
unreasonable survey entry.206
We also reviewed by hand the values of particular critically
important variables in hopes of ferreting out unreliable entries that
are more difficult to detect. In effect, we used more elaborate and
time-consuming approaches to expose unreasonable or unreliable
entries and then returned to single or multiple imputation methods to
replace the suspect values.
For instance, we examine all income values over $200,000 and
any entries with potential typos individually.207 For incomes over
$200,000, we cross-checked the employee’s reported occupation, job
title, industry, experience, and education to determine whether the
numbers reported by the respondent are reasonable. With respect to
Imputed Data 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21248, June
2015),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21248.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z9H2-9TL6]
(“Survey non-response has continued to rise in recent years which has generated an
increase in the share of observations with imputed values on a number of commonly
used datasets.”).
204. This form of imputation is known as single imputation. Starting with the
nonmissing values of other variables, single imputation essentially deduces the value
of a missing or erroneous observation. Single imputation methods include using the
mean of the variable from observations with reliable values, estimating missing
values based on an expected ratio between observations, replacing the offending
value with the nearest existing observation, and using a regression to determine
missing values, among other logical deduction methods. See JELKE BETHLEHEM ET
AL., HANDBOOK OF NONRESPONSE IN HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS 418-42 (2011).
205. See Stephens & Unayama, supra note 203, at 3, 10, 22-23.
206. We describe our multiple imputation work in Section II.F, deferring the
discussion until after we explain our weighting strategy in Section II.E.2.
207. In particular, we first sought out income values that seemed to us
suspicious, before checking by hand whether they were objectively within a
reasonable range or whether we ought to impute them.
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potential typographical errors, we built a “test” ratio by comparing
the individual’s current income to next year’s expected income (a
variable that is non-missing for all responses).208 For yearly income
values in our data, this ratio is less than 0.2 and greater than 9 in 609
cases. We scrutinized these observations as well as high-income
observations and applied a situation-specific test to decide whether to
replace these suspect values.209 When we were unable to produce
reliable alternative income values or when these alternative values
dropped below minimum-wage levels (based on the reported number
of hours and weeks worked), we swapped out the problematic values
as missing in order to replace them later—along with other variables’
missing values—with multiple imputation estimates.210
In addition to hand cleaning unreasonable income values, we
also inspected the entries for the occupation and industry variables
by hand. We began by having two sets of research assistants (RAs)
code each survey respondent’s free-form written answer to “what
your current employer produces or does” as well as the respondent’s
job title and a written job-duties description using the 2010 Standard
Occupation Classification System and the 2012 North American
Industry Classification System. We then had a third RA compare the
occupation and industry coding entries from the first two iterations,
and revisit those entries that did not match.
This coding protocol produced three distinct sets of hand-coded
occupation and industry codes; we exploited the two-digit codes that
the respondents had selected themselves to choose between coding
208. A typo in an entry in one year but not in the other (and assuming wage
growth is relatively low) should produce a ratio close to either 0.1 or 10, which are
thus indicative of a potential problem.
209. A response-by-response analysis of these 609 wage records (taking into
account each individual’s wage history, occupation, hours worked, experience,
tenure, and education) revealed a nontrivial number of errors in the wages income
variable. The most common errors were an additional or missing zero or two (117
observations). Twenty-one individuals clearly lied about their income, conditional
on their occupation and experience (e.g., grocery store bagger earning $2 million a
year). Others indicated they had zero income and we were unable to use their wage
history to impute their income (242 observations). When possible, we imputed
incomes in the following way: If, relative to prior wage history and the expected
future wage trajectory, there was simply a difference in the number of zeros, the
number of zeros was adjusted to align with the other numbers. If a respondent’s
reported current income was wildly different from the previous year’s number and
the number from the following year, we replaced the current income value with the
average of the surrounding years (assuming the surrounding years were reasonable).
210. Please see infra Section II.F for details about the multiple imputation
approaches we employ in our work.
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outcomes when there was disagreement among the RAs.211 The logic
of this replacement method is as follows:
1. If two RA codes match the respondent’s self-selected code, use
the self-selected code.
2. If no RA codes match each other, but one RA code matches
the self-selected code, use the self-selected code.
3. If two RA codes match each other and no RA codes match the
self-selected code, use the matching RA codes.
4. If no RA codes match each other and none of them match the
self-selected code, use the self-selected code.
5. If two RA codes match each other and one RA code matches
the self-selected code, use a fourth RA to break the tie.
To conclude this review of our data refinement efforts, Table
10 displays our replacement methods for inconsistent, unreasonable,
or missing values in otherwise informative observations.
Table 10
SAMPLE 4 CORRECTIONS FOR FLAGGED VARIABLES
Panel A: Flags Using Multiple Variables
Flag Type

Method

Earned less than minimum wage
Tenure in current position > tenure at firm
Average # of offers/year of tenure > 10
Finished school before age 13
# noncompetes > # of employers in last 5 years
Establishment larger than firm
Started related work before age 13
Started with current firm before age 13
Started in current position before age 13
Learned about noncompete when older than current age
Degree pursuing inconsistent with degree held

Impute
Tenure in position = Tenure at firm
Impute
Year finish school = YOB + 13
# noncompetes = # employers
Firm size = Establishment size
Experience = 2014 – (YOB + 13)
Tenure = 2014 – (YOB + 13)
Tenure in position = 2014 – (YOB + 13)
Age learned about noncompete = Age
Do nothing

Panel B: Flags Using One Variable
Flag Type

Method

Missing responses
Annual earnings more than $200K
Spouseʼs annual income greater than $1M
Finished school before 1939
Values not possible
Recruited by over 50 employers in last year
More than 30 employers in last 5 years
Taking online surveys before 1990
More than 30 noncompetes in last 5 years
More than 30 jobs within same employer

Impute
Inspect individually, impute if necessary
Inspect individually, do nothing or impute
Impute as 2014 – age + estimated years of school
Impute or do nothing
Impute
Impute
Do nothing
Do nothing
Impute

Note: This table displays the methods we used to correct inconsistent or implausible entries by flag type when
multiple variables are involved (Panel A) and when only one variable is involved (Panel B). YOB stands for year
of birth.

211. In the process of examining and cleaning the occupation and industry
codes, we discovered that a few of the survey respondents were actually business
owners and thus did not belong in the sample. We dropped all 24 such observations,
which translated to a final dataset tally of 11,505 observations.
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Before we lay out our multiple imputation methods in Section
II.F, we must first confront the fact that multiple imputation requires
weights constructed so that the weighted sample as a whole reflects
the population of interest.212 Weighting is necessary when using
multiple imputation to replace missing values because, without
recalibrating the likelihood of drawing each value from the sample to
match the likelihood of drawing that value from the relevant
population, we would necessarily select replacement values from a
potentially skewed, nonrepresentative distribution.
Therefore, to complete the assembly of Sample 4, we first
weighted the data to reflect the population of interest. Second, we
used multiple imputation to impute missing values. Third, we reweighted the now completed dataset to reflect population moments.
There is no shortage of weighting methods—we describe some
of them below—but all weighting schemes seek to enhance sample
data’s representativeness. Methods exist for reweighting observed
data in a sample to match observed data in the population, but it can
be tough to ascertain whether the sample reflects the population on
those variables that the researcher can observe in the sample but not
in the population. Indeed, weighting is conceptually linked to sample
selection bias, which refers to the possibility that the process of
sampling itself—by whatever method—may render certain types of
individuals particularly likely or unlikely (relative to their true
numbers) to find their way into a sample. When this occurs, the
sample is nonrepresentative on the characteristics causing affected
groups to be disproportionately likely or unlikely to appear in the
sample. Surveys—and in particular online surveys—are especially
dubious because individuals choose to take them. For this reason, we
next discuss the possible sources, extent, and implications of any
selection bias in our data, the role reweighting the data can play in
mitigating this bias, and, finally, multiple imputation.
E. Sample Selection
The 2014 Noncompete Survey necessarily produced an online
convenience sample, not a typically more representative probability
212. See JAMES R. CARPENTER, USING SURVEY WEIGHTS WITH MULTIPLE
IMPUTATION—A MULTILEVEL APPROACH 18 (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.lse.ac.uk/
statistics/events/SpecialEventsandConferences/CarpenterJR.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B8GP-J828] (noting that “[i]n the light of this, for accurate inference within
domains for survey data, the imputer needs to include the weights, the domain
indicator, and their interaction for valid MI inference in general”).
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sample.213 Consequently, one far-reaching concern is that nonrandom
selection of respondents into our sample may generate significant
bias in the inferences we draw from the data about the population of
interest.214 In this Section, we describe sample selection threats to our
survey project. We evaluate the severity of these threats, concluding
that any nonrepresentativeness is likely minor in its consequences.
Along the way, we discuss potential ways to make inferences from
our survey data more robust to sample selection bias. We briefly
describe a few of the benefits of reweighting convenience samples,
and we then summarize our reweighting scheme in detail.
1. Sources of Potential Selection Bias
In an online survey of this length and complexity, a discussion
of selection bias issues cannot be avoided.215 We can divide these
potential problems into four broad selection concerns:

1. Not all of the U.S. labor force is online.
2. Not all of those online register to take online surveys.
3. Not all of those who register to take online surveys are invited
to take the survey.
4. Not all of those who are invited to take the survey will finish
(or even start) it.
We examine each of these four selection issues in the context
of our survey project. We highlight the relative importance of each
and their likely consequences for our data and inferences. In the next
Subsection, we describe a set of reweighting strategies.216 We believe
that one these approaches—depending on the specific goals of the
research—can significantly mitigate these selection concerns.
213. Samuel J. Best & Brian S. Krueger, Drawing Samples on the Internet,
in INTERNET DATA COLLECTION 16-18 (2004); Mary Hibberts et al., Common Survey
Sampling Techniques, in HANDBOOK OF SURVEY METHODOLOGY FOR THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 61-62, 66-67 (Lior Gideon ed., 2012); Samuel J. Best et al., An
Assessment of the Generalizability of Internet Surveys, 19 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV.
131, 131-34 (2001).
214. Kimmo Grönlund & Kim Strandberg, Online Panels and Validity:
Representativeness and Attrition in the Finnish eOpinion Panel, in ONLINE PANEL
RESEARCH, supra note 184, at 88; Hibberts et al., supra note 213, at 66;
TOURANGEAU ET AL., supra note 159, at 11-13.
215. See generally Jelke Bethlehem, Selection Bias in Web Surveys, 78 INT’L
STAT. REV. 161, 161-62 (2010).
216. Id. at 267-71; JELKE BETHLEHEM & SILVIA BIFFIGNANDI, HANDBOOK OF
WEB SURVEYS 329-79 (2011).
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Of the four selection issues, the first and fourth on the list are
“standard” challenges. Other survey approaches must overcome their
own versions of these problems.217 With respect to the first selection
concern, for example, random-digit dialing (RDD) methods can only
reach the population with a telephone and in-person surveys rely on
being able to locate, travel to, and interview the person.218 Moreover,
even though probability samples begin with a randomly selected
target sample, systematic unit nonresponse can cause the final
sample to be a nonrandom draw of the population.219
Overcoming this first issue in probability samples has been the
subject of significant debate among scholars. As we have already
noted, work by Kohut and his colleagues finds that RDD response
rates have decreased from 36% in 1997 to just 9% in 2012.220 Against
the backdrop of falling response rates, Wang et al. (2014) shows that
by putting more or less weight on particular observations—in this
case, using multilevel regression methods and post-stratification221—
a convenience sample of Xbox users can better predict the outcome
of the 2012 presidential election than traditional Gallup polls.222
Reweighting, however, is no panacea.223 It is difficult to do well, and
the proper execution of any weighting strategy requires great care.
Nevertheless, the design and application of valid weighting methods
is an active area of research.224
Recall that the target population of interest for our survey is
U.S. labor force participants aged 18–75 who are not self-employed
and not working for government unless they are employed by a
public healthcare system. What do we know about reaching the labor
217. TOURANGEAU ET AL., supra note 159, at 13, 39; Best & Krueger, supra
note 213, at 14.
218. DON A. DILLMAN, MAIL AND TELEPHONE SURVEYS: THE TOTAL DESIGN
METHOD 43, 46 (1978).
219. ROBERT M. GROVES ET AL., SURVEY NONRESPONSE 276 (2002).
220. KOHUT ET AL., supra note 164, at 1.
221. See R.J.A. Little, Post-Stratification: A Modeler’s Perspective, 88 J.
AM. STAT. ASS’N 1001 (1993), for details on post-stratification, and David K. Park
et al., Bayesian Multilevel Estimation with Poststratification: State-Level Estimates
from National Polls, 12 POL. ANALYSIS 375 (2004), for details on multilevel
estimation with post-stratification.
222. Wei Wang et al., Forecasting Elections with Non-Representative Polls,
31 INT’L J. FORECASTING 980, 989-90 (2014).
223. Matthias Schonlau et al., A Comparison Between Responses from a
Propensity-Weighted Web Survey and an Identical RDD Survey, 22 SOC. SCI.
COMPUTER REV. 128, 128-38 (2004).
224. Jelke Bethlehem & Mario Callegaro, Introduction to Part IV, in ONLINE
PANEL RESEARCH, supra note 184, at 264, 271.
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force via online methods (selection concern #1)? A recent study of
internet users indicates that the overall internet penetration rate is
about 87% for U.S. adults.225 We reproduce additional findings from
the Pew Research Center study in Table 11.
Table 11
INTERNET USERS IN 2014
Among adults, the percent who use the internet, email,
or access the internet via a mobile device

a.
b.
a.
b.
c.
a.
b.
c.
d.
a.
b.
c.
a.
b.
c.
d.
a.
b.
c.

All adults
Sex
Men
Women
Race/ethnicity*
White
African-American
Hispanic
Age group
18–29
30–49
50–64
65 +
Education level
High school grad or less
Some college
College +
Household income
Less than $30,000/yr
$30,000–$49,999
$50,000–$74,999
$75,000 +
Community type
Urban
Suburban
Rural

Use internet
87%
87%
86%
85%
81%
83%
97%cd
93%d
88%d
57%
76%
91%a
97%ab
77%
85%
93%ab
99%ab
88%
87%
83%

Source: Pew Research Center Internet Project Survey, January 9–12, 2014, n=1,006 adults.
Note: Percentages marked with a superscript letter (e.g., a) indicate a statistically significant difference between that
row and the row designated by that superscript letter, among categories of each demographic characteristic (e.g.,
age). The results for race/ethnicity are based off a combined sample from two weekly omnibus surveys, January 9–
12 and January 23–26, 2014. The combined total n for these surveys was 2,008; n=1,421 for whites, n=197 for
African-Americans, and n=236 for Hispanics.

The demographic groups that are less likely to have access to
the internet are the elderly, those in households earning less than
$30,000 a year, and those with at most a high school education.226 On
the basis of this information and the fact that our target population is
all members of the U.S. labor force, we should be most concerned
about survey participation of the elderly because the percentage of
225. Susannah Fox & Lee Rainie, The Web at 25 in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR.
(Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/02/27/the-web-at-25-in-the-u-s/
[https://perma.cc/KNV8-WUSP].
226. See supra Table 11. According to the Pew Research Center Project
Survey in 2014, 57% of respondents at least 65 years old, 77% of respondents in
households earning less than $30,000 a year, and 76% of respondents with at most a
high school education or less reported using the internet.
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those over 65 who use the internet is just 57%.227 We note, however,
that the population of interest in the Pew study of internet penetration
is “all adults,”228 not only labor force participants aged 18–75. We
surmise that the internet use rate for labor force participants who are
aged 65–75 is much higher than 57%.229 Admittedly, the use rate for
those aged 65–75 is probably lower than the 88% rate for those aged
50–64. Nevertheless, at least some evidence shows that the working
elderly use the internet extensively.230 Overall, we do not believe this
source of selection to be a major concern.
However, the fact that someone must register to receive online
surveys to complete our survey—the second source of selection—
raises serious questions about our sample’s representativeness.231 One
would expect that because online surveys take nontrivial amounts of
time to complete and offer small rewards, individuals who (1) have
spare time and (2) want or need the rewards offered would be most
likely to sign up.232 To get a sense of the demographic differences
between those who register to participate in online surveys and the
U.S. labor force, Table 12 compares the panel populations of two of
our survey’s most represented partners (ClearVoice Research and
Sample Strategies) to U.S. labor force averages that we calculated
using American Community Survey (ACS) data.233
227. See supra Table 11.
228. The Pew study was focused on generating internet penetration or use
statistics for the population as a whole, not for labor force participants aged 18–75.
For more details on trends in internet access over time, see Andrew Perrin & Maeve
Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000-2015, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access-2000-2015/
[http://perma.cc/2K6Y-55JM].
229. For details on internet adoption and usage among the elderly, see Aaron
Smith, Usage and Adoption, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.
org/2014/04/03/usage-and-adoption/ [https://perma.cc/QX5Z-N8VD] (reporting that
74% of those aged 65–69 go online, while 68% of those 70–74 years old go online).
See also JONATHAN LAZAR ET AL., UNDERSTANDING WEB CREDIBILITY: A SYNTHESIS
OF THE RESEARCH LITERATURE 9-10 (2007).
230. See Smith, supra note 229. While this particular study does not examine
employment status explicitly, it does offer evidence that among the elderly those
with higher incomes are more likely to be using the internet. Id.
231. D. Sunshine Hillygus et al., Professional Respondents in
Nonprobability Online Panels, in ONLINE PANEL RESEARCH, supra note 184, at 219.
232. Id. at 224; Reg Baker et al., Research Synthesis: AAPOR Report on
Online Panels, 74 PUB. OPINION Q. 711, 720 (2010); Florian Keusch et al., Motives
for Joining Nonprobability Online Panels and Their Association with Survey
Participation Behavior, in ONLINE PANEL RESEARCH, supra note 184, at 171, 172.
233. To clarify, the ACS numbers are not for the entire ACS population, but
only for members of the U.S. labor force, whom we are able to identify using the
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Table 12
PANEL PARTNER DEMOGRAPHICS
Panel size
Responses in sample
Proportion of sample (%)

ClearVoice
902,878
4,949
42.9

Sample Strategies
425,413
2,299
19.9

U.S. Labor Force

Gender (%)
Male
Female

56.6
43.4

41.0
59.0

52.9
47.1

10.0
26.8
24.3
7.5
2.2
16.3
2.5
8.2
2.2

14.3
25.3
21.1
5.2

9.8
26.9
24.9
9.1

.

.

18.5
2.0
10.0
3.7

19.9

5.4
21.9
22.7
26.3
13.0
7.6
3.1

.

.

23.0
27.0
19.0
16.0
10.0
5.0

15.1
24.1
21.3
21.0
14.9
3.7

51.0
13.0
3.3
15.0

82.0
13.7
4.3

Education (%)
< High School
High School graduate
Some College
Associateʼs degree
Trade School
Bachelorʼs degree
Some postgraduate
Graduate degree
None of the above

.
9.5

.

Age (%)
13–17
18–24
25–34
35–44
45–54
55–64
65–99

Employment (%)
Employed full-time
Employed part-time
Unemployed
Student full-time
Student part-time
Homemaker
Self employed
Permanently unemployed
Retired

35.3
10.9
9.7
9.9
3.6
8.8
7.7
7.2
6.9

.
5.0
5.3

.
3.5

.
.
.
.
.
.

Note: This table shows the panel demographics for ClearVoice Surveys and Sample Strategies as they compare to
the sample demographics of the American Community Survey. The demographic information comes from the
panel books from the respective partners. The numbers in the table are column percentages.

With respect to gender balance, while the U.S. labor force is
not far off of being evenly split, ClearVoice and Sample Strategies
have survey populations that deviate in opposite directions from this
point—with 56.6% male and 41% male, respectively. Some expert
observers believe that online survey panel compositions tend to skew
toward women;234 according to Table 12, this is evidently not always
true. Education-level demographics are unusually similar across the
same sampling frame we use to define our survey sample of interest. See supra note
176. Unfortunately, we do not have access to comparable labor force numbers for
the panel partner populations, so we instead report statistics for each partner’s entire
panel population. We obtained demographic information on the panel populations
from Qualtrics and our panel partners. Data from the ACS is available at American
Community Survey (ACS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programssurveys/acs/ [https://perma.cc/68MP-HM9H] (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
234. We elicited this belief about skewed gender balance in survey panels
from Qualtrics representatives during conversations in mid-2014.
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survey panels and the U.S. labor force.235 The panel age distributions,
however, differ from the ACS labor force numbers.236 If ClearVoice
and Sample Strategies are generally representative of online panels,
then survey panels underrepresent some middle-age groups (45–64)
and overrepresent some younger ones (18–24).237
The employment characteristics of the panel partners’ survey
populations present the starkest contrast to the U.S. labor force. Only
35.3% of the ClearVoice panel and 51% of the Sample Strategies
panel is employed full-time relative to the 82% full-employment rate
for the whole of the U.S. labor force.238 This is unsurprising: Panel
partners have a survey population made up of many more part-time
employees, students, homemakers, and unemployed.239 We of course
only survey individuals on these panels who are a part of the labor
force, however, and thus the numbers from the full panel populations
are not directly comparable to Table 12’s third column. In fact, if we
restrict the panel populations to include only the full-time, part-time,
and unemployed rows of Table 12, the full-employment proportion
for ClearVoice is 63.1% and for Sample Strategies, 75.8%—much
closer to the corresponding U.S. labor force number.240
While these demographic comparisons offer at least a sense of
who registers to take online surveys, they do little to inform us about
why people choose to sign up. This matters in practice because when
we require a reliable estimate of the incidence of noncompetition
agreements, for instance, we must be wary of the possibility that
individuals who are more likely to register for online surveys may
also be systematically more or less likely (relative to the labor force
generally) to have entered into a noncompete agreement.241 For this
235. See supra Table 12.
236. See supra Table 12.
237. See supra Table 12. It is interesting to note that the panels are not
consistently undershooting or overshooting ACS population proportions. Rather,
different panels appear at times to bookend the population numbers, suggesting that
panel partners may distinguish themselves in the marketplace by offering distinctive
survey populations.
238. See supra Table 12.
239. See supra Table 12. ClearVoice and Sample Strategies report 10.9%
and 13.0% part-time employees, 13.5% and 15.0% students, 8.8% and 5.0%
homemakers, and 9.7% and 3.3% (temporarily) unemployed, respectively.
240. These calculations are 35.3 ÷ (35.3 + 10.9 + 9.7) = 63.1% and 51 ÷
(51.0 + 13.0 + 3.3) = 75.8%, respectively.
241. From a research perspective, we have initially focused on accurately
estimating the incidence of noncompetition agreements in the U.S. labor force, and
so selection dynamics that bias this assessment are our primary concern. However,
more generally, researchers relying on survey data must keep in mind their specific

430

Michigan State Law Review

2016

reason, we asked our survey respondents to account explicitly for
their interest in completing online surveys.242 Table 13 lists various
reasons individuals reported for why they registered to receive online
surveys, cutting the data by income quartile.
Table 13
WHY SIGN UP FOR ONLINE SURVEYS?
Reason
Like rewards
Share opinion
Want money
Learn
Fun
Need money
Game benefits
Other
Accident

0%–25%
0.58
0.56
0.47
0.41
0.31
0.38
0.11
0.02
0.00

Income Quartile
25%–50%
50%–75%
0.58
0.60
0.57
0.57
0.43
0.43
0.39
0.39
0.29
0.33
0.33
0.23
0.13
0.10
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00

75%–100%
0.60
0.60
0.33
0.39
0.33
0.10
0.11
0.01
0.01

Total
0.59
0.58
0.40
0.39
0.32
0.23
0.11
0.01
0.00

Note: This table presents the reasons respondents selected when asked why they signed up to take online surveys in
the first place. Respondents were free to provide more than one answer. The numbers in the table are column
percentages.

The two most common reasons people report for registering to
take online surveys are that (1) they like the rewards they receive for
taking them and (2) they like to share their opinion.243 Forty percent
of respondents indicate that they registered because they “want[ed]
money”; a similar fraction of respondents indicate registering to
learn about new products or ongoing research.244 Interestingly, the
relative importance of the reasons given by respondents does not
vary much by income level, with some exceptions: 38% of those in
the 0%–25% income quartile report that they signed up because they
need the money, for instance, while only 10% of the 75%–100%
quartile gave the same reason.245 If we take these explanations at face
value,246 the sample selection issue asks us to consider whether those
who “like rewards” or like to “share their opinion” are differentially
research questions, and ask whether the sample population’s motivation to take
online surveys may be correlated with the study’s outcome of interest.
242. We recognized that while many surveys can only speculate about the
potential reasons somebody may or may not be in the sample produced, in designing
our noncompete survey, we were at least free to ask people who decided to take the
survey why they agreed to take surveys in general and our survey in particular.
243. This aligns with wider findings. See Baker et al., supra note 232, at 720.
244. See supra Table 13. This was surprising to us, as we assumed that most
individuals would sign up to receive the monetary benefits that were available.
245. See supra Table 13. A smaller but similar trend is observed for those
who signed up because they want money.
246. By which we mean not only that the respondents reported truthfully, but
also that the list of potential reasons from among which they had to choose is
reasonably comprehensive.
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likely (relative to those who care less about these things) to agree to
a noncompete. Unfortunately, it is not clear to us whether this is true.
Overall, our best guess—based on hypotheses and anecdotes, but no
rigorous evidence—is that individuals who choose to sign up for
online surveys are at least somewhat less likely to be employed in
jobs that require noncompetes.247 If this supposition is true, then our
incidence measures would likely be biased downward.
The third selection issue revolves around who receives the
survey—i.e., whether the survey is being sent broadly to a random
selection of the panel population (or the entire population) or instead
to a particular (and potentially skewed) subset of that population. We
learned, via conversations with ClearVoice Research and Qualtrics
representatives, that panel partners typically estimate the number of
invitations they must send in order to reach the target number of
respondents and then randomly distribute the survey to members of
the panel population.248 However, if there are binding sample quotas
in place,249 panel partners consider only candidates who will ensure
compliance with the quota criteria, sending the survey randomly to
these individuals. Thus the only possible selection issue at this stage
appears to be selection on the variables underlying the criteria for the
quotas. Yet it is critical to recall that we intended this precise form of
selection.250 Accordingly, the data themselves allow researchers to
explicitly study and account for this species of selection—through
the use of weighting methods or by controlling for the quotas in a
regression framework—because the variables (e.g., state, job status,
earnings, age, education, etc.) with which we build the quota criteria
are objective, observable, and included in our data.
The fourth selection issue is the standard threat of nonresponse
bias: The individuals who receive the survey are not required to
finish or even start it.251 If the individuals who enter into noncompete
agreements with their employers were systematically more or less
likely to finish the survey, estimates of the incidence of noncompetes
will be biased.252 What might cause someone with a noncompete to
be more or less likely to start or finish our survey?
247. Our speculation is based on the observed differentials in employment in
the online survey-taking population and the population overall. See supra Table 12.
248. We learned these details in phone conversations in mid-2014.
249. See supra Section II.B (discussing our quotas and sample criteria).
250. See supra at 405, for a discussion of our quota criteria.
251. Baker et al., supra note 232, at 728.
252. TOURANGEAU ET AL., supra note 159, at 24. For an example of a study
where a variable of interest interacted with survey uptake and completion, see Mick

432

Michigan State Law Review

2016

One important potential source of selection bias is whether the
survey was advertised or described as a “noncompete” survey before
a prospective respondent decided whether to begin the survey. If so,
those who were aware of what a noncompete agreement was or who
were more or less interested in issues related to noncompetes might
have been differentially more or less likely to take the survey. And if
these individuals were systematically more likely to have agreed to
noncompetes in the past—indeed, noncompete experiences may be at
the root of any special interest), estimates from the survey data about
noncompete incidence, for example, may be unreliable. Fortunately,
none of the survey invitations included the word “noncompete” or
something similar anywhere in the invitation,253 and we know of no
evidence that respondents had any indication of the subject matter of
the survey before agreeing to begin.254
Unfortunately, absence of selection into who opens and begins
a survey does not preclude significant selection from occurring prior
to the completion of the survey. Specifically, conditional on starting
the survey, if respondents who are currently bound by noncompetes
were more likely to finish the survey, perhaps because they found the
survey more interesting, incidence estimates would in all likelihood
be upward biased.255 To explore the scope of the danger posed by this
selection concern, we simply asked respondents why they took our
survey. Table 14 displays how survey finishers responded to this
question by income quartile. Differences across income quartiles are
relatively minor. Higher-income individuals—who are more likely to
P. Couper et al., Noncoverage and Nonresponse in an Internet Survey, 36 SOC. SCI.
RES. 131, 146 (2007).
253. Examples of screen shots of these online invitations are on file with the
authors. To illustrate the sort of language the panel partners use in these invitations,
consider ClearVoice’s framing: “You are about to start a General Opinion Survey,
and you can earn $3.00 for your participation.”
254. Another potential source of selection bias relates to whether potential
respondents may have declined to initiate the survey because they deemed the
compensation for the survey to be too small relative to the estimated 27 minutes it
would probably take to complete the survey. Respondents were informed of the
median finish time of the survey based on the pilot sample. We do not have a
method to account for the extent of this form of selection, although we can point out
that 29% of the 50,504 individuals who started the survey and were a part of the
sample of interest finished it in the first round.
255. In our discussion, we focus on the potential selection bias in estimating
noncompete incidence, but we remind readers that the threat is more general. If a
certain type of respondent is more likely to finish the survey, and that type of
respondent is not representative on any measure, then it is invalid to draw inferences
about how the population fares on that measure.
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have signed a noncompete agreement—were more “interested” in the
survey than lower-income respondents, but not by a large margin (8
percentage points). Higher-income individuals were also somewhat
more likely to have decided to take the survey at least in part to share
their experiences with noncompetes, but differences in this statistic
across income groups were just as small.
Table 14
WHY TAKE THIS SURVEY?
Reason
Interest
Like rewards
Want money
Enjoy
CNC experience
Need money
Game benefits
Pass time
Other

0%–25%
0.48
0.44
0.38
0.35
0.18
0.30
0.09
0.07
0.01

Income Quartile
25%–50%
50%–75%
0.49
0.52
0.43
0.43
0.36
0.35
0.31
0.31
0.19
0.21
0.27
0.17
0.12
0.09
0.08
0.08
0.02
0.01

75%–100%
0.56
0.42
0.26
0.26
0.26
0.08
0.10
0.08
0.02

Total
0.52
0.43
0.33
0.30
0.21
0.18
0.10
0.08
0.01

Note: This table presents the reasons respondents selected when they were asked why they took this particular
survey. Respondents were free to provide more than one answer. The numbers in the table are column percentages.

Nevertheless, a significant number of our respondents declared
that their desire to “share my experiences with noncompetes” was
among their reasons for completing the survey, and this fact raises
questions about selection among the finishers. It is unclear to us
whether “share my experiences with noncompetes” was interpreted
to mean “share my employment experiences” or “share my views on
noncompetes” or even “share my family member’s experiences with
noncompetes,”256 but if finishers were in fact more likely to have
noncompete stories to tell and if having such stories implies more
experience with such agreements, care must be taken in drawing
inferences from our data, at least when assessing absolute incidence
levels, rather than relative differences across groups of finishers. On
the other hand, there are selection pressures that cut the other way, as
well: Potential respondents may have declined to finish the survey to
avoid answering questions about their existing noncompete, either
because the questions made them feel uncomfortable for some workrelated reason or because doing so might plausibly be interpreted as
violating a confidentiality clause.257
256. In support of these alternative interpretations, we estimate that 71% of
the respondents who selected this response were not currently laboring under a
noncompete, and 48% of these individuals had never signed a noncompete.
257. As a result, it is ultimately unclear how concerned we should be about
respondents who select “wanted to share my experiences with noncompetes.” Only
20% of respondents selected this reason in explaining why they completed the
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To address this selection issue, one partial solution is to probe
the robustness of any analyses by eliminating all respondents who
indicated an interest in sharing their noncompete experiences in the
survey. While this strategy does not address the fact that those with
noncompetes may disproportionately fail to finish the survey, it does
remove the set of respondents whose answers are likely to artificially
inflate our incidence estimates.258 Some fraction of these respondents
would have completed the survey regardless of their experiences,
however. Therefore, this tactic is necessarily a conservative strategy
to resolve potentially confounding selection, allowing us to interpret
the resulting incidence estimates as lower bounds.
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Figure 1
RESPONDENT EXPERIENCE TAKING ONLINE SURVEYS
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Note: Years Taking Online Surveys is truncated at 25 years. There are 338 respondents who report taking
online surveys for more than 25 years. Kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.3621.

We also investigated our survey respondents’ general online
survey-taking frequency and history with the objective of detecting
survey, and many of these respondents later indicated that they had never actually
signed a noncompete. Still, users of our survey data and consumers of any results
that derive from these data ought to keep this selection issue and how it might affect
the reliability of any inferences in mind when engaging in interpretation.
258. Indeed, researchers are free to calculate the incidence of noncompetes
after dropping from the sample all individuals who reported that they chose to finish
the survey to share their experiences about noncompetes. Importantly, because 71%
of those who ticked this option were not currently bound by noncompetes, excluding
these individuals only marginally affects our basic incidence results.
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any other selection threats.259 We asked our respondents to report
how long (in years) they had been taking online surveys and how
frequently they currently take them. Figure 1 above illustrates the
distribution of the length of time (in years) respondents report having
taken online surveys. The median response is 0.5 years, suggesting
that most of the sample is relatively new to the online survey-taking
world. Table 15 shows the frequency with which the final sample of
respondents takes online surveys. Overall, higher-income individuals
in our data tend to respond less frequently to survey invitations than
lower-income members of the sample.
Table 15
HOW FREQUENTLY DO YOU TAKE ONLINE SURVEYS?
First online survey
Daily
A few times per week
Once a week
A few times per month
Once a month
A few times per year
Less than a few times per year
Total

0%–25%
3.91
36.97
37.78
3.72
10.26
1.91
3.81
1.63
100.00

Income Quartile
25%–50%
50%–75%
3.43
2.43
35.51
31.32
36.81
39.33
4.44
5.30
11.56
13.19
1.76
2.71
4.73
4.07
1.76
1.65

75%–100%
3.36
23.16
40.93
6.66
16.05
3.08
5.14
1.62

100.00

100.00

100.00

Total
3.11
30.39
39.07
5.35
13.38
2.51
4.53
1.66
100.00

Note: This table shows the frequency with which respondents take online surveys. The numbers in the table are
column percentages.

Our discussion to this point has spoken primarily in terms of
“overall” selection into or out of the sample, but the role that
observable characteristics—such as age, occupation, education, and
income—play in sample selection also merits mention. Because we
use quotas to constrain the final composition of the sample with
respect to many observables,260 the real selection question is what
distinguishes, for example, the college-educated managers who earn
$60,000 per year that we do observe in our sample from those we do
not observe in our sample (either because they are not online, did not
sign up to take online surveys, or did not start or finish the survey).
In particular, on what other dimensions, if any, do they differ, and
what do these potential differences mean for the estimated incidence
of noncompetes or other questions related to noncompetes?261
259. For example, if the sample were dominated by long-time survey takers,
one might be worried that they use online surveys as a mode of employment, which
may reflect systematic differences in the types of jobs they have had and thus
whether they have signed or are currently bound by a noncompete.
260. See supra Section II.B. For an explanation of quota sampling, see Quota
Sampling, LÆRD DISSERTATION, http://dissertation.laerd.com/quota-sampling.php
[https://perma.cc/GH5Z-L9QQ] (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
261. Bethlehem, supra note 215, at 183.
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For all we know, the answer may have to do with the fact that
some individuals have a network of family, friends, or colleagues
who participate in online surveys regularly and that these individuals
are more likely to register to take online surveys themselves as a
result of their association with this network.262 Unfortunately, we
have no rigorous evidence to speak to whether this (or any other)
theory is accurate. However, to the extent that contact with these
networks is independent of noncompete signing status or experience
conditional on factors such as occupation, income, and education,
selection bias concerns on the whole should be minimal.263
So far in this Section, we have addressed four potential sources
of sample selection that might affect the content of our data: the
nonrepresentativeness of our respondents (1) who are online, (2) who
register to take online surveys, (3) who are invited to take our online
survey, and (4) who start and complete the survey. Although we are
relatively unconcerned about the first and third forms of selection,
the second and fourth forms present as more serious challenges. We
consider all four and offer reasons and evidence suggesting that none
is, in practice, likely to be particularly problematic. Still, because our
measures are imprecise or inaccurate and our methods and arguments
have limitations, we can never entirely discount selection. Moreover,
although selection bias plagues all surveys, the disease is particularly
virulent in a convenience survey of the sort we employed. For these
reasons, we ought, when possible, to limit the extent of any potential
bias.264 One important approach to remediating selection effects in
survey data is reweighting the sample.265
2. Weighting Techniques
Due to falling response rates for more traditional survey modes
(random-digit dialing, mail-in surveys, etc.), scholars have developed
various reweighting approaches to address selection in convenience
samples. When available and appropriate, reweighting methods free
262. In retrospect, we wish we would have asked respondents the question,
“How did you come to sign up to receive online surveys?”
263. BETHLEHEM & BIFFIGNANDI, supra note 216, at 281-94.
264. See the discussion above with regard to methods for identifying such
biases. We propose in some instances dropping certain suspect observations (e.g.,
those respondents who may have completed the survey precisely because they are a
party to a noncompete contract) to provide a bound on any bias.
265. See Paul P. Biemer & Sharon L. Christ, Weighting Survey Data, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF SURVEY METHODOLOGY 317 (Edith D. de Leeuw et
al. eds., 2008).
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researchers to exploit more cost-effective data-collection strategies,
including the use of online surveys.266 In what follows, we introduce
a few standard approaches; compare their properties, assumptions,
and application to our survey data; and choose the one best suited for
understanding noncompete activity in the U.S. labor force.
We evaluate three weighting methods: (1) post-stratification,
(2) iterative proportional fitting (raking), and (3) inverse propensity
score weighting. We sketch each of these methodologies and apply
them to our survey data.267 Each method requires demographic data
from the population of interest—i.e., representative data from the
population that we hope the reweighted survey data will closely
match.268 We use data from the three-year American Community
Survey (ACS) from 2014,269 which contains information on gender,
age, education, race, industry, occupation, annual weeks worked,
state, employee class, marital status, and whether the individual is
enrolled as a student. We restrict the ACS population we examine to
match our population of interest: labor force participants aged 18–75
who work in the private sector or in a public healthcare system.
Post-stratification reweights the survey data, when possible, to
match the joint distribution of key variables in the population.270 The
method proceeds by placing each survey data observation into a cell
defined by the values of key covariates, such as gender, age-group,
income-range, and education indicators.271 The researcher then adds
up the number of observations in each cell, and calculates the
proportion of the survey data that falls within each cell—sc. Next, the
researcher tabulates corresponding proportions for each cell in the
population data—pc. Post-stratification weights each cell c by the
ratio of these two proportions: wc = pc / sc.272
266. See generally HANDBOOK OF SURVEY METHODOLOGY FOR THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES, supra note 213.
267. An interested reader may benefit from referencing Graham Kalton &
Ismael Flores-Cervantes, Weighting Methods, 19 J. OFFICIAL STATISTICS 81 (2003),
for a recent discussion.
268. Bethlehem, supra note 215, at 180.
269. To learn more about content, structure, and history of the ACS, see
supra notes 169 & 233.
270. The joint distribution of, say, occupation and industry reflects the
proportion of individuals in each occupation across all industries (e.g., managers in
manufacturing, in sales, etc.) for every occupation. BETHLEHEM & BIFFIGNANDI,
supra note 216, at 335-36.
271. See Kalton & Flores-Cervantes, supra note 267, at 92-94.
272. For example, if 25% of the sample is male college graduates, while the
proportion of the population that is male college graduates is 50%, then the weight
applied to the male college graduates cell in the sample is 50/25 = 2.
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One advantage of using post-stratification is that it reweights
the sample to exactly match the joint distribution observed in the
population of interest.273 A critical downside of post-stratification,
however, is the “curse of dimensionality,” which can arise when one
uses a large number of variables in conducting the post-stratification
reweighting. Specifically, absent sufficient data, certain cells in the
survey data can wind up being sparsely populated or not populated at
all. The practical consequence is unstable (and therefore unreliable)
estimates as a cell’s weight might be laid on only a few or even a
single—potentially unrepresentative—individual.274
Another disadvantage of post-stratification is the possibility of
measurement error.275 Post-stratification works by matching the joint
distribution of the variables of interest, and so an erroneous entry
with respect to any of these variables can result in the observation
being placed in the wrong cell. Such measurement error may be
especially likely with questions that impose a significant cognitive
burden on respondents, such as requests for occupation and industry
codes, which may require that each survey taker read a long list of
descriptions before selecting the most appropriate match.276
To calculate post-stratification weights, we experimented with
four sets of post-stratifying variables:
1. Post-Stratification I uses gender, age (three categories), annual
compensation (three categories), industry, and occupation as
post-stratifying variables, which equates to 6,248 cells. Within
our sample, 16 individuals had characteristics that did not
match a single individual in the ACS data, meaning they were
273. See Kalton & Flores-Cervantes, supra note 267, at 84-86. This feature
of post-stratification is important because, as a result, within the post-stratifying
variables, sample estimates are unbiased predictors of the corresponding population
values. For example, post-stratifying survey data on occupation and industry allows
one to accurately predict not only the incidence of noncompetes across occupations
(e.g., between managers and salespeople) and across industries (e.g., between
manufacturing and sales), but also within occupations across industries (e.g.,
between managers who work in manufacturing and managers who work in sales).
274. BETHLEHEM & BIFFIGNANDI, supra note 216, at 347-48.
275. See Joop J. Hox, Accommodating Measurement Errors, in INT’L
HANDBOOK OF SURVEY METHODOLOGY, supra note 265, at 387.
276. Under these circumstances, asking redundant questions and engaging in
painstaking data cleaning may be necessary before it is wise to use such variables in
post-stratification weighting procedures. With respect to our data, we have sought to
recode our occupation and industry data from text-entered answers to occupation
and industry questions (comparing them to the codes entered) to match as narrowly
defined as possible NAICS and SOC codes. See supra at 421-22, for details on how
we performed this procedure with our data.
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not placed in a cell. Relatedly, sample respondents did not fall
into all 6,248 cells; indeed, 4,343 of the 6,248 did not contain a
single sample respondent. These unfilled cells represented
13.6% of the population.
2. Post-Stratification II includes as post-stratifying variables just
annual compensation (three categories), occupation, and
industry, which generated 1,202 cells. There were three
individuals in the sample who were not placed in a cell
because of their idiosyncratic characteristics. Of the 1,202
cells, 576 had no sample respondents, although these unfilled
cells represented just 3.2% of the population.
3. Post-Stratification III omits industry (on account of the fact
that including industry and occupation alone generate over 400
cells), but includes other key variables: gender, age (three
categories), annual compensation (three categories), education
(three categories), and occupation, which created 1,188 cells.
Every sample respondent fell into one of the cells. Of the
1,188 cells, 325 cells were unfilled by sample respondents.
These 325 cells represented 2% of the population.
4. Post-Stratification IV includes as post-stratifying variables just
occupation and industry, resulting in 413 cells. Each sample
respondent fit into one of the cells. Of these 413 cells, 124 of
them (representing 1.1% of the population) did not contain a
single sample respondent.
Iterative proportional fitting (also known as raking) ignores the
joint distribution of selected variables in the population and instead
focuses on reweighting the sample so that the marginal probability
densities of variables of interest match those of the population.277
Because raking does not seek to match the joint distribution of the
sample to the population, the curse of dimensionality does not
arise—the number of cells does not increase exponentially as you
add variables.278 Raking gets its name from the way in which the
iterative procedure works. Essentially, the procedure cycles through
the variables matching each marginal survey density to its marginal
population density, iterating until each variable is appropriately
weighted.279 The primary benefit of raking is that it is possible to
277. See Kalton & Flores-Cervantes, supra note 267, at 86-87.
278. Id.
279. To describe how raking works more intuitively, imagine taking the joint
distribution of two indicator variables in the sample and arranging them in a two-bytwo table. Raking works by first moving down the table, weighting each observation to
match the marginal distribution of that variable in the population. Assuming the
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match the marginal distribution of many variables;280 the downside of
this weighting approach that it ignores joint distribution information
from the population.281
Inverse probability weighting proceeds by estimating the
conditional probability that a particular individual would have been a
survey respondent given the nature of the population.282 Thus, if the
estimated propensity score for an individual with a particular set of
covariates is 0.10,283 we estimate that for every 10 individuals in the
population with those covariate values, one of them should be a
respondent in the sample.284 Conversely, one individual in the sample
marginal distribution of the other variable in the sample does not match the marginal
distribution in the population, the next step involves raking in the other direction—
across the table—to match the other variable’s marginal density to its population
marginal density. This second step may result in the first variable’s marginal density
departing from the population density, so the process iterates, and raking continues
until both variables match their marginal population densities.
280. See Kalton & Flores-Cervantes, supra note 267, at 86-87; Little, supra
note 221, at 1009-10.
281. Bethlehem & Callegaro, supra note 224, at 269. We chose to rake our
sample by gender, age (deciles), annual compensation (20 quantiles), industry,
occupation, education (nine categories), an indicator for being in school, employee
class (for-profit, nonprofit), an indicator for being unemployed, indicators for
working more than 40 weeks per year and for working more than 40 hours per week,
and state. We implemented raking with the -ipfweight- command in Stata. See
Michael Bergmann, IPFWEIGHT: Strata Module to Create Adjustment Weights for
Surveys, IDEAS, http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/i/ipfweight.ado [https://perma.cc/
W5Y7-TH6R] (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). We allowed for 1,000 iterations and set
the maximum weight at 5. See David Izrael et al., Extreme Survey Weight
Adjustment as a Component of Sample Balancing (a.k.a. Raking), SAS GLOBAL F.,
2009, at 2, commenting with respect to maximum weights that:
There are no strict rules or procedures either to define extreme weights or for
trimming the weights. Different surveys follow different rules and therefore in
practice there are several procedures to trim extreme weights. Some common
procedures for trimming large weights include: 1) identifying any weight
bigger than 4 or 5 times the mean weight as an outlier weight and trimming
that weight by making it equal to the limit, 2) identifying any weight bigger
than the median weight plus 5 or 6 times the inter-quartile range of the weights
and trimming the weight by making equal to the limit, and 3) truncating
weights above a certain percentile like 95 or 99 in the distribution of weights.
For another discussion, see MATTHEW DEBELL ET AL., USER’S GUIDE TO THE
ADVANCE RELEASE OF THE 2008–2009 ANES PANEL STUDY 31 (2009), http://www.
electionstudies.org/studypages/2008_2009panel/anes2008_2009panel_UserGuide_
AdvanceRelease.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RAC-BAJS] (“Trim weights larger than 5.”).
282. Stephanie Steinmetz et al., Improving Web Survey Quality, in ONLINE
PANEL RESEARCH, supra note 184, at 273, 280-81.
283. Bethlehem & Callegaro, supra note 224, at 270.
284. Id.

Understanding Noncompetition Agreements

441

represents 10 people in the actual population.285 Weights are thus
attributed to individual respondents in the form ͳΤƸ where Ƹ is the
estimated probability of sample participation, typically predicted
using a logit or probit model.286 To implement this weighting method,
we estimated a simple logit model on a set of demographically
significant independent variables.287
Table 16
WEIGHTING SUMMARY STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS
Panel A: Weighting Summary Statistics
Weighting Method
Raking
Post-Stratification I
Post-Stratification II
Post-Stratification III
Post-Stratification IV
IPW I
IPW II

Obs.
10,226
10,210
10,223
10,226
10,226
10,226
10,226

Mean
1.00
0.87
0.97
0.98
0.99
10,788
10,787

Std. Dev.
1.30
0.95
0.93
1.25
0.78
20,660
20,660

Min
Max
Max/Min
0.00
5.00
1,945
0.00
20.25
14,087
0.02
21.03
1,245
0.03
65.00
2,323
0.02
9.20
461
238 1,042,315
#########
4,373
237 1,042,314
#########
4,391

Panel B: Correlation Between Weights
Raking
Raking
Post-Stratification I
Post-Stratification II
Post-Stratification III
Post-Stratification IV
IPW I
IPW II

1.00
0.38
0.43
0.42
0.46
0.53
0.53

Post-Strat. Post-Strat. Post-Strat. Post-Strat.
I
II
III
IV
1.00
0.65
0.61
0.56
0.23
0.23

1.00
0.47
0.78
0.28
0.28

1.00
0.42
0.29
0.29

1.00
0.29
0.29

IPW I

IPW II

1.00
1.00

1.00

Note: Panel A shows summary statistics for seven weighting schemes: raking, four types of post-stratification, and
two types of inverse probability weights. Raking uses gender, age (deciles), annual compensation (20 quantiles),
industry, occupation, education (9 categories), an indicator for being in school, employee class (for-profit,
nonprofit), an indicator for being unemployed, indicators for working more than 40 weeks per year and for
working more than 40 hours per week, and state. We allowed for 1,000 iterations and set the maximum weight at
5. Post-Strat. I includes gender, age (3 categories), annual compensation (3 categories), industry, and occupation
(6,248 cells). Post-Strat. II includes annual compensation (3 categories), occupation, and industry (1,202 cells).
Post-Strat. III includes gender, age (3 categories), annual compensation (3 categories), education (3 categories),
and occupation (1,188 cells). Post-Strat. IV includes occupation and industry (413 cells). IPW I is constructed as
the inverse of the predicted probability of participating in the sample (1/p̂) from a logit model in which an indicator
for participating in the survey is regressed on gender, age (deciles), annual compensation (20 quantiles), industry,
occupation, education (9 categories), an indicator for being in school, employee class (for-profit, nonprofit), an
indicator for being unemployed, indicators for working more than 40 weeks per year and for working more than 40
hours per week, state, race, and an indicator for being married. IPW II is obtained by calculating (1-p̂)/p̂. Panel B
shows the correlation matrix of the weighting variables.

285. Id.
286. Id. One can improve the stability of the sample by further multiplying the
weight byͳ െ Ƹ , which increases the weight given to those respondents likely to be in
the sample and decreases the weight given to those unlikely to be in the sample. See Peter
C. Austin, An Introduction to Propensity Score Methods for Reducing the Effects of
Confounding in Observational Studies, 46 MULTIVARIATE BEHAV. RES. 399, 409 (2011)
(citing Stephen L. Morgan & Jennifer J. Todd, A Diagnostic Routine for the Detection of
Consequential Heterogeneity of Causal Effects, 38 SOC. METHODOLOGY 231 (2008)).
287. Specifically, we included gender, age (deciles), annual compensation (20
quantiles), industry, occupation, education (nine categories), an indicator for being in
school, employee class (for-profit, nonprofit), an indicator for being unemployed,
indicators for working more than 40 weeks per year and for working more than 40 hours
per week, state, race, and an indicator for being married.

442

Michigan State Law Review

2016

Table 16 offers summary statistics for our weighting variables
and a correlation matrix.288 In the abstract, each weighting approach
has its own merits, but in practice, researchers must choose among
them.289 To select our baseline weighting approach, we analyzed the
ability of each set of weights to match the distributions of important
variables in our survey data to actual ACS population distributions.
For each variable, we calculated the absolute value of the difference
between the proportion in the cell given by the weighting method
and the proportion in the cell in the population. We then summed
these absolute values across all cells for a given weighting scheme.
The result of this sum is the proportion of “misplaced” individuals in
the weighted sample relative to the population. We report the results
of this exercise across a number of variables in Table 17 below.
Table 17
WEIGHTING METHODS AND POPULATION DISTRIBUTIONS
Variable

Raking

Education (9 categories)
Percent misallocated
12.99
Per-cell misallocation average
1.44
Income (20 categories)
Percent misallocated
3.92
Per-cell misallocation average
0.20
Age (10 categories)
Percent misallocated
0.00
Per-cell misallocation average
0.00
Occupation (22 categories)
Percent misallocated
0.28
Per-cell misallocation average
0.01
Industry (19 categories)
Percent misallocated
0.05
Per-cell misallocation average
0.00
State (51 categories)
Percent misallocated
0.00
Per-cell misallocation average
0.00
Occupation by Industry (289 categories)
Percent misallocated
20.42
Per-cell misallocation average
0.07

PostStrat. I

Weighting Method
PostPostPostStrat II Strat. III Strat. IV

IPW I

IPW II

37.46
4.16

39.30
4.37

31.54
3.50

41.16
4.57

7.25
0.81

7.25
0.81

26.68
1.33

27.76
1.39

26.65
1.33

29.95
1.50

8.56
0.43

8.56
0.43

9.28
0.93

14.64
1.46

8.20
0.82

15.78
1.58

7.78
0.78

7.78
0.78

10.44
0.47

2.61
0.12

2.06
0.09

1.12
0.05

9.30
0.42

9.30
0.42

8.29
0.44

2.15
0.11

8.53
0.45

1.04
0.05

9.88
0.52

9.89
0.52

23.53
0.46

22.43
0.44

23.38
0.46

20.75
0.41

9.66
0.19

9.66
0.19

17.13
0.06

3.87
0.01

22.78
0.08

0.00
0.00

25.79
0.09

25.79
0.09

Note: This table compares the ability of seven weighting schemes to match sample distributions of key variables
to population distributions. For each variable of interest and for each weighting method, we aggregated across the
distribution to identify the total percentage of individuals who are misallocated by the weighting method when
compared to the population at large. The per-cell misallocation average is the total percentage that is misallocated
across all the cells divided by the total number of cells.

288. Importantly, inverse probability weights are frequency weights—i.e.,
the number of individuals in the population represented by each respondent—while
raking and post-stratification weights are cell or analytic weights that instead reflect
the importance of an individual’s cell relative to the population. The first set of poststratification weights are the most unstable, which can be attributed to the sparseness
of populated cells in that weighting scheme.
289. We have examined the robustness of our work to different weighting
schemes, and have found no significant differences in the substance of the results.
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First, we consider how well the weighting methods performed
in matching the population’s educational achievement distribution.290
Post-stratification weights performed relatively poorly, misallocating
between 32% and 41% of the population. Inverse probability weights
scored best on this measure, misallocating 7% of individuals. Raking
improperly assigned 13% of individuals, although this appears to be
a consequence of the restriction we imposed that groups not receive
weights exceeding 5.291 By contrast, inverse probability weighting
did better because its weights were unconstrained. Furthermore, the
bulk of raking’s misallocation resulted from the weight constraint
limiting the size of the group that did not complete high school,
placing weight instead on the high school graduate groups.292
With respect to other key variables—income, age, occupation,
industry, and state—raking weights matched the survey and ACS
distributions almost perfectly, while post-stratification fared poorly
and inverse probability weighting performed only somewhat better.
For instance, with our measure of income, post-stratification weights
misallocated approximately 30% of the data, and inverse probability
weighting misallocated 7.8%. Raking only misallocated 3.9%. Poststratification’s poor performance is no surprise given that we were
able to specify relatively few post-stratification variables.
Raking works by matching marginal population distributions,
and so one important test is whether raking also aligns the sample’s
and the population’s joint occupation-industry distributions.293 We
created the proportions for each occupation-industry cell using twodigit NAICS and SOC codes.294 We found that raking misallocated
290. We are keen on matching the education distribution of the population
because, as with a labor force participant’s occupation and industry, we surmise that
education is likely to be strongly related to the use of noncompetes.
291. See supra note 281.
292. We do not report these results, but they are available upon request.
293. It is important that our sample closely matches the joint occupationindustry distribution because we expect noncompete use will depend not just on
occupation and industry separately, but on the interaction between the two.
294. See Introduction to NAICS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.
census.gov/eos/www/naics/ [https://perma.cc/YT3A-GCJA] (last modified Mar. 4,
2016) (“The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is the
standard used by Federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments
for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the
U.S. business economy.”); Standard Occupational Classification, U.S. BUREAU OF
LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/soc/ [https://perma.cc/JRC8-TBEE] (last visited
Apr. 14, 2016) (“The 2010 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system is
used by Federal statistical agencies to classify workers into occupational categories
for the purpose of collecting, calculating, or disseminating data.”).
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20.4% of the data, while inverse probability weighting misallocated
even more—25.8%. Among the post-stratification choices, the ones
that use occupation by industry performed noticeably better: PostStratification IV, for example, which uses only occupation and
industry as post-stratifying variables, matched the joint distribution
perfectly. Post-Stratification II performed almost as well, which is
not unexpected because the only additional post-stratifying variable
is income. Post-Stratification III performed poorly because it does
not post-stratify on industry, and Post-Stratification I failed for the
straightforward reason that it resulted in too many empty cells.
While these approaches for evaluating the performance of our
weighting schemes are ad hoc,295 we conclude for purposes of the
analysis we present in Part III that reweighting using our raking
approach makes the most sense because of raking’s ability to match
the marginal distributions while performing adequately in matching
the ASC population’s joint occupation by industry distribution.296 We
acknowledge that, for purposes of demonstrating how they work in
practice, we assess just a few reweighting schemes in these pages.297
We also admit that we chose to focus on variables that are relevant to
our particular research aims. Given our sampling approach and our
goal of understanding the role noncompetes play in the workplace,
the ability of a reweighting scheme to match (as closely as possible)
our survey sample to the joint occupation-industry distribution of the
population seems to us particularly important,298 but researchers with
other aspirations may understandably emphasize representativeness
along other dimensions.299
295. A more sophisticated method might proceed by incorporating the size of
the differences across variables of interest under each weighting method and the
population of interest, and then combine those differences into overall estimates of
each method’s viability.
296. We hasten to add that our incidence estimates are qualitatively similar
regardless of which weighting approach we employ.
297. More complicated weighting methods exist, including the method used
by Axel Börsch-Supan, Detlev Elsner, Heino Faßbender, Rainer Kiefer, Daniel
McFadden, and Joachim Winter. See Axel Börsch-Supan et al., How to Make
Internet Surveys Representative: A Case Study of a Two-Step Weighting Procedure
3 (Mar. 30, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Michigan State Law
Review), http://www.mea.mpisoc.mpg.de/uploads/user_mea_discussionpapers/loil50ozz
320r55b_pd1_040330%20geschuetzt.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB97-GY4F] (using “an
explicit behavioral model of Internet access and survey participation decisions” to
construct weights).
298. See supra notes 281, 285.
299. It is worth making explicit that the particular weighting scheme one
uses may influence the extent to which the differences in our samples—i.e., the
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Sample selection concerns are pervasive in empirical work.300
Researchers must recognize them where they exist, address them
when possible, and in every event, interpret their findings in light of
them. In this Section, we outlined general selection issues with using
our survey data to estimate the overall incidence of noncompetes,
and we have suggested both ways to test the robustness of any
findings to these selection issues and ways to mitigate selection’s
likely effects on some dimensions by reweighting.
We determined to conduct our survey using an online platform
because, in our view, the benefits outweighed the costs. Selection
concerns may in fact be less serious for our survey and the questions
motivating it than in other important contexts.301 Moreover, in some
circumstances, selection effects can be “signed”—meaning one can
at least identify the direction of any selection bias—which may
permit us to establish an upper or lower bound on the answer to any
particular question.302 Finally, reweighting techniques are available to
different ways of cleaning and refining the data—matter in the final analysis. For
example, post-stratifying on occupation and income will result in the grocery bagger
who earns $2 million receiving zero weight, while raking will accord him positive
though small weight. Which of these weighting approaches is more suitable turns in
part on our data cleaning and refinement efforts. If the survey data for the grocery
bagger are legitimate aside from his income, then post-stratification will award him
too little weight, and raking would be an improvement. On the other hand, if the rest
of his data are inaccurate, then giving him zero weight is equivalent to dropping him
from the sample, which would appear to be the better choice. We have done our best
to clean the data, so individuals who remain through the fourth round of preliminary
cleaning are associated with accurate data. We also believe the imputation methods
we have used are appropriate and that they will contribute to more accurate weights
regardless of the weighting scheme a researcher chooses.
300. James J. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error, 47
ECONOMETRICA 153, 153 (1979) (“This paper discusses the bias that results from
using nonrandomly selected samples to estimate behavioral relationships as an
ordinary specification bias that arises because of a missing data problem.”). For an
instructional resource that seeks to develop the ability to identify and navigate
selection concerns, see Denise Dickins et al., The Importance of Sample Selection:
An Instructional Resource Using U.S. Presidential Elections, 31 J. ACCT. EDUC. 68,
75 (2013) (“Sampling is a powerful, efficient auditing tool. However, it is
susceptible to the possibility that conclusions drawn from a sample’s results may not
be representative of a population’s actual characteristics (nature, value, outcome,
etc.). To reduce this sampling risk, it is important that steps be taken to fully
understand the characteristics of the population to be sampled, to use the appropriate
sampling unit, and to mitigate the likelihood of biased results.”).
301. Although, as we reiterate here, researchers should whenever possible
explicitly ask questions to understand the extent of any such selection.
302. For example, if individuals who sign noncompetes (typically assumed
to be highly educated and well-compensated) are less likely all else equal to be
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reduce or eliminate the effects of at least some sources of selection
bias. Nevertheless, care and caution remain important. Fortunately,
for the empirical result presented in this Article, we believe there is
even less reason to be concerned about selection than there may be
more generally. In Part III of this Article, we compare the incidence
of noncompete agreements across different noncompete enforcement
regimes. Selection is likely unable to explain the geographic pattern
we identify because differences in the scope or extent of noncompete
enforcement seem very likely to be orthogonal to which individuals
completed our survey.
F. Multiple Imputation
Multiple imputation creates multiple completed datasets (each
dataset being one imputation) from a single dataset with missing data
by “filling in” missing data using information from respondents for
whom the relevant data are not missing. In the context of our survey,
there are three types of “missing” values in our sample of completed
surveys: (1) missing values that result from a survey question being
added after the respondent had completed the survey; (2) “missing”
values that are entries flagged as unreasonable, as we describe above
in the Section on data refinement; and (3) “missing” values that arise
from the inability of respondents to recall the answer to a question—
e.g., whether they have agreed to a contract. The first two categories
of missing observations are typical problems, but the third category
is special to our context and so we describe our process for imputing
these data in detail, focusing in particular on those data that relate to
the use of covenants not to compete.
It is perhaps unremarkable that many labor force participants
appear to be unaware of what a noncompete is or, for that matter,
unsure of whether they have signed one.303 This fact is in line with
research and endless anecdotes indicating that many people do not
carefully read contractual language (if they read it at all),304 or if they
taking online surveys, then our survey will underestimate the incidence of
noncompetes in the population.
303. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 83, at 106; see also Jesse Rudy, What They
Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending Employment-at-Will in Light of Findings
that Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 307, 310-11 (2002) (“Empirical evidence on the subject strongly suggests
that employees do not understand the at-will employment term and its application.”).
304. See Kim, supra note 83, at 110-11; Rudy, supra note 303, at 340
(“[T]ry to recall the last time you read all of the disclaimers and warranty
information when you purchased a kitchen appliance . . . . Chances are, there is no
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do read it carefully, they fail to understand the significance of many
of its potentially important provisions.305 To be sure, whether an
employment contract contains a noncompete clause will be salient
for certain categories of employees with certain skills and in certain
industries.306 But in general, across almost every class of worker, at
least a few individuals are simply unsure about whether they are
currently subject to a noncompete (or would prefer not to say). For
our purposes, this raises the central question of how best to account
for—how to code and analyze—those individuals who indicate that
they “don’t know” or that they are “unsure” about whether they are a
party to a noncompetition agreement.
In our survey, we ask our respondents a number of questions
about their experience with and knowledge of noncompetes,307 after
specifically defining what a noncompetition agreement is, clarifying
what it is not, and providing some helpful information about when a
respondent might have been asked to sign one.308 Our incidence
analysis in Part III focuses on the current status of our respondents,
which involves the answer to the following question: “Did you sign a
non-competition agreement with your current employer?” Available
last time, because if you are like most consumers you have never read this
information.”).
305. See Kim, supra note 83, at 151; Rudy, supra note 303, at 340 (“Gaining
a working understanding of legal rules is costly for parties.”). We explore this
possibility in our survey: “Have you ever unknowingly signed a noncompete, only
to realize later that you had in fact signed one?”
306. See Kim, supra note 83, at 144 tbl. 5 (finding that 46.9% of those
without a high school diploma gave correct responses to questions involving the
lawfulness of various types of discharges, while 61.8% of those with an advanced
degree provided correct responses).
307. Examples of these noncompete-related questions from our 2014 survey
include without limitation the following: “Have you ever heard of a noncompete
[before this survey defined it for you]?”; “From where or from whom did you first
learn about noncompetes?”; “At what age did you first learn about noncompetes?”;
“Have you ever signed a non-competition agreement with any employer?”; “How
sure are you that you have or have not signed a non-competition agreement at some
point in your life?”
308. “A non-competition agreement is a contract between an employer and
an employee that prevents the employee from joining or creating a competing
company for a period of time after the employee leaves his or her current employer.”
Later, the survey offers additional information to the respondent: “It might be
helpful to know that non-competition agreements can be signed: (a) as stand-alone
contracts related to a job; (b) as part of policy manuals or employee handbooks you
acknowledged receiving; (c) as part of the ‘fine print’ in any employment material
you have every signed at work, such as a job application form; (d) along with other
contracts such as non-disclosure agreements, confidentiality agreements, nonsolicitation, and non-poaching agreements.”
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answer choices are:309 “Yes,” “No,” “Cannot remember,” and “Do
not want to say.”310 We interpret these answers as “yes,” “no,” and
the last two as “maybe.” Methodologically, the critical question is
how should we treat the respondents whose answer is a “maybe”?
We assume that at least a fraction of respondents who answer
“maybe” were actually bound by a noncompetition agreement when
we surveyed them. If our goal is to understand how common these
agreements are among labor force participants, we need a defensible
method for determining the percentage of respondents who would
have answered such an incidence question “yes” if they were fully
informed and willing to answer truthfully. We anticipate that this is
likely to be a general problem with future survey research about
contracting behavior.311 Neither missing data nor respondents lacking
the knowledge to answer survey questions is a new problem. Still,
we thought it might be of some value to explain how we address this
problem when the variable at issue—current noncompete status—is
essential to the analysis. We pursued two distinct strategies to
account for the “maybe” data.312
First, we posed and answered a slightly different question.
Rather than measure what percentage of the labor force is currently
bound by a noncompetition agreement, we calculated the minimum
and maximum bounds between which the true incidence percentage
most likely falls. This approach allows a more nuanced answer to the
incidence question: for example, “at least X% and at most Y% of
employees in this category are currently bound by a noncompete.”
The advantages of calculating, presenting, and interpreting incidence
numbers in this way is that, depending on the specific question, it is
309. Other questions we ask about noncompetition agreements sometimes
involve differently phrased answer options, depending on context.
310. We decided to include the last answer option because we anticipated
that some respondents might have believed their confidentiality agreements with
their employer or even just their conception of employee loyalty should preclude
their answering arguably sensitive questions about their private contractual
arrangements with their current employer.
311. See Marx, supra note 63, at 701 (“For six of the dyads, interviewees
could not remember whether the employer had included a noncompete in the
employment contract.”).
312. Another possibility is just to discard the “maybe” cases, but the listwise
deletion of observations can be the medicine that kills the patient. See Gary King et
al., Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for
Multiple Imputation, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 49, 49, 51-52 (“Listwise deletion
discards one-third of cases on average, which deletes both the few nonresponses and
the many responses in those cases. The result is a loss of valuable information at
best and severe selection bias at worst.”).
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intrinsically conservative.313 We make no implicit assumptions about
respondents who answered the question “maybe”; we explicitly and
simultaneously consider both extreme possibilities. We incorporate
both possibilities into the results we present below.
Second, to extract more information from our data, we also
used multiple imputation methods to estimate the true status for
respondents who answered “maybe.”314 “Multiple imputation . . .
replaces each missing or deficient value with two or more acceptable
values representing a distribution of possibilities.”315 As this passage
hints, the challenge in imputing missing values is accounting for the
uncertainty that necessarily surrounds predicted values. If we were to
ignore this concern, imputation would be straightforward: We would
just use what we already know to make our best guess. This might
equate to calculating the mean of the variable in question from those
observations in which we do observe a value.316 A more sophisticated
approach would compare observations with missing values to those
with known outcomes, and would then estimate the most likely
outcome using these comparisons.317 In other words, we would
replace missing values with the average value for similar cases—i.e.,
conditional on observed values of other variables.318
313. In fact, one could describe this route as the most conservative approach
because it lets the data speak entirely for themselves.
314. We discuss only one example of multiple imputation here, but the basic
ideas are applicable to other situations in which the researcher is unclear how the
respondent should have answered in an ideal world in which respondents answer
every question, information is complete, and memories are reliable.
315. DONALD B. RUBIN, MULTIPLE IMPUTATION FOR NONRESPONSE IN
SURVEYS 2 (1987); see also generally HANDBOOK OF STATISTICAL MODELING FOR
THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (Gerhard Arminger et al. eds., 1995).
316. See JEFFREY C. WAYMAN, MULTIPLE IMPUTATION FOR MISSING DATA:
WHAT IS IT AND HOW CAN I USE IT? 2 (presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the
Am. Educ. Research Assoc., Chi., Ill.), http://www.csos.jhu.edu/contact/staff/
jwayman_pub/wayman_multimp_aera2003.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BET2-PS9B]
(“Some of the most popular missing data methods involve ad-hoc deletion or
replacement of missing data.”).
317. Put differently, we would use the data we observe for all respondents to
model the observed outcome, in this case, the answers “yes” and “no.” Specifically,
using a subset of the data—the set of respondents who answered “yes” or “no”—we
might run a regression to estimate the relationships between observables (e.g., age,
education, gender, industry, etc.) and the outcome in question. With these estimates
in hand, we would then use them to predict the outcome (either “yes” or “no”) for
those who answered “maybe” using the same observables.
318. See Stephens & Unayama, supra note 203, at 10 (“A number of
straightforward approaches are available when the non-reporting of values follows
the selection on observables assumption.”).
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We are interested in testing hypotheses and making inferences,
however, which means we must not only estimate the most likely
value of noncompete incidence, but also how certain we are about
that value—i.e., the estimate’s reliability.319 Multiple imputation
methods accomplish this by building many plausible complete
datasets in which we explicitly incorporate randomness (making
them different, not mere copies), conducting the analysis on each of
them, and then combining the results to calculate final estimates
(including estimates of variance in the form of standard errors).320
For purposes of this example, we predicted whether individuals in
the “maybe” category had signed a noncompete 25 times, building
25 complete, but different, datasets, based on the characteristics of
those who answered “yes” and “no.”321 This allows us to estimate
noncompete incidence in a reliable way in Part III, taking into
account uncertainty surrounding who in the “maybe” group is bound
by a noncompete.
We imputed noncompete signing status, income, and all other
missing, flagged, or “maybe” variables in one step.322 We included as
319. Yang C. Yuan, Multiple Imputation for Missing Data: Concepts and
New Development 1 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with SAS Institute),
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/sas/library/multipleimputation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
8V9X-SX42] (“Single imputation does not reflect the uncertainty about the
predictions of the unknown missing values, and the resulting estimated variances of
the parameter estimates will be biased toward zero.”).
320. See King et al., supra note 312, at 53 (“Multiple imputation involves
imputing m values for each missing item and creating m completed data sets. Across
these completed data sets, the observed values are the same, but the missing values
are filled in with different imputations to reflect uncertainty levels. That is, for
missing cells the model predicts well, variation across the imputations is small; for
other cases, the variation may be larger, or asymmetric, to reflect whatever
knowledge and level of certainty is available about the missing information.
Analysts can then conveniently apply the statistical method they would have used if
there were no missing values to each of the m data sets, and use a simple procedure
. . . to combine the m results. As we explain below, m can be as small as 5 or 10.”).
321. See John W. Graham et al., How Many Imputations Are Really Needed?
Some Practical Clarifications of Multiple Imputation Theory, 8 PREVENTION SCI.
206, 206-13 (2007). In Table 5, the authors show the acceptable power falloff for
different levels of “missingness.” Id. at 212. In our data, 29.67% of our unweighted
sample report not knowing whether they signed a noncompete. Following the third
row, the authors recommend 20 imputations. Id. We added an additional five
imputations to increase power further.
322. We used Stata’s “mi impute chained” command. See STATA MULTIPLEIMPUTATION REFERENCE MANUAL: RELEASE 13, STATACORP LP, (2013),
https://www.stata.com/manuals13/mi.pdf, for additional details. We imputed the
following survey variables: whether the respondent has a retirement plan, deferred
compensation, stock options, and/or is unionized; is currently constrained by a
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predictive variables in the imputation all variables that are likely to
be related to noncompetes, as well as all of the variables that are also
being imputed in the same step.323 We used a logit model to impute
noncompete; has ever signed a noncompete; is aware of his or her employer suing a
co-worker over a noncompete; negotiated over his or her initial pay, current pay, or
training level; agrees or strongly agrees that he or she is loyal to his or her employer,
that his or her job is secure, that he or she would become a “boomerang” employee
if he or she ever left, that he or she is satisfied with the job, and that his or her
employer shares all valuable work-related information with him or her, is committed
to upgrading his or her skills, and values creativity. We also imputed whether the
employer has a reputation for threatening employees over their noncompete, and
whether in the last year or (separately) in the last two years, the respondent received
a merit raise, a raise due to an outside offer, a promotion, an offer from a competitor,
an offer from a noncompetitor, formal firm-sponsored training, informal firmsponsored training, or self-sponsored training; whether the respondent has been
recruited by a competitor or noncompetitor throughout his or her tenure, has
received an offer from a competitor or noncompetitor throughout his or her tenure;
feels like the noncompete limits his or her job options (both before and after an
information experiment). While the prior list of variables are all binary, we also
imputed the following continuous variables: the likelihood a respondent believes
that his or her firm would sue him or her over a noncompete or that a state court
would enforce it (both before and after the information experiment); respondent
search effort directed toward competitors or noncompetitors; the proportion of the
occupation that is present in respondent’s industry; the number of establishments
and employment in respondent’s county and industry; the number of positions
respondent has held with his or her employer; the probabilities that respondent
leaves for a competitor or noncompetitor in the next year and that respondent
receives an offer from a competitor or noncompetitor in the next year; the number of
hours worked per week; weeks worked per year; income; and raking weights.
323. These variables include an indicator for the respondent claiming he or
she will never move, a third-degree polynomial in the log of the competitor-specific
reservation wage, a third-degree polynomial in tenure, a third-degree polynomial in
experience, a third-degree polynomial in age, indicators for job status (unemployed,
employed, multiple jobs), education, how the respondent is paid, having signed a
non-disclosure, non-solicitation, non-poaching, arbitration, IP pre-assignment
contract, whether the respondent reports having heard of noncompetes, whether the
respondent expects to work more than 10 years at his or her employer, gender,
industry, occupation, multi-unit firm, multi-state firm, categories for establishment
size, firm size, the type of sensitive information the respondent possesses, whether
the noncompete is a factor in moving or starting a firm, whether the respondent
reports receiving an offer, whether the respondent reports that he or she took the
survey because of a noncompete, whether the respondent searched for another job in
the last year by contacting other employers or sending out applications. We also
included continuous controls for respondent self-reported motivation (including
desires for internal and industry advancement, desire for money, dedication to
employer, desire to master skills, and desire to have an impact on the world) and
controls for self-reported measures of effort, performance, and creativity. Finally,
we included a third-degree polynomial in noncompete enforceability (see infra Part
III for a discussion of this data) from Starr (2015) fully interacted with an indicator
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binary variables, and predictive mean matching to impute continuous
variables. The latter procedure involves creating a predicted value
for non-missing values from a regression of the missing variable on a
set of covariates, and then picking randomly among a set of nearest
neighbors.324 By selecting randomly among nearest neighbors, we
ensured that the predicted variables maintain consistent and plausible
characteristics (e.g., income cannot be less than zero).325
The Stata Manual provides a simple exposition of how multiple
imputation works:
Multiple imputation (MI) is a flexible, simulation-based statistical
technique for handling missing data. Multiple imputation consists of three
steps:
1. Imputation step. M imputations (completed datasets) are generated
under some chosen imputation model.
2. Completed-data analysis (estimation) step. The desired analysis is
performed separately on each imputation m = 1, . . . , M. This is called
completed-data analysis and is the primary analysis to be performed
once missing data have been imputed.
3. Pooling step. The results obtained from M completed-data analyses
are combined into a single multiple-imputation result. The completeddata analysis step and the pooling step can be combined and thought
of generally as the analysis step.326

The imputation step itself involves three steps: First, we fit a
regression model with the observed data, predicting a variable we
would like to impute. Second, we simulate new coefficients based on
the joint posterior distribution of the coefficient estimates and
standard deviations. Third, we apply these simulated coefficient
estimates to the observed covariates to impute the missing values.
We repeated this process 25 times to generate 25 fully imputed
datasets.327 Each variable that we predicted, along with the
percentage of missing values and descriptive statistics for the nonmissing values, is shown in Table 18.
for being in the information experiment treatment group and measures of the
importance of being sued or having a noncompete enforced in determining whether
the respondent would move.
324. See STATA, supra note 322, at 241-46. The Stata manual cites a source
that recommends at least 10 nearest neighbors, and potentially more with larger
sample sizes. Id. at 243. We chose to use 15 nearest neighbors, but supplementary
analysis confirmed that choosing 10 as opposed to 15 does not change the results.
325. We allowed for the imputed value to be selected from among a set of
the 15 nearest neighbors. See STATA, supra note 322, at 241-46.
326. Id. at 3.
327. See id. at 245-46.
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Table 18
CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPUTED VARIABLES
Variable Description
Negotiated initial pay
Negotiated current pay
Employer has a reputation for taking actions to prevent
employees from violating their noncompetes or other
agreements
Currently signed noncompete
Ever signed noncompete
Aware of an instance when employer sued departing
coworker over noncompete
Negotiated over training
Percent of total employment in industry made up by
respondentʼs occupation
Total employment in respondentʼs occupation in
respondentʼs industry
Deferred compensation
Recruited in last year to join competitor
Raking weights
Annual compensation
After experiment, respondent would negotiate
Received merit based raise within last year
Received raise as a result of outside offer in last year
Received promotion in last year
Received an offer from a noncompetitor in last year
Received an offer from a competitor in last year
Received firm-sponsored formal training in last year
Received firm-sponsored informal training in last year
Received self-sponsored training in last year
Received merit based raise in last two years
Received raise as a result of outside offer in last two years
Received promotion in last two years
Received an offer from a noncompetitor in last two years
Received an offer from a competitor in last two years
Received firm-sponsored formal training in last two years
Received firm-sponsored informal training in last two years
Received self-sponsored training in last two years
Probability of leaving for a competitor in next year
Probability of leaving for a noncompetitor in next year
Probability of receiving an offer from a noncompetitor
in next year
Probability of receiving an offer from a competitor
in next year
Recruited in last year to join noncompetitor
Agree or strongly agree that respondentʼs job is secure
Agree or strongly agree that respondent is loyal to employer
Agree or strongly agree that respondent is satisfied with job
Agree or strongly agree that employer shares all
work-relevant information with respondent
Agree or strongly agree that employer is committed to
upgrading respondentʼs skills
Agree or strongly agree that employer values creativity
Agree or strongly agree that respondent would boomerang
back to employer if ever left employment

Number of
Missing
Observations
7,374
7,374

Mean of
Nonmissing
Observations
0.31
0.31

Std. Dev. of
Nonmissing
Observations
0.46
0.46

6,261

0.20

0.40

3,414
3,105

0.22
0.43

0.41
0.50

2,851

0.08

0.28

2,764

0.07

0.25

1,433

0.28

0.30

1,433

91,612.95

153,168.60

1,316
1,315
1,279
1,270
1,202
962
962
962
962
962
962
962
962
962
962
962
962
962
962
962
962
962
962

0.13
0.23
1.00
50,680.44
0.74
0.50
0.09
0.17
0.12
0.11
0.33
0.47
0.10
0.59
0.12
0.25
0.15
0.14
0.40
0.54
0.12
13.15
19.72

0.34
0.42
1.30
41,436.23
0.44
0.50
0.29
0.37
0.32
0.31
0.47
0.50
0.30
0.49
0.32
0.43
0.36
0.35
0.49
0.50
0.33
21.97
28.41

962

22.17

30.36

962

18.82

27.19

933
782
782
782

0.28
0.78
0.81
0.68

0.45
0.42
0.39
0.47

782

0.56

0.50

782

0.54

0.50

782

0.61

0.49

782

0.67

0.47

Note: This table shows all of the variables that are imputed, how frequently they are missing, and the mean and
standard deviation of the nonmissing observations. The final sample size is 11,505.
sssasaasasasasasasasas

One can observe the impact of replacing suspect values of the
income variable by comparing the distribution of Sample 1’s income
variable to Sample 4’s distribution in Figure 2. The tails of Sample
1’s distribution are much longer on both ends. This occurs because
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Table 18 (continued)
CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPUTED VARIABLES
Number of
Missing
Observations

Variable Description
Search effort (0–10) directed towards noncompetitor in last year
Search effort (0–10) directed towards competitor in last year
Stock options at current employment
Unionized at current employment
Retirement plan at current employment
Number of positions respondent has had within employer
Number of weeks worked per year
After experiment, believes noncompete limits options
Before experiment, believes noncompete limits options
Received job offer from a competitor while employed with
current employer
Received job offer from a noncompetitor while employed
with current employer
Before experiment, probability firm will sue over noncompete
After experiment, probability firm will sue over noncompete
Before experiment, probability court will enforce noncompete
After experiment, probability court will enforce noncompete
Hours respondent works per week
Number of establishments in respondentʼs county and
industry in 2014
Number of employees in respondentʼs county and
industry in 2014

Mean of
Nonmissing
Observations

Std. Dev. of
Nonmissing
Observations

782
782
551
374
265
218
203
198
198

3.33
2.73
0.20
0.07
0.61
1.65
48.41
0.60
0.57

3.29
3.05
0.40
0.25
0.49
1.22
6.77
0.49
0.49

78

0.22

0.41

77

0.26

0.44

55
55
55
55
20

39.51
37.93
43.35
42.32
38.95

35.52
34.67
36.69
36.38
11.16

16

2,329.73

4,230.92

16

39,389.48

66,184.81

Note: This table shows all of the variables that are imputed, how frequently they are missing, and the mean and
standard deviation of the nonmissing observations. The final sample size is 11,505.
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there are respondents who report unreliable zeros and extremely
large (and highly improbable) numbers. Replacement and imputation
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redistributes the mass of these observations to the central part of the
distribution in Sample 4.328 In the end, deciding how best to identify
and treat missing values and idiosyncratic errors requires careful
thinking about the raw quality of the data, the research question, the
source of item nonresponse,329 and the costs and benefits of various
imputation methods.330 No easy recipe exists, unfortunately.331
G. Re-Weighting
After we implemented the imputation procedure above, we
finalized the dataset by re-weighting it using iterative proportional
fitting (raking).332 With the dataset comprising 25 separately imputed
datasets, we used raking to create weights for each observation so
that each dataset would be nationally representative with respect to
our demographic variables of interest. After this procedure, we were
left with a clean and weighted dataset ready for analysis.
III. NONCOMPETE INCIDENCE AND ENFORCEMENT
After demonstrating the need for individual employee-level
data in Part I and laying out our survey approach and data methods in
Part II, we have accomplished the bulk of what we set out to do in
this Article. We are confident that the 2014 Noncompete Survey data
328. As a result of the implausibility of some of the respondent-reported
income numbers and the propensity for typos in this domain, we believe that the
cleaned income measure is a better choice for any analysis involving income levels.
We include our constructed income measure in every sample except for Sample 1.
329. We note that in some circumstances investigation can mitigate such
concerns. For example, we were able to identify the source of item nonresponse for
weeks worked, hours worked, and number of positions: every respondent with
missing values for these variables took our initial pilot version of the survey. Item
nonresponse was therefore due only to selection on being the first to take the survey,
which we believe is unlikely to be correlated with unobservables.
330. See generally RODERICK J.A. LITTLE & DONALD B. RUBIN, STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS WITH MISSING DATA (2d ed. 2002).
331. Overall, for purposes of this Article, we take an agnostic approach in
which we let the data speak for themselves, but our preferred sample for most
analyses is Sample 4 because of the plausible way in which it accounts for most
types of idiosyncratic error. Moreover, given the easy availability of other samples
constructed using alternative assumptions, we are able to evaluate the robustness of
our research to this choice in most situations. Indeed, we employed Sample 4 data in
our analysis below in Part III, and yet we found the same basic conclusion when we
attempted the same analysis on Samples 1, 2, and 3.
332. We must perform this step because the previous weighting step
generated weights only for the observations with non-missing data.
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will supply the starting block in the years ahead for many important
strides in our understanding of the role that noncompetes play in the
U.S. labor market.333 Furthermore, we hope that this work—and the
work of other researchers, using our survey data as well as other
sources—will better inform the increasingly important policy debates
over the regulation of noncompetes, keeping them rooted in evidence
whenever possible and promoting an acknowledgment of ignorance
whenever not.334 In this Part, we aim to highlight the potential value
of our survey data by examining a single hypothesis.335 Specifically,
we test whether noncompetition agreements are more common—as
one would naturally expect—in jurisdictions where such agreements
are supposedly more enforceable than in jurisdictions where they are
rarely enforceable or unenforceable.
In order to assess whether noncompete incidence—essentially,
the regularity of noncompete use—is correlated with a jurisdiction’s
(in this case, a state’s) noncompete enforcement regime, we must be
able to gauge the relative frequency of noncompetition agreements
by state. Our survey data contains information on the residence and
employment location of each respondent,336 and we can use the
bounding approach or multiple imputation to estimate whether a
respondent is currently restricted by a noncompete.337 The remaining
required input is some measure of noncompete enforcement intensity
(or enforceability) by state. Our survey did not assemble information
333. See, e.g., Evan Starr, The Use and Impacts of Covenants Not to
Compete (Kauffman Foundation Proposal, Sept. 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with authors) (seeking support for many future and ongoing research projects
making use of the survey data).
334. See, e.g., Lydia DePillis, The Rise of the Non-Compete Agreement, from
Tech Workers to Sandwich Makers, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/21/the-rise-of-the-non-compete-agreementfrom-tech-workers-to-sandwich-makers
[https://perma.cc/RVV5-GAN3];
Patrick
Thibodeau, As Noncompete Agreement Use Expands, Backlash Grows,
COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 5, 2016, 1:12 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/
3030641/it-careers/as-noncompete-agreement-use-expands-backlash-grows.html
[https://perma.cc/HX72-XEMJ]; Russell Beck, Noncompete Studies Suggest Noncompete
Enforcement Improves Training and Quality of Startups, FAIR COMPETITION L. (Feb. 22,
2015),
http://faircompetitionlaw.com/2015/02/22/noncompete-studies-suggestnoncompete-enforcement-improves-training-and-quality-of-startups [https://perma.cc/
2VJ4-DMZY].
335. Our presentation here summarizes and elaborates on analysis we
initially reported in a working paper. See Evan Starr, Norman Bishara, & J.J.
Prescott, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force (SSRN Working Paper),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2625714 (May 10, 2016).
336. See supra Section II.D.
337. See supra Section II.D.
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on this dimension of the noncompete system. Fortunately, as we note
in Part I, most existing empirical research on this topic invokes legal
enforcement metrics to draw conclusions about the consequences of
noncompetes.338 We therefore borrow from this literature, exploiting
a recently developed enforcement measure that builds on Bishara’s
multi-dimensional measure of state enforcement intensity.339
Measuring the “strength” of a noncompete legal enforcement
regime is challenging: Relevant doctrines are ancient, multifaceted,
and heterogeneous.340 Enforcement—or enforceability—is governed
by both statute and precedential case law,341 and interjurisdictional
issues are complex.342 Still, it is possible to summarize the key
dimensions along which legal variation is most significant.
A few states such as California and North Dakota do not
enforce noncompetes at all.343 Most states will enforce one, but only
if the agreement is “reasonable.”344 All states are in accord that there
must be some “protectable interest” at issue, such as a trade secret,
confidential information, or a client list, but states differ with respect
to what those interests must be.345 Florida and Kentucky, for instance,
include general skills training.346 Some states, but not others, will
only enforce a noncompete against someone who voluntarily quits.347
338. See infra discussion surrounding notes 352-57 (discussing different
measures of enforcement intensity used by various scholars).
339. See Starr, supra note 31, at 7-8 (relying on Bishara, supra note 75, at
772-79).
340. Blake, supra note 7, at 645-46 (finding that by the end of the nineteenth
century, courts had “accepted the method of decision on which modern refinements
were to develop,” but that the “restraint-of-trade doctrine is not unitary”).
341. There were approximately 1,000 reported noncompete decisions in 2014.
Russell Beck, Trade Secret and Noncompete Survey—National Case Graph 2015, FAIR
COMPETITION L. (Jan. 17, 2015), http://faircompetitionlaw.com/2015/01/17/trade-secretand-noncompete-survey-national-case-graph-2015/ [https://perma.cc/ M5RM-LF9D].
342. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 27, at 1418-24 (discussing the complex
problems of interjurisdictional competition in the context of determining which legal
regime should govern noncompetes).
343. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 4; Bishara, supra note 75, at 757,
767, 778.
344. See Anenson, supra note 38, at 17 (stating that the “English rule of
reason,” which focuses on a reliability analysis, “remains the doctrinal scheme in the
majority of states” in the United States).
345. Bishara, supra note 75, at 773.
346. See Lester, supra note 85, at 58 nn.40 & 44; Brandon S. Long, Note,
Protecting Employer Investment in Training: Noncompetes vs. Repayment
Agreements, 54 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1310, 1312 n.95 (2005).
347. See, e.g., SIFCO Indus., Inc. v. Advanced Plating Techs., Inc., 867 F.
Supp. 155, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“New York courts will not enforce a non-
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Certain states will rewrite an “unreasonably” broad noncompete,348
while others will simply refuse to enforce it (like Wisconsin).349
Colorado courts will not enforce a noncompete against anyone who
is not in upper management.350 States also differ in the procedure and
consideration necessary for enforcement. Oregon requires that firms
notify employees of any noncompete two weeks before they begin
their employment, and if they do not, the firm must offer additional
consideration for the modification.351
Malsberger and his colleagues began collecting and organizing
these dimensions by state years ago, making them available in a
survey volume.352 Over the last 15 years, a number of scholars have
sought to translate Malsberger’s qualitative work into a quantitative
measure that captures something akin to “enforcement intensity.” In
2003, Stuart and Sorenson created a single indicator variable—either
zero or one—to measure enforceability.353 Garmaise aggregated 12
dimensions of enforceability (scoring each as a zero or a one) into a
single numerical index in 2009.354 In 2011, Bishara assembled two
indices—one for 1991, one for 2009—using seven dimensions.
These indices assign states a score between one and 10 on each
dimension, and then aggregate these dimensional scores using

competition provision in an employment agreement where the former employee was
involuntarily terminated.”).
348. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(c) (West 2015) (“If a contractually
specified restraint is overbroad, overlong, or otherwise not reasonably necessary to
protect the legitimate business interest or interests, a court shall modify the restraint
and grant only the relief reasonably necessary to protect such interest or interests.”).
349. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 2015) (“Any covenant, described in this
subsection, imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable even as
to any part of the covenant or performance that would be a reasonable restraint.”).
350. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 2015) (“Any covenant not to
compete which restricts the right of any person to receive compensation for
performance of skilled or unskilled labor . . . shall be void, but this subsection . . .
shall not apply to . . . executive [management] and management personnel.”).
351. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295(1) (West 2015) (“A noncompetition
agreement entered into between an employer and employee is voidable and may not
be enforced by a court of this state unless . . . [t]he employer informs the employee
in a written employment offer received by the employee at least two weeks before
the first day of the employee’s employment . . . .”).
352. See BRIAN M. MALSBERGER ET AL., COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (2015).
353. Stuart & Sorenson, supra note 4, at 190.
354. Garmaise, supra note 8, at 388-90. To be precise, every of the 12
dimensions is measured as either a zero or a one, and the score for a state is the sum
of all 12 of these dimensional measures. Id.
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weights selected to capture each dimension’s relative importance.355
In this Article, we rely on Starr’s 2015 enforceability indices. Starr
builds on Bishara’s measure by replacing its subjective dimensional
weights with weights calculated using confirmatory factor analysis.356
Figure 3 reproduces Starr’s indices.357
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Figure 3
STARR (2015) FACTOR ANALYSIS ENFORCEABILITY INDICES

State
1991

2009

We conducted our analysis by comparing incidence in states
with low levels of enforceability to incidence in states with high
levels of enforceability. We proceeded in the following way: First,
we divided states into six groups based on Starr’s “enforceability”
coding for the year 2009. North Dakota and California occupy one
end of the spectrum because these states largely refuse to enforce
employment noncompetes. We divided the remaining states into five
quantiles of enforcement intensity, with states like Florida, which
freely enforces noncompetes under its statutory and case law,358 at
the other end of the enforceability spectrum. These quintiles do not,
355. Bishara, supra note 75, at 772-79.
356. See Starr, supra note 31, at 7-8.
357. See id. at 9 fig.1. Our Figure 3 shows the index for both 1991 and 2009
to illustrate how the index has changed over time. In our analysis, we use only the
2009 enforceability index.
358. It is understandably very difficult to know the strength of enforcement
in a particular state solely using legal indices like Malsberger’s compendium. These
concerns are treated in other papers, and we do not revisit them here. See Bishara,
supra note 75, at 762-67.
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however, contain the same number of states, although our measure of
enforceability is relatively smooth. In any event, we do not survey
the same number of people in each state, which results in variation in
the precision of our incidence estimates across these quintiles.359
Second, for each of these quintiles, we used our multiple imputation
method to estimate the percentage of employees in each quintile who
are currently subject to a noncompete.360 We also used our bounding
method as a robustness check—we calculated the maximum and
minimum percentages of employees with an existing noncompete,
assuming both extreme cases for the “maybe” respondents. We also
calculated 95% confidence intervals for all of these quantities.361 We
report our findings in Figure 4.
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Figure 4
NONCOMPETE INCIDENCE AND ENFORCEABILITY

Nonenforceability
(CA & ND)

1st Quintile

2nd Quintile

3rd Quintile

4th Quintile

5th Quintile
(Maximal Enforceability)

Noncompete Enforceability Level
(Nonenforceability + Enforceability Quintiles Among Enforcing States)
Upper-Lower Bounds of Incidence

95% CI of Upper-Lower Bound Estimates

Multiple Imputation Incidence Estimate

95% CI of Multiple Imputation Estimate

Overall Multiple Imputation Incidence

Note: The upper and lower bounds of incidence assume that those who do not know whether they have signed
a noncompete did and did not sign, respectively. The noncompete enforceability measure from Starr (2015) is
used to divide states into nonenforcing states and quintiles of enforcing states. CI stands for confidence
interval.

While our work is preliminary, to our eyes, the pattern that
emerges is relatively stark and ratifies our reasons for conducting the
359. See supra Section I.B.
360. In other words, we used all of the data we had at hand. For our multiple
imputation estimates, we included in the tabulations those respondents who answer
“yes,” those who answer “no,” as well as those who answer “maybe.” We used the
imputation methodology we detail in supra Section II.F to sort each “maybe” into
the “yes” or “no” bins.
361. We clustered the standard errors at the state level.
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survey in the first place. According to prior research, considerable
variation in the enforceability of noncompetes across states exists,
and yet the incidence of these contracts does not appear to vary
across diverse enforcement regimes. On average, across all quintiles,
about 18% of labor force participants are bound by noncompetition
agreements. There are some differences across quintiles, but these
differences are not statistically significant, and the estimates do not
change in the order one expects. Non-enforcing states like California
and North Dakota, for instance, have an estimated noncompete
incidence of approximately 19.3%, which is actually higher than the
corresponding level for every enforceability quintile (the highest
enforcing quintile has an incidence of 19.0%).
Importantly, if we consider other observable information about
respondents—such as age, occupation, and industry—in a regression
framework, the substance of the resulting pattern does not change.362
Controlling for a host of employee- and firm-level characteristics,363
we find that noncompetes are 2.5 percentage points more common in
the most enforcing quintile than in California and North Dakota (the
least enforcing states). But the magnitude of this difference is small,
and it cannot be statistically distinguished from zero.364
We note that there are implicit assumptions in our approach, as
there are in all empirical exercises.365 We present the bounds (which
show a similar “flat” pattern) in case there is concern or confusion
over our use of multiple imputation methods. Because the “maybes”

362. These results are available from the authors upon request.
363. In particular, we included controls for occupation by industry fixed
effects, protectable interests (e.g., access to confidential information), the size and
structure of the employer, the employee’s education, the hours worked per week, the
weeks worked per year, an interaction between hours and weeks worked, and a third
degree polynomial in age. Thus, the possibility that we might, by random chance,
have surveyed different types of employees in different states in a particular
confounding pattern seems unlikely to explain our findings.
364. In fact, the states where noncompetes are most enforceable do not have
statistically different incidence rates when compared to non-enforcing states. When
incidence is linearly regressed on the enforceability index and other covariates, we
estimate a positive, but small and at best marginally significant coefficient (pvalue = 0.078). Even if we ignore the evidence of a nonlinear relationship in the
data, any relationship between enforceability and incidence appears to be very weak.
365. See generally supra Part II. Importantly, aside from the decisions we
made in assembling the data, the empirical approach itself will necessarily rely on
assumptions about the data. For some assumptions that are typically seen in this type
of data analysis, see Bishara, supra note 75, at 762-67.
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make up a relatively large percentage of respondent answers,366 if the
respondents who answered “maybe” were more likely to have signed
in high enforcement states relative to low enforcement states, Figure
4 would be misleading. But the story that generates this possibility,
without also increasing the total number of “yes” answers is hard for
us to conjure. Even if there were a satisfying explanation, the data
nevertheless tell the story that any relationship between noncompete
incidence and enforceability is likely to be relatively weak.
Policymakers interested in the effects of noncompetes might
easily start with the assumption that employers and employees care
about noncompete enforceability or enforcement intensity—i.e., that
both parties would consider the enforceability of a noncompete
agreement when deciding whether to require or acquiesce to one.
Admittedly, it might not be all that remarkable that employee
behavior does not vary much by legal regime. Employees seem much
less likely to be aware of governing noncompete law, and may
believe that all contractual language is enforceable.367 Still, it is likely
to come as more of a shock that employer behavior appears, at first
blush, to be invariant to noncompete enforceability.
One possible interpretation—which we only suggest here—is
that actual enforceability may be unimportant to parties; instead,
perceived enforceability on the part of employees is what is critical,
and the actual content of the law may have little relationship to what
employees perceive.368 Indeed, employers may misinform employees
simply by asking them to sign a noncompete, which is something
they may be more likely to do whenever there is a chance that an
employee might view it as binding, or perhaps even a chance that the
366. We agree with those who find this pattern in the data interesting in its
own right. Cognitive limits—like mental fatigue and imperfect memory—may be an
important consideration in designing optimal approaches for enforcement. See
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in
Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1511 (1998). See
generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 214-16 (1995).
367. See Kim, supra note 83, at 116-17 (“[I]nformation failures [are] likely
to render employees unable to bargain meaningfully . . . . [E]mployer and employee
rarely negotiate individual employment contracts in a formal sense.”); Rudy, supra
note 303, at 326 (finding “that employees in Nebraska and Virginia do not
understand the legal rules that govern their employment relationships”).
368. If this theory has some explanatory power, it creates a significant hurdle
for existing empirical scholarship, which has relied on measures of enforceability to
determine the consequences of noncompetition agreements. See supra Section I.A
for a discussion of articles in this category; see also Bishara & Starr, supra note 58,
at 520-30 (describing and critiquing these studies).
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employee will subsequently view it as a promise or other expressive
device that will likely improve the relationship.
In sum, our findings are at least somewhat at odds with the
dominant belief that a state’s noncompete enforcement policy will
influence the scale of a state’s noncompete contracting activity.
Furthermore, because our findings suggest that the status quo legal
regime in a state may not matter on the ground (at least in terms of
incidence levels), policymakers should be wary of presuming that
black-letter-law reform can be a useful tool to change employer
practices.369 The fact that the frequency of noncompetes in a state
appears unrelated to the governing legal regime does not necessarily
imply there is also no relationship between noncompete law and
employee behavior and outcomes.370 Even so, our finding does raise
the specter that, at some basic level, reflexively curtailing or banning
noncompetition agreements in something like the California mold
may accomplish much less than many scholars, commentators, and
policymakers currently imagine.
CONCLUSION
The impetus for engaging in this large-scale data-collection
project has always been to develop a much fuller and more credible
understanding of the use of restrictive covenants in the United States.
Many important and vigorous discussions are underway about the
propriety of noncompetes in employment contracts, yet we know
remarkably little about these contractual devices as they operate in
the real world. Until now, researchers have had no way of knowing
how common noncompetes are, if and how they are negotiated, or
whether employees understand their content or legal enforceability.
We surveyed over 11,500 labor force participants to provide a
representative picture of how employees understand and experience
noncompetes and to construct a data resource capable of supplying
reliable evidence on critical policy questions.
369. However, we ought to stress that certainly some noncompete reforms—
for example, mandated employer practices such as Oregon’s notice requirement, see
Rassas, supra note 103, at 460—can influence how and when employers request
noncompetes. In addition, the fact that noncompete enforceability does not seem to
matter to incidence levels hints that policies aimed at educating employees about the
content of noncompete law, and ensuring greater understanding of the practical
implications of contracting arrangements, is worth exploring.
370. In other words, even if the law does not affect how many noncompete
contracts are made, it may still be the case that behavior under these contracts—e.g.,
mobility—differs depending on the governing legal framework.
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In this Article, we describe the content and implementation of
our survey and the cleaning and refining of the data. We do this not
only to lay the groundwork for our future research in this area, but
also to provide a model for researchers whose fields might benefit
from surveying individuals.371 Assessing the potential consequences
from legal change requires the ability to observe the world clearly.
When it comes to the law that governs individual behavior and
private interactions, data is all too often sparse or non-existent.
In addition to introducing the survey project, we made a quick
foray into analysis to demonstrate its value. We investigated a simple
empirical question: Is noncompete incidence positively correlated
with state-level enforceability? One might reasonably hypothesize
that unenforceable contracts are likely to be rare (at least if they are
costly to negotiate) and less common whenever enforcement is more
challenging. Yet we find essentially no relationship between formal
noncompete law (which receives virtually all of the policy attention
in this domain) and the level of noncompete activity. Noncompetes
appear to thrive outside of law’s shadow, with employers requiring
them for reasons unrelated to their formal legal effect.
In the future,372 the 2014 Noncompete Survey data and the
research it engenders will furnish a far more accurate picture of
noncompete contracting activity. We will know more about just how
common these contractual devices are. We will gain insight into how
employees comprehend noncompete law and how those beliefs drive
behavior like deciding whether to accept, negotiate over, or leave a
job under possible threat of noncompete enforcement—whether that
constraint is real, imagined, or simply ignored. More generally, we
will understand more about the consequences of noncompetes and
enforcement intensity on employment relationships, innovation, and
entrepreneurship. And perhaps most importantly, along the way, we
will have the tools we need to critically evaluate the assumptions and
recommendations of scholars, the media, and policymakers.
371. Our survey instrument itself, and our experience in developing it, can
also serve as a useful roadmap for conducting interesting studies concerning smaller
slices of the workforce. For instance, one could further break down the labor force
with variables such as geography, job description, and other demographics such as
age, gender, wages, training investments, and the relevant legal regimes.
372. We do not describe in detail our research agenda in this Article. Projects
underway include a careful exploration of noncompete incidence in the U.S., a finegrained investigation into the role noncompetes may play on many different
mobility-related dimensions (e.g., job search behavior and recruitment activity), and
an evaluation of an information experiment to isolate employee assumptions about
noncompete enforceability and how those assumptions influence behavior.

